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PREFACE

1. As NATO special operations continue to evolve, the requirement for additional references to aid the development of the NATO special operations forces (SOF) continues to grow. The primary purpose of the NATO SOF Military Assistance (MA) Handbook is to provide a single reference that reflects the key concepts for NATO special operations MA tasks of train, advise, and mentor/partner when deployed in support of NATO joint operations. The NATO SOF MA Handbook is intended for use by all SOF commanders, staffs, and subordinate leaders from SOF troop-contributing nations (TCNs) for education, training, and deployments.

2. SOF are specially selected to conduct high-risk, high pay-off missions. They are characterized by their speed, agility, precision, and flexibility. Their success at the tactical level requires detailed intelligence, planning, coordination, synchronization, execution, and consequence management. Successfully integrating special operations into multinational operations begins with a thorough understanding of special operations and the ability for SOF to utilize various processes and procedures while fully integrating into the joint force. The NATO SOF MA Handbook describes the fundamental aspects of special operations MA and provides guidance on integrating SOF at the tactical level with operational-level MA tasks and objectives.

3. The NATO SOF MA Handbook is written as tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for use at the SOF tactical through operational and component levels. This handbook incorporates recent changes in special operations doctrine in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-3.5(A)(1), Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, dated 17 Dec 13. The NATO SOF MA Handbook is not a doctrinal publication but directly supports all applicable AJPs and is subordinate to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters (NSHQ), Special Operations Component Command (SOCC) Manual, dated Jun 14.

4. The NATO SOF MA Handbook is designed to assist commanders and staff with resourcing, planning, and employment of MA specific to land, maritime, and air special operations. The handbook focuses on NATO SOF interoperability at the tactical level in an MA environment. It does not attempt to dictate size and resource list of any SOF element conducting MA; rather the focus is on the various MA requirements and capabilities required of NATO SOF units for operational deployment. The NATO SOF MA Handbook is not intended to replace any country’s doctrinal or reference manuals, handbooks, or guidelines; to serve as a standard operating procedure (SOP); or to be considered a mandate or regulation.

5. This handbook provides SOF commanders, staff, and subordinate units concepts for planning and conducting special operations MA in the land, maritime, and air environments. It also encourages the user to apply their intuition, experience, and judgement to complex MA problems. The handbook supports and aids the commander’s decision-making by promoting collaborative planning among the staff and with the other component commands (CCs). The checklists, briefing guides, and examples in this handbook illustrate important concepts; however, they are provided only as a starting point for critical thinking, mission planning, and execution. SOF commanders, staff, and subordinate units must adjust as needed to best meet the SOCC commander's (COM SOCC's) intentions while executing the mission to the best of their ability.

6. Important information is highlighted throughout this handbook. The following icons focus the user’s attention on the crucial pieces of information and best practices.
7. Nations are encouraged to help keep this handbook up to date and as relevant as possible. You may do so by submitting best practices, important notes, and red flags based on sound lessons identified (LI) as a result of national or Allied SOF exercise or operations, through your national NSHQ representatives and ask that they be forwarded to the NSHQ J10 and J11 for consideration and inclusion in this handbook.
CHAPTER 1 – MILITARY ASSISTANCE OVERVIEW

“Your ideal position is when you are present and not noticed”.

- Lieutenant Colonel T.E. Lawrence, 1917

1-1. **General.** MA has been one of the three core tasks for NATO SOF for many years now and yet it still remains one of the most misunderstood aspects of special operations in terms of policy and doctrine. For years now, MA has been planned for and executed in more of an ad hoc fashion based on the dictating operational environment and the lead nation’s involvement. Each NATO SOF nation executes MA in its own way, shape, or form. This handbook, and in particular this chapter, tries to capture and consolidate the common MA themes and factors that are applicable to and should be considered by each NATO SOF nation conducting MA.

1-2. **Special Operations and the Spectrum of Conflict**

a. Special operations may be conducted across the spectrum of conflict (or range of military operations) as part of Article 5 collective defence or non-Article 5 crisis response operations to fulfil NATO’s three essential core tasks (collective defence, crisis management, and cooperative security). Special operations are conducted not only during major combat operations, stability operations, and peace-support operations as part of the NATO crisis response system, but also for peacetime engagement and enhancing mutual cooperation. Special operations missions may include a suitable combination or all of the principal tasks of MA, special reconnaissance (SR), or direct action (DA) depending on the circumstances of each operation. While special operations missions may range from small unilateral actions to large-scale activities of a combined and joint nature, they are tailored to contribute to the accomplishment of the defined political and military/strategic objectives.

b. The handbook has been developed in order to enhance the NATO SOF understanding of the MA mission and the implied subordinate task of security force assistance (SFA).

1-3. **Military Assistance**

a. MA is a broad category of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through organizing training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations. The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces; engagement with local, regional, and national leadership or organizations; and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. SOF conduct MA within their field of expertise. More specifically, MA activities may include:

   (1) **Training.** These are activities that train designated individuals and units in tactical employment, sustainment, and integration of land, air, and maritime skills; provide assistance to designated leaders; and provide training on TTP, thus enabling a nation to develop individual, leader, and organizational skills.

   (2) **Advising.** These are activities that improve the performance of designated actors by providing active participation and expertise to achieve strategic or operational objectives.
(3) **Mentoring/Partnering.** These are activities conducted by small teams of subject matter experts (SMEs) who are tasked to work closely with designated personnel and provide direction and guidance that may concern the conduct of military or security operations.

b. MA is conducted in several of the key SOF activities, such as counterterrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN). However, it is not understood as well in terms of factional liaison. Factional liaison in terms of MA should be thought of in the same terms as DA for “Strike to develop, develop to strike”. For MA, it could be thought of as “Liaise to develop, develop to liaise”.

![Image](image.png)

**Figure 1-1. Special Operations and the Spectrum of Conflict**

1-4. **Military Assistance Truths.** Conducting MA is a complex and nuanced task. There is a natural tendency for SOF advisors (SOFADs) to offer advice and solutions to their host nation (HN) counterparts, but this advice can suffer from a Western perspective, fail to instil local buy-in, and represents a lost opportunity to develop HN problem-solving skills. The alternative is to advise with carefully calibrated questions. Such questions should solicit and capitalize on the goals of the HN SOF outfit, help local officers think through problem sets, weigh pros and cons of various courses of action (COAs), and craft HN-centric solutions. The following MA *truths* have been identified as a result of hard won or lost lessons learned (LL/LI) and best practices. Identified by a number of NATO SOF units conducting MA and SFA in different places around the world, some of the truths include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. **Appreciation.** Appreciate the environment where MA will be conducted. Understand the HN, their national challenges, and cultural issues. Understand their
internal and external threats. Understand personal national restraints and constraints and how far the nation is willing to go down the MA road.

b. **Patience.** MA is not like DA. There is no speed and surprise. There is achievement of *relative superiority*. MA takes time and lots of it. Both sides (HN and supporting NATO SOF elements) need to understand what is required and what is at stake if it fails. Tolerance becomes a key aspect. Not everyone else in the world acts and thinks the same. Finding the right balance between what is desired and what can realistically be expected from the HN will make the MA task all the more successful, or at least workable.

c. **Rapport building.** A strong rapport between the SOFAD and host nation security forces (HNSF) counterpart enhances information sharing, increases the likelihood that advice will be accepted, and reduces coalition force risk. Short tour lengths and limited engagement opportunities make rapport-building difficult, so SOFADs must proactively build relationships with HNSF. Language/cultural sensitivity skills and proximity to HNSF offices can expedite the rapport-building process. Non-transactional relationships are especially crucial and are cultivated through personal conversations and shared meals.

d. **Perseverance.** Determination, willingness, strength of mind. Perseverance has two SOF principles in common: rehearsal and sense of purpose. MA is about trial and error and try again. SOF must identify the end state and build something that will see them through to the end of the tunnel. SOF and their HN partner must have the same end state. Remember the old saying, “You can lead a horse to water, but you can’t force it to drink”. Try and figure out how to make the horse at least take a sip. After a while, hopefully, the horse will drink.

e. **Ownership.** Remember who owns the final product and will have to work with it. The job of MA is to build a capacity to meet an end state identified by the HN. If SOF agree with the end state, then embrace it, but remember at the end of the day, it is theirs and theirs alone. They will be the ones who have to live and work with the final product long after the MA mission is done and SOF have gone home.

f. **Adaptability.** No plan survives first contact. MA will take a number of left and right turns throughout. Progress and moving backwards will be the reality. Most factors can be foreseen and planned for; others cannot. As with any plan, the one built for MA must adjust to the MA environment. Learn to manage expectations.

g. **Continuity.** Effective continuity means new advisors build on previous advisor practices and relationships, avoid *reinventing the wheel*, and understand past successes and failures. Recommendations for enhancing staff continuity include increasing tour lengths for key SOFAD positions; ensuring advance notification for deployments, thus allowing incoming advisors time to prepare and make advance connections; properly organizing and maintaining key advisory files on computer portals; requiring outgoing personnel to create advisory journals; and harnessing experienced advisors who can mentor continuity within the SOF advisory elements.

h. **Conditions Based.** SOF can’t just assign a timeline and expect everything to fall neatly into place. MA is based on the HN’s participation and commitment. Things may move extremely fast, or they may move painfully slow. Success has to be based on conditions and not timelines.
i. **Integration.** SOF advisory elements must ensure proper integration and coordination not only within coalition forces but also for HNSF. Across the advisor force, advisors have found that they often need to *mentor the mentors* in order to avoid advisor fratricide and overcome HNSF logjams. The SOCC should host SOFAD functional key leader engagements (KLEs) for both intelligence and logistics, which help facilitate information sharing and problem solving. To integrate up, SOF advisory elements should be integrated at the ministerial level. These high-level advisors can help dislodge key roadblocks affecting SOF advisors and teams. The ministerial advisors can help the SOCC headquarters (HQ) staff better understand and improve synchronization with key priorities at the various HN ministries involved with national security. Advisors also work to facilitate connections among HN SOF units. At times, SOFADs must force relationships among key, but reluctant, HN partners by arranging meetings and refusing to play the intermediary role. In other cases, SOFADs must leverage their own advisor networks to introduce HN counterparts to key ministries of security players.

j. **Comprehensive Approach.** MA may include non-military organizations and resources. As such, SOF units tasked to conduct MA should become familiar with all potential civilian actors and be in a position to leverage their respective capabilities at the right time and place.

k. **Sustainability.** SOF advisors and teams employ a variety of practices to enhance the sustainability of the units and HQs that they are advising. Appropriate advising practices can facilitate HN decision-making, ownership, and problem-solving skills. They should focus on developing processes within partnered units by fostering forums that help integrate operations and intelligence, or simplify partner unit operations and equipment requirements that purposefully eliminated overly complex and expensive weapons from HNSF’s formations. One challenge that typically confronts SOF advisors and teams is the continued provision of key enablers such as air; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); fires; etc., that can foster dependency and short circuit HNSF partner unit problem-solving.

l. **Pre-mission Training.** SOFADs require substantive training in language and cultural skills, coalition force structure and partner nation governing institutions, command and control (C2), and logistics processes. It is also critical that those appointed to be advisors learn how to advise. The SOCC (or other relevant CCs) may wish to develop a regularly held training event that focuses on MA.

1-5. **Security Force Assistance in the Military Assistance Environment**

a. **SFA** is a unified action to generate, employ, and sustain HNSF in support of a legitimate authority. Military forces conduct SFA to facilitate an HN’s ability to deter, defeat, and defend against transnational and internal threats to stability. SFA developmental tasks are to organize, train, equip, rebuild, and advise.

b. This chapter defines the SFA environment and describes imperatives, tasks, and principles, and how NATO has designed SFA for future missions. All CCs should understand the joint task force commander’s (COM JTF’s) intent and expectations for the SFA mission and its advisory elements and individual advisors. SFA will be a main effort for any NATO mission mandated to assist an HN government establish security and stability within its borders. This makes the advisor capability critical to mission success. Advisors must become familiar with the SFA network and the JTF processes and mechanisms designed to facilitate functionally oriented advising and information flow.
from the executive and strategic (ministerial) levels down to the operating forces (fielded forces) and back up the chain again.

Figure 1-2. Security Force Assistance Principles

1-6. **Security Force Assistance Principles.** Figure 1-2 identifies the SFA principles that should be considered when conducting SFA. The major themes for these principles are:

a. **Mission.** Ensure all involved understand the NATO objectives and end states.

b. **Approach.** Ensure the HNSF is included in all partnering development issues. It is their country, and they will understand the issues and resources required to deal with security situations within their borders.

c. **Mindset.** Be open minded at all times and appreciate the situation that the HNSF are in. Let the HNSF drive the SFA vehicle. SOF’s job is to encourage them to drive it in the right direction.

1-7. **Security Force Assistance Imperatives.** Conducting SFA in an HN requires the JTF to adopt a specific mindset of working by, with, and through the HNSF to support their internal defence and development. It includes working with other regional and international organizations supporting HNSF development. JTF personnel must understand that the HN government’s legitimacy is vital. The population must perceive the HNSF, and HN government in general, as legitimate in order to achieve enduring success. The imperatives of SFA are:

a. **Understand the Operational Environment.** See Chapter 4 on human terrain.

b. **Ensure Unity of Effort.** A clear delineation and understanding of authorities is essential to avoid confusion and to ensure that each entity’s strengths are maximized.
c. **Provide Effective Leadership.** Leaders must be accountable for their actions, masters of their functional area, and must focus on transitions and decisions that move the HNSF toward long-term sustainability.

d. **Build Legitimacy.** Develop HN security infrastructure (HNSI) and HNSF that contribute to the HN government’s recognition and acceptance as legally, morally, and politically legitimate by local nations and the international community.

e. **Manage Information.** Disseminate timely and relevant information, integrate it during planning, and leverage it appropriately during execution. Managing information encompasses collection, analysis, application, and preparation of information.

f. **Sustainability.** The ability to maintain the SFA effort throughout all phases of the operation and the ability of the HNSI and HNSF to sustain their capabilities independently over the long term is essential.

g. **Support Host Nation Government Ownership.** A county’s history, culture, legal framework, and institutions must inform the principles, policies, laws, and structures of the SFA programme in order to secure the continued support of the HN population.

h. **Incorporate Principles of Good Governance and Respect for Human Rights.** Accountability, transparency, public participation, respect for human rights, and legitimacy must be mainstreamed in HNSF development.

i. **Link Security and the Rule of Law.** All security forces must operate within the bounds of domestic and international law to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the HN population.

j. **Foster Transparency.** Encourage open and transparent consultation with other JTF agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international donors, and the media to enhance mission development and mission execution.

k. **Do No Harm.** Posture the HNSI and HNSF so they can sustain themselves. The advisor’s job is to help the HN population identify and implement sustainable and appropriate processes.

1-8. **Security Force Assistance Tasks.** The following tasks are common to SFA mission sets and help SFA planners assess and allocate resources based on conditions.

a. **Organize.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate doctrinal principles, organizational structures, capability constructs, and personnel management.

b. **Train.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate training, leader development, and education at the individual, collective, and staff levels.

c. **Equip.** All activities to design, improve, and integrate materiel and equipment procurement, fielding, accountability, and maintenance through life-cycle management.

d. **Rebuild/Build.** All activities taken to create, improve, and integrate facilities to support the HNSF.

e. **Advise and Assist.** Advise includes all activities to provide subject matter expertise and counsel to the HNSF while carrying out the missions assigned to the unit or
organization. Assist consists of providing the required supporting or sustaining capabilities so the HNSF can meet their objectives.

1-9. **Levels of Security Force Assistance Support.** Refers to the degree of advisor training and assistance provided to the HNSF element.

a. Levels include:

   (1) **Level 1.** Advisors train, advise, and assist their HNSF counterparts on a continual, persistent (daily) basis from either an embedded footprint or in close proximity. Level 1 advising is the most effective approach and provides the best conditions for HNSF development.

   (2) **Level 2.** Advisors train, advise, and assist their HNSF counterparts on a less frequent basis to ensure their continued development. The frequency of this interaction varies based on the proximity to, and capability of, the HNSF counterpart, threat level to advisors, and coalition force resources. Special forces advisor teams that provide Level 2 advising will likely support more than one HNSF unit.

   (3) **Level 3.** JTF provides additional training and advice from a centralized location (e.g. at a regional training centre or regional battle school) or during a battlefield circulation or staff assistance visit while accompanying HNSF commanders and staff sections. Level 3 advising is not limited to special forces or conventional force advisor teams. For instance, JTF HQ staff may coordinate and execute training to improve the planning capability of their counterparts in an HNSF brigade or corps HQ or operation coordination centre – regional.

b. As the JTF and coalition reduces its footprint within the operational environment, advisors at critical nodes within the HNSI (army and police HQs) increase in importance as JTF links to the regions, provinces, states or districts. JTF will maintain situational awareness (SA) of the security and governance progress outside of the HN capital through regional-level operational coordination centres. Operational coordination centres will be a major focus in the employment of advisors. These centres are vital links from the ministerial level to the regions and will require a JTF presence at least through the end of the mission.

c. While Level 1 advising will continue at the HNSF HQs and operational coordination centres, the importance of monitoring key army and police units will not diminish. These key units will require less frequent visits to provide support for continued progress (i.e. Level 2 advising).

d. The close proximity of advisors to counterparts should not prohibit a move from Level 1 to Level 2. It is practicable to reduce the number of visits and contact while living adjacent to counterparts.

1-10. **Functionally Based or Oriented Security Force Assistance**

a. When deployed, the JTF and its CCs will eventually need to shift the emphasis from unit-based, combat advising to functionally based or oriented advising. This functional framework is designed to facilitate a coordinated (HN and coalition) problem-solving effort and sustainable relationships. It is about maturing the processes that will enable HNSF to
be sustainable. If the HN is unable to solve a particular problem, advisors can seek assistance from any other advisors along the functional process—from the lowest tactical level up to the ministry. The advisors should have process maps that will aid them in understanding how the HN processes are designed to work (see Figure 1-3).

b. Integrating ministerial, institutional (national), and fielded forces advisors is central to the functionally oriented framework. Advisors are focused on HQ coordination and sustainability functions to provide HNSF the ability to effectively employ and sustain tactical forces. Linking these HNSF functions to the responsible agencies and elements within the HN security ministries is critical to achieving the level of security required to facilitate and sustain growth and governmental development. This is accomplished using a combination of functional pillars and functional enterprises outlined below.

**Important Note.** International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) developed an SFA framework that shifted the emphasis from unit-based, combat advising to functionally oriented advising. ISAF still performed SFA, but the emphasis shifted. The new functional framework was designed to facilitate a coordinated (Afghan and coalition) problem-solving effort and sustainable relationships. It was about maturing a process that would enable Afghan forces to be sustainable. If the Afghans were unable to solve a particular problem, advisors could seek assistance from any other advisors along the functional process—from the lowest tactical level up to the ministry. The advisors had process maps that would aid them in understanding how the Afghan processes are designed to work. Figure 1-3 provides an example of a process map used by ISAF SOF HQ while conducting SFA with Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) general directorate of police special units (GDPSUs) national and provincial police special units. Process maps like this one should be produced by the JTF and the respective CCs assigned to the various HNSF organizations.
11-11. Security Force Assistance Functional Pillars (Institutional and Fielded Forces). The first key components of a functional SFA framework are the functional pillars for the fielded forces. These five pillars are categories used to describe the generating and operating forces' functions, to focus required resources, to achieve unity of effort, and to facilitate communications and understanding of the goals and objectives the JTF will pursue.

a. **Command and Control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated COM over all assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission.

b. **Leadership.** The ability of the COM and subordinate leaders to demonstrate a mastery of their functional area, provide purpose, direction, and motivation to accomplish all assigned missions while being accountable for their actions.

c. **Combined Arms Integration.** The ability to field and integrate new systems and develop the capability to effectively bring all available forces, assets, and enabling systems to bear.

d. **Training.** The ability to conduct individual and collective mission-focused training, institutional training, and to assess and maintain proficiency on all critical tasks.

e. **Sustainment.** The ability to independently sustain training and operational missions.

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1 ATF stands for Afghan task force; CF stands for counter-narcotics force; CRU stands for crisis response unit; DM stands for deputy minister; ISU stands for investigation and surveillance units; NMU stands for national mission units; PRC stands for provincial response company; SPTC stands for special police training centre; SPTW stands for special police training wing.
1-12. **Human Aspects of the Operational Environment.** Human aspects of the operational environment (HAOE) represents a complex set of elements, factors, processes, interactions, and perceptions in a society affected by medium or major violence that might either influence the operations of military forces or determine the outcome of the conflict. HAOE refers to psychological, cultural, and sociological factors in connection with a historical, political, military, and economic context of crisis situations. They are of the highest relevance in stability and reconstruction operations, COIN, peace keeping/enforcing, and similar MA operations. Key to HAOE is the ability to work with others.

1-13. **Security Force Assistance: Recommendations.** Throughout the discussion of procedures, LLs, and systems utilized by SOF, there are several common threads that SFA can take forward as it develops: unity of effort, whole-of-government approach, civil information, and the embassy country team. Each of these ideas supports the others and builds toward the comprehensive focus that SFA seeks to provide in accomplishing the mission.

   a. **Emphasize Unity of Effort in Security Force Assistance Doctrine and Employment.** Unity of effort begins with the commander on the ground. The building blocks of trust and access build the necessary relationships to develop the linkages between the HN government and institutions, the coalition military forces and government counterparts, and other interested parties. Past SOF experiences in Vietnam and Colombia provide useful examples of the importance of unity of effort. Contemporary examples from Iraq and Afghanistan would serve to illustrate varying degrees of unity of effort. Unity of effort is easier to explain than implement. SFA will involve numerous actors, and unity of effort cannot afford to go unaddressed.

   b. **Integrate a Whole-of-Government or Comprehensive Approach to Security Force Assistance.** Similar to the recommendation describing the need for unity of effort, a comprehensive approach takes unity of effort and synchronizes various actors and their interests into a common direction toward a desired objective. SFA currently focuses
largely on the military’s efforts in conducting missions in an SFA environment. The military aspect of SFA is just one consideration.

c. **Incorporate Civil Information Management.** Although civil information management technologies are relatively new, the practice of civil information management precedes the use of advanced tools. Civil information provides the information to bridge the gap in understanding between the military and the civilian environments. SFA does not currently incorporate civil information management. The practices of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in support of SOF bear significant relevance in improving the capabilities of units conducting missions in an SFA environment. Continued joint testing of civil information management concepts will enable easier integration into SFA, but liaison and sharing of best practices from the CIMIC community is an easy first step in building continuity of information. Civil information management can only improve understanding of the operational environment whether MA, SFA, or any other mission requirement.

d. **Emphasize the Role of the National Embassy Country Team.** The national embassy country team should be considered a relevant SFA organization that provides access to a unique menu of HN capabilities and funding not provided by the military. The strategic links to the missions that national militaries conduct through the various national embassies can provide a vital flow of information pivotal to the success of SFA. NATO national SOF organizations will most certainly use their respective embassy country teams to their advantage prior to any MA/SFA engagements.

1-14. **Recommendations for the Special Operations Component Command**

a. The SOCC should synchronize its HNSF development goals and priorities with those officially promulgated by the ministries and senior HNSF commanders.

b. The continued provision of coalition enablers and assistance to HNSF Afghan elements may hinder and delay HNSF preparation for the day when such enablers are no longer available. As such, the SOCC HQ should increasingly wean coalition enablers that will soon disappear.

c. To improve pre-deployment training for SOF officers and senior non-commissioned officers (NCOs) supporting MA/SFA, the SOCC and its subordinate SOFAD elements should:

(1) Carefully plan personnel policies such that individual augmentees receive more advance notification on impending deployments and that deployment orders clearly articulate pre-deployment training requirements.

(2) NSHQ and individual NATO SOF national commands should augment existing advisor pre-deployment training courses with curriculum on state-of-the-art advising/coaching/influence techniques and augment that training with role-playing exercises that enhance both advising skills and cultural competency.

(3) Host officer professional development seminars and other in-theatre training events that can further professionalize the down-range advisory force.
(4) Introduce an MA and training advisory course used during the Vietnam War, which can help prepare a more professional cadre of advisors and who can serve as a ready reserve of personnel for advisory missions both today and in the future.

1-15. **Summary**

a. Every MA or partnering mission will be different, which means every MA team will be different. The SOF contribution to the SFA effort continues to undergo examination. Gone is the argument of who is better suited to conduct SFA. The bottom line is that SFA requires a team effort combining the strengths of SOF and conventional forces. MA requires NATO SOF to:

(1) **Understand the Operational Environment.** Pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) and find, feel, understand influence, and disrupt (F2UID) will help gain the ground truth necessary before starting the partnering mission. The more time spent getting the PDSS and F2UID right the first time, the less time will be spent dealing with unforeseen issues when the focus should be on the task of partnering.

(2) **Recognize Political Implications.** NATO, the SOF member nation, and the HN will all have different political agendas. Understanding the political restraints and constraints upfront will help avoid situations that could be detrimental to the mission.

(3) **Facilitate Interagency Activities.** This will help force issues of coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization of efforts. It will also set the stage for a sustainable result once NATO SOF have returned home at mission’s end.

(4) **Engage the Threat Discriminately.** Targets should be based on higher-level objectives. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order effects should be determined as best as possible in order to understand the full effect actions will have not only on the threat and its organization but also on the social environment.

(5) **Consider the Long-term Effects.** Short-term gain versus long-term pain. Ensure partnering roles don’t take shortcuts. Develop sustainable and long-term partnering objectives that will allow the HNSF to carry on with its mission long after NATO SOF has left the theatre. If the HNSF is enabled in ways that are not sustainable by themselves after NATO has left, then all the work up to that point will be for naught.

(6) **Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Special Operations.** Don’t say one thing and do another. Part of the partnering plan should include the information operations (Info Ops) required to sell NATO SOFADs to the HN. If the HN has its own rule of law (RoL) then uses that RoL as the foundation for training and the conduct of operations alongside the HNSF.

(7) **Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects.** Partnering is a physically and mentally challenging exercise for any SOF or conventional operator. Each HN will have its own culture and will do things differently that may not be considered normal to the SOF nations’ code of conduct. There will be times when advisors/mentors will question the validity of what they are doing based on their
own beliefs. A PDSS, to include a detailed understanding of the HN cultural nuances, will help in this area.

(8) **Apply Capabilities Indirectly.** Don’t rush to give the HNSF everything thought to be necessary to get the job done, especially when *the dirt hits the fan*. Encourage the HNSF commanders and team leaders to understand the potential or actual plight of their situation and help lead/guide them to making the decision to plan, request, and effectively utilize additional capabilities and enablers. Only then will they learn what to apply, when to apply, and how to apply them.

(9) **Develop Multiple Options.** Develop sound partnering options and pick the one that best meets the needs of the NATO SOF mission, the national SOF mission, and the HN.

(10) **Ensure Long-term Sustainment.** Don’t just focus on the shoot–move–communicate of SFA. Develop any enablers that the HN deems necessary to defeat the internal or external threats long after NATO SOF have left the theatre.

(11) **Provide Sufficient Intelligence.** Provide sufficient intelligence to support the partnering mission but not too much. Making the HNSF dependent on NATO SOF intelligence will not help in the long run. Alongside the training of the HNSF operators, efforts should be made in parallel to develop the required enabling forces, to include ISR.

(12) **Balance Security and Synchronization.** Force protection (FP) will always be an issue for SOF partnering teams deployed and living with the HNSF. When developing the security plan, a balance will have to be found so that the HNSF feels like SOF trust them.

b. While this handbook recommends several practices that can help enhance continuity of MA/SFA operations across individuals and units in place, it is ultimately critical that the SOCC centrally develop and promulgate formal continuity guidelines that ensure compliance of established MA/SFA practices to SOF advisors and teams.
CHAPTER 2 – ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-1. General. When NATO SOF are organizing for MA they are heavily dependent on and driven by the framework provided by NATO’s strategic (political and military) and operational levels, as well as by TCNs, partner nations, and HNs. These actors will negotiate and address their goals, objectives, and interests, including caveats and limitations, during the planning process. Additionally, the environment has become more complex, and therefore challenging, since organizations, public opinion, and perception have gained an influential role in developing approaches for crisis resolution. This sets the stage for SOF to provide capabilities unique to NATO. As shown in Figure 2-1, NATO SOF will engage and interact on all levels from strategic (e.g. Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)) down to tactical (e.g. SOCC, special operations task group (SOTG)). Therefore, a solid environmental understanding is vital during the operational planning and preparation phases to ensure that appropriate capabilities are deployed.

Figure 2-1. Actors and Influencers

2-2. Framework for Military Assistance. Based on the Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), dated 4 Oct 13, NATO will develop the strategic and operational plans to react to and solve an actual or potential crisis. While conducting parallel planning on all levels, planners will identify the possible requirement for MA. For this purpose, there has to be a common understanding of roles and responsibilities within the framework of involved actors and the respective interdependencies and relationships. The extent of these roles and responsibilities are related to the particular situation. Due to the specific capabilities SOF can provide, there are different options for NATO in the way SOF are employed for MA. This may lead to SOF conducting MA unilaterally in the absence of any other military effort in theatre or supporting other ongoing military or civilian assistance efforts. Whatever task is assigned to
SOF, it will affect the extent of how SOF, NSHQ, and SOF TCNs will interact with others, and will tailor and define force and capability requirements.

2-3. **Prerequisites for Exercising Roles and Responsibilities.** Before NATO, with its subordinate commands and entities, and nations can fulfill their roles and responsibilities properly, they need to establish a set of prerequisites and create an overall common understanding. Once these are established, conditions are set for engagement and planning for any type of MA. Some aspects to consider when gaining a common understanding include:

a. MA is an interagency effort.

b. MA requires the application of political primacy, legitimacy, building of comprehensive capacities, sustainability, and flexibility.

c. MA includes reform of HN governmental institutions leading to a coordinated and integrated approach.

d. MA requires a thorough understanding of the political climate, social structure and attitudes, economic conditions, and religious considerations.

e. MA requires NATO and nations to clearly define their respective interests and goals.

f. MA can only succeed via a comprehensive approach.

2-4. **Roles and Responsibilities.** As depicted in Figure 2-1, roles and responsibilities are defined by doctrine and concepts and shaped and adjusted by the environment and involved actors, which is the result of a specific situation and the potential or actual crisis.

**Important Note.** Prior to any SOF commitment, it is primarily NATO’s strategic level that is challenged with multiple engagements and interactions in order to set the condition for a tailored-to-the-situation MA approach.

The actors at the operational level, as well as NATO SOF, will contribute as appropriate or as required. The specific contribution and influence of SOF will be addressed in detail in Chapter 7.

a. **NATO Headquarters**

(1) NATO HQ, with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as the head, is the principal political decision-making body within NATO. It brings together high-level representatives from each member nation to discuss policy or operational questions requiring collective decisions. Therefore, it is the only approval authority for any decision regarding the commitment of NATO resources and for any formal agreement. Additionally, it is the primary authority for political engagement with any actor, including HNs, on a strategic level. Within this role, NATO HQ will ensure the integration of any national interests, objectives, and concerns specifically addressed by NATO nations. Finally, it is the forum where the strategic comprehensive approach is applied. Here NATO interacts and coordinates its activities with actors and entities like the United Nations (UN),
governmental organizations (GOs), NGOs, and international organizations (IOs), as well as affected nations such as the HN. Due to this important role as potential actor and/or mediator, NATO HQ has specific responsibilities that include:

(a) Political engagement and relationship-building with all relevant actors.

(b) Integration of NATO nations’ national interests, objectives, and concerns.

(c) Strategic communications.

(d) Strategic interaction and coordination with partner nations and potential HNs.

(e) Interagency coordination and deconfliction.

(f) Initiation of any strategic planning.

(g) Development of strategic design with a defined end state.

(h) Negotiation of any legal arrangements (like Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) or memorandum of understanding).

(i) Approval of any strategic concept or plan developed by SHAPE.

Figure 2-2. NATO Headquarters Activities
(2) NATO SOF has to be aware that any initiation of or decision for MA is nested within this level of decision-making. Therefore, NATO SOF has to be involved in the process from the beginning to ensure the appropriate reflection and integration of SOF expertise.

**Important Note.** Of specific importance is the awareness of NATO HQ decision-makers that employing SOF as an alternative to large conventional forces on an MA operation may result in an earlier opportunity to achieve the desired strategic or operational effect.

b. **Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe**

(1) As the strategic military HQ, SHAPE’s role is to be the primary entity for strategic military planning and execution of NATO operations, missions, and tasks in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the Alliance. This includes the permanent monitoring of any potential or actual crisis, thus enabling the timely advice to and the sound preparation of any decision taken on the strategic political level. For this purpose, SHAPE has established the Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC), which enables strategic thinking, planning, and acting, both current and future. Once the NAC has agreed on the requirement to commence prudent strategic military planning, SHAPE will start the planning process to produce a strategic plan to solve the potential or actual crisis. As a result, SHAPE has a variety of tasks that include:

(a) Crisis monitoring.

(b) Development of strategic assessments and response options for NATO HQ.

(c) Strategic planning, execution, and revision of NATO operations.

(d) Planning and coordination with HNs on all relevant aspects of strategic planning.

(e) Integration of non-military actors into planning and execution to ensure a comprehensive approach to crisis resolution.

(f) Coordination of partner/multinational support, and the designation and reinforcement of supporting and supported commands.

(g) Provision of strategic military guidance and direction (G&D) to subordinate HQs.

(h) Force generation and deployment coordination of NATO forces.

(i) Execution of strategic C2.

(j) Integration of special operations into planning and execution.

(2) SHAPE is the appropriate level at the initial stage of any activity for crisis resolution.
Important Note. As the strategic-military estimate, produced for approval by the NAC, tailors and defines the strategic framework and approach for the respective NATO operation, it is of utmost importance that NATO SOF are permanently represented in all relevant SHAPE organizations in order to shape the environment accordingly.

Any requirement for MA has to be identified during the strategic-military estimate and mentioned in the respective strategic documents. Everyone has to be aware that the employment of SOF is a political decision and requires NAC consensus. Once decided, it is SHAPE’s task to generate the identified SOF capabilities required for the MA operation. NSHQ has the vital role to facilitate the process by engaging potential SOF TCNs in a timely matter.

c. Joint Headquarters

(1) When designated by SHAPE, the joint headquarters (JHQ) will be responsible for planning, executing, and sustaining the campaign. This includes any approach for MA and reflects the fact that MA is only one element of a multi-agency approach to improve the HN situation and increase required capabilities and capacities. Therefore, it requires a target-oriented selection and integration of actors and entities into the planning process. So one of the main tasks of the JHQ is to merge interests and capabilities of military and non-military organizations as well as state and non-state actors to create unity of effort and to achieve a synergy effect. Derived responsibilities in relation to planning and execution of MA are:

(a) Integration of SOF into the operational framework development.
(b) Identification of limitations and opportunities for MA.
(c) Provision of adequate operational advice with SOF contribution to SHAPE.
(d) Early interaction and integration of HN interests and goals.
(e) Development of a comprehensive approach to MA with appropriate SOF reflection and integration.
(f) Execution of operational C2.
(g) Primary interface for NATO-HN interaction and coordination during execution of the campaign and the inherent MA.
(h) Execution of MA with the appropriate integration and engagement on HN ministry/administrative level.
(i) Identification and application of military and humanitarian or civic action resources.

(2) The operational level is the most critical and, therefore, most important level for SOF engagement for planning and execution of MA. Here SOF have the opportunity and obligation to shape the operational framework by providing
planning input on how to integrate their unique capabilities and limitations. This may either come from a deployed special operations planning and liaison element (SOPLE) of a SOCC to the JHQ or, in the absence of the SOPLE, by the SOFAD of the JHQ. The final option in the initial planning phase is to send a SOPLE from NSHQ in case the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) orders the activation of the NSHQ SOCC Core, which is the temporary SOCC HQ unless a nation provides a fully capable one.

d. **NATO Member Nations**

(1) As NATO has no organic forces, it has to rely on the member nations’ willingness to provide forces and capabilities as identified during the planning process. It is important that early in the process, nations address their intentions and interests together with caveats or limitations for MA missions. It enables NATO to plan on all levels within the feasibility of available forces. This is specifically of relevance for SOF, as they are scarce assets with unique capabilities. Member nation responsibilities are:

   (a) Early articulation of national interests, caveats, and limitations for MA planning purposes.

   (b) Creation of additional legal arrangements or conditions as required.

   (c) Provision of forces, capabilities, and resources for MA.

   (d) Deployment and employment of SOF for MA.

   (e) Sustainment of MA forces and operations.

(2) Due to the sensitivity of any SOF employment, it is critical to have information on any SOF provided by the nations. This will enable adequate planning for SOF MA, both on operational and tactical levels.

e. **Host Nation**

(1) As the HN and the related situation or crisis is the primary reason for any NATO effort, including potential MA, the HN has to fulfil its role to support campaign planning and execution. This implies early engagement and cooperation on all levels. The HN should provide all information as required for planning, as well as available resources during execution. Mission success depends on the full cooperation of the HN on all military and non-military levels. It is the responsibility of the HN to ensure:

   (a) Early engagement with NATO strategic and operational levels.

   (b) Provision of all relevant information concerning the situation and their own capabilities and limitations, leading to sound MA planning and execution.

   (c) Provision of all required resources identified during planning for or execution of MA.
(2) When NATO plans for MA within a comprehensive approach to crisis resolution, NATO SOF will have a critical role. Normally SOF will conduct MA when it supports the achievement of strategic- and/or operational-level effects or when it involves political sensitivity. Therefore, SOF will most likely concentrate their activities on SFA of HN forces with strategic or operational relevance. This will not exclude the need for additional cooperation and coordination with other entities and HN organizations beyond the tactical level. This will be explained in detail in Chapter 7, which will also include the specific requirements of SOF partnering, the planning for SOF MA with the specific challenge of the human terrain of the HN, and the importance to find adequate procedures to handle the sensitive area of intelligence.

**Important Note.** If NATO SOF is to fulfil its role as a tactical asset for strategic and operational effects, then it has to be integrated in every level of planning. This affects all SOF levels to include NSHQ, SOFAD at the JHQ, a designated SOCC, and the available SOF of the TCNs. This will guarantee the appropriate and capability-based integration of SOF for any MA approach.

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**Figure 2-3. NATO Special Operations Forces Network**

**f. NATO Special Operations Headquarters**

(1) NSHQ personnel are designated and trained to man all relevant SOF positions at the strategic level. Since SHAPE is responsible for crisis monitoring,
preparing assessments and options for NATO HQ approval as a part of executing the political military estimate, and the strategic planning and execution of NATO operations based on a NAC-approved option, NSHQ is permanently represented within the CCOMC of SHAPE. NSHQ planners will ensure timely and focused SA, as well as the provision of best-suited and high-quality expertise and advice on all matters pertaining to SOF. By doing this, NSHQ fulfils its role as the primary point of development, coordination, and direction for all NATO SOF-related activities in order to optimize SOF employment. This includes the capability to provide operational C2 capabilities with a SOCC Core when directed by SACEUR. By activating a SOCC Core, NSHQ may be required to support JHQ campaign planning in the initial stages.

(2) For the reasons above, NSHQ has to exercise specific responsibilities when the situation arises for SOF employment, including the option for MA. NSHQ has to ensure:

(a) Permanent engagement and interaction with SHAPE (specifically CCOMC), SOF elements in HQs of the NATO Command Structure (NCS)/NATO Force Structure (NFS), allied and partner SOF nations, and other relevant NATO organizations as required.

(b) Provision of SOF advice and expertise to NATO decision-makers (especially SACEUR) and other elements at the SHAPE and JHQ levels, both for planning and execution.

(c) Provision of a coordinated and feasible SOF approach.

(d) Support, coordination, and synchronization of the NATO SOF force generation process in support of SHAPE.

(e) Promotion of national and combined SOF capabilities.

(f) Provision of training and operational support to deployed SOF.

Important Note. The establishment and sustainment of a SOF network is critical for SOF mission success. It will ensure the timely and high-level information exchange and coordination to enable NSHQ, SOCC, and contributing SOF TCNs to best integrate, plan, and execute SOF MA for the desired strategic or operational effect to complement the overall effort.

g. Special Operations Forces Advisor. The JHQ is responsible for planning and executing the campaign as directed by SHAPE. It ensures a comprehensive approach to the crisis, engages the HN on all matters of planning and execution, and commands and controls its assigned forces. While the detailed planning process, with a specific focus on MA, is explained in Chapter 7, it is required to understand the role and responsibility of the SOFAD within the JHQ, as he is the critical enabler for a SOCC to be integrated into campaign planning and execution. His role as the primary advisor for COM JHQ as a SOF SME provides the SOFAD with permanent access to JHQ decision-makers, in addition to a previously established conventional network within JHQ available for SOF
purposes. In the initial absence of SOCC or NSHQ representation, the SOFAD has the critical function of establishing and maintaining SA, as well as inserting appropriate SOF input during initial planning. Once the SOCC or NSHQ has assigned the respective planning capacity to JHQ, the SOFAD switches into an enabling and supporting role, providing information as required and facilitating access to all relevant actors within the JHQ. Respective responsibilities are:

(1) Establishing and sustaining a network within JHQ.

(2) Maintaining SA from a SOF perspective.

(3) Ensuring information exchange between all NATO SOF entities.

(4) Providing SOF-specific advice and expertise, as required.

(5) Enabling all incoming SOF representation to exercise their responsibilities.

h. **Special Operations Component Command**

(1) The major part of the workload for planning SOF employment within a campaign is nested in a designated SOCC. Its primary role and function is to plan and execute SOF operations on the tactical level. At the same time, it has the critical obligation to shape the operational environment to establish the required conditions for SOF planning and execution based on realistic and available capabilities and capacities. The SOCC, in close coordination with the subordinate forces, provides tactical advice for the JHQ from the outcome of its own assessment. During planning, the SOCC provides all necessary information and products to the JHQ to facilitate concept of operations (CONOPS) and operation plan (OPLAN) development. Additionally, the SOCC and the subordinate SOTGs/special operations air task groups (SOATGs) develop their own plans in line with higher HQs G&D. Tactical-level planning comprises all phases of the process and is conducted in parallel to all other planning entities. Once the SOCC is deployed and conducting MA, additional tasks and responsibilities may arise in relation to HN structures and organizations. Figure 2-4 depicts the SOCC within the operational and tactical network. SOCC responsibilities include:

(a) Support of JHQ operational advice with SOF-specific expertise.

(b) Provision of SOF planning capacity to the JHQ.

(c) Incorporation of subordinate SOF expertise, capabilities, and capacities into planning.

(d) Early liaison and fact-finding with HN, as authorized, to initiate and conduct MA planning in support of campaign planning.

(e) Planning for SOF deployment and employment to conduct MA as part of the operational framework of JHQ.
(f) Execution of MA as part of a JHQ comprehensive approach.

Figure 2-4. The Special Operations Component Command's Role and Responsibilities

(2) At the end, the SOCC is responsible for creating selected, operationally capable HN units within sustainable structures and conditions that NATO SOF can partner with during MA operations. Being successful entails overcoming challenges in the areas of legal arrangements, intelligence, and human terrain, and requires flexibility and patience to set the stage. Therefore, reliable and effective cooperation, relationships, and networks, both with the JHQ and HN, are critical. These challenges have to be incorporated into any SOCC planning approach.

i. Special Operations Task Groups. Regardless of the above, it is the SOTG that has the key role in achieving successful SOF MA operations. Based on assessments, requirements, and specific capabilities, the SOTGs execute the SOF MA campaign plan as developed by the SOCC level during the planning process. The SOTGs prepare for and execute MA via train, assist, and advise with their identified HNSF partner units. The major responsibilities of the SOTGs are:

(a) Support the SOCC planning process with capabilities and expertise.

(b) Planning MA execution based on identified requirements and HNSF partnered units.

(c) Preparation prior to deployment from TG level down to operator level.

(d) Execution of MA to include assessment.
Important Note. Successful pre-deployment training and execution of MA is a challenge for any SOTG and requires a thorough understanding of the human terrain (see Chapter 4), which enables the SOF partnering teams to build rapport, increase capacities and capabilities, and achieve sustainable conditions within the HNSF partner units.

Figure 2-5. Operational Environment

2-5. Summary. Successful planning and execution of MA is a challenging task for NATO SOF. Due to the complex environment with a variety of actors and their different interests, it is critical to interact with all parties from the beginning, to utilize their strengths and take advantage of related opportunities. This requires a parallel and simultaneous, all-level SOF engagement in order to shape the environment and create plans that cover human terrain, intelligence, and targeting and legal requirements (Figure 2-5).
CHAPTER 3 – DEVELOPING HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES

3-1. **General**

a. The essential element of any MA mission for NATO SOF will be the training of HNSF. This is typically called SFA. In some cases, NATO SOF will have to start from scratch; in others NATO SOF will have to transform existing security forces that best meet the needs of the HN and the security situation.

b. The intent of this chapter is to help NATO SOF define and describe the partnering environment, evaluate the forces to be partnered with, and decide on how best to train, assist, advise, and mentor HNSF charged by the HN government to help support stability and provide security for its respective country.

c. SOF must balance the desire to conduct operations using an HN face and actually building up HN capability so that HNSF can do the job themselves. If not, SOF will be drawn into a prolonged partnering arrangement that may become unsustainable.

d. For the purposes of this handbook, the HN force that SOF will develop will be referred to as the HNSF. The HNSF can be a military unit or a police force and includes combat, combat support, combat service support, and their C2, intelligence, logistics, and communications elements.

e. This chapter draws upon some significant LLs from several NATO SOF units and staff deployed in support of the ISAF mission who have spent the better part of the past decade supporting the Afghan’s MOI forces under the GDPSU. It will examine the success and failures that have been made for a slow progression of the Afghan special police units (SPUs) and their higher HQs in the hopes that these lessons can be applied to the next major MA mission for NATO SOF in a generic sense.²

3-2. **Creating a Sustainable Partnering Support Environment.** Far too often, SOF wants to bring in all their high-tech enablers to help support the mission. The West has become a slave to new technology, and this can hurt SOF when trying to plan for and execute MA. The HN will dictate how best to support partnering efforts. If the HN has had access to high-tech enablers, such as ISR unmanned aerial vehicles and intelligence gathering and analysing

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² It also draws upon and expands on several observations made in the RAND Paper, “Best Practices for Special Operations Advisory Groups”, dated Mar 14, as well as the ISAF SFA Guide 2.0, dated 1 Jan 14.
apparatus, then SOF can continue to help them refine those capabilities. However, if SOF are going into an HN with little to no technology, then they must tailor the MA support accordingly. There is no use partnering with the HNSF, teaching them to use the technology, and making them reliant upon it, only to leave, taking everything and leaving them without the enablers they are now used to. Analyst notebook is a good example. While a powerful intelligence tool that helps capture, manage, and display intelligence on threat networks and individuals, if the HN doesn't have the computer architecture to use and maintain it or the information technology (IT) skill set to make it work, then it is going to be useless to them down the road. In this scenario, it would be better to help the HN develop the basic fundamentals of link analysis using whiteboards, pictures, and string, and getting back to the basics of association and event matrices that can be done by hand. The PDSS will help SOF determine how best to create a sustainable partnering support environment and will manage expectations accordingly.

3-3. **Leveraging Existing Host Nation Intelligence Infrastructure.** Building security forces to do the tactical high-risk arrests and DAs is relatively easy; building a new intelligence infrastructure that can collect, analyze, fuse, and disseminate information that will lead to the high-risk arrest and DAs is not so easy and can take a long time. Once again, during the PDSS, examine the HN intelligence infrastructure and come up with a realistic plan on how SOF can best use the existing organizations to get the MA mission moving quickly. During the MA operation, look for ways to make it better, and if time allows, try building something new.

| Best Practice. | Early planning and advanced shaping are key to SOF MA. “The reason why we were able to proceed relatively quickly with our partnering efforts in the beginning was that we started our planning very early and we shaped the environment. We established the relationship with provincial chief of police and the other key players several months in advance of our arrival, so when we arrived we could proceed very quickly.” – Interview with the commanding officer of the 601st Special Operations Group (SOG) CZE during deployment to Nangahar province in Afghanistan 2011. |

3-4. **Creating a Host Nation Interagency Task Force.** The interagency task force concept has been used by several NATO SOF nations in both the international and domestic arenas. Often called a joint interagency task force (JIATF), they are designed to bring together all the different governmental and non-governmental agencies that are required to work together and collaborate against a common threat. Working in isolation will not allow for the level of collaboration required. Creating a JIATF will be an uphill climb for those attempting to bring these organizations together. Typically, many organizations within a nation dealing with security don't trust each other or share information with each other even though they are working toward the same security goals. This is the nature of the security beast, and old habits die hard. SOF need to do as much as possible during the MA mission to help create an interagency sharing structure. Over the past decade, ISAF SOF, while not always successful, were instrumental in breaking down some of the barriers and building stronger relationships between many of the MOI, ministry of defence (MOD), and national directorate of security organizations in the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). During the early days, the ISAF SOF HQ set up the Partnering and Liaison Directorate, after that it was renamed the Partnering Directorate, and finally it was named the Special Operations Advisory group (SOAG). While functioning under several names at different times, the goal for each was the same: help develop the tactical, operational, and strategic/political levels of collaboration and information sharing required to defeat an insurgency that was taking advantage of the lack
of coordination between the ministerial and security organizations within the GiRoA. A typical JIATF should at a minimum include elements from the HN's military, national and local police forces, boarder security forces, intelligence organizations, foreign affairs and internal affairs ministries, and other organizations that play any sort of role in maintaining security. It may also include select NGOs that have experience in a certain area that will bring additional information and added value to a collective effort in solving internal and external problems. Figure 3-2 shows a possible JIATF structure that could be built in almost any nation that SOF finds itself deployed to. The biggest challenge of all in the establishment of a JIATF will be the appointment of a lead organization or agency. Clearly this will be the decision of the HN government; however, SOF should be able to help influence this through effective mentorship and advising in key strategic/political offices.

![JIATF Table](image)

**Figure 3-2. Example of a Possible Joint Interagency Task Force for Military Assistance**

3-5. **Building Rapport.** Rapport is everything. Without it, a partnership between the SOF unit and the indigenous security force will likely fail. Rapport is directly related to the time that the SOF MA mission will last. If the mission is of short duration, 3 to 6 months, building effective rapport will be difficult. Long-term missions like those seen in Afghanistan and Iraq were a very long duration, allowing sufficient time for rapport building. There are several steps that should be observed when trying to build effective rapport between SOF and HNSF.
a. Units that return time and time again to partner with the same HNSF will usually achieve excellent rapport. SOF deploying for short duration missions will have a harder time building rapport. This can be mitigated by thorough pre-deployment training that includes detailed country studies and cultural awareness.

b. All work and no play is counterproductive. Finding time to hang out and not spending all one’s time training will increase rapport. Don’t always have a game face on.

c. Take a genuine interest in their culture and how they live life. Don’t assume that everything SOF believe in is what they believe in. Taking the time to understand their culture before deployment will show an immediate willingness from the get go and will immediately break the ice and build a positive rapport. Learning the basics of their language before deployments and practising with HNSF will also help.

d. Rapport is a command-down driven requirement. It is important and must be emphasized to all subordinates. If possible, the SOF commanders must insist that a close proximity between SOF and HNSF be maintained 24/7. Being present during the day during training but disappearing at night will not build rapport.

e. Empathy leads to understanding; understanding leads to rapport. Empathy can be defined as identification with and understanding of another’s situation, feelings, and motives. Understanding other human beings and their motivations allows for the development of honest relationships and long-term rapport. Many SOF and conventional force advisors and mentors have often described their tours as a 6 to 12 month course in human empathy.

3-6. **Mentorship Networks.** Networking has always been a key to SOF success. SOF’s ability to form deep networks and use each element of the network to its respective strengths has always been an informal SOF ethos. It binds people and guides them when the situation becomes difficult or tenuous. It ensures that SOF elements are never isolated and can readily tap into other resources as required, be they military or non-military, to get the job done. Mentoring networks should always be considered vital ground when planning and executing MA that includes the development of HNSF and HNSI.

3-7. **Partnering Categories.** When conducting MA, the level of partnering and enabling assets provided to the HNSF will typically lead to a specific category. The following is a list of categories that the SOCC and HNSF’s partnered operations will typically fall in.

a. Partnered operations are planned and led by SOTG elements with a minimum partnering force ratio (PFR) of around 30%. The partnering ratio is based on the percentage of HNSF on the task organization for a specific mission. See paragraph 3-21 for more details.
b. Enabled operations are planned and led by the HNSF SPU with an SPU ground force commander. The scheme of manoeuvre (SOM) will be executed by the SPU including their conduct of decisive tasks on the objective. JTF SOTG embedded elements will provide enabling and/or specialist support. HNSF SPU partner ratio should be greater than 50% but may be less for FP reasons.

c. Advised operations are conceived, planned, approved, and exclusively led by the HNSF SPU with limited JTF combat elements on the ground to provide advice and maintain deconfliction with JTF elements. HNSF SPU partner ratio should be greater than 75% but may be less due to FP reasons.

d. HNSF SPU unilateral operations are HNSF SPU planned, led, and conducted with no JTF SOF involvement or participation other than pre- and post-operation assessments.

3-8. Partnering Levels

a. Partnering will span a number of various levels with the HNSF structure to include:

   (1) Political/strategic—typically their ministries charged with security in their HN as well as land, air, or naval component HQs.

   (2) Operational—typically their joint HQs or joint units.

   (3) Tactical—typically their fighting HQs and units, such as corps, divisions, wings, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies/squadrons, platoons/troops, and sections/squads/teams.

b. Various HNSF development-focused organizations will be created by the JTF and its respective CCs in order to provide the required level of training, assistance, and advisement to the HNSF.

c. Teams will be required to work at the tactical level alongside the HNSF military and police units to include their HQs and supporting elements. Additional teams will be required to partner with and mentor the higher tactical- and operational-level HQs and organizations that control the tactical HNSF elements. Finally, mentorship will be required at the highest military and police strategic organizations, as well as the ministerial organizations that provide the political oversight for all their military and policing actions. During the planning phase for the MA, NATO SOF at the SOCC and SOTG levels will need to understand exactly what the current HNSF hierarchy looks like, and from there, determine how best to integrate with it and provide the required partnering and mentorship. There is no real doctrine that dictates how these partnering or mentorship teams should be task organized. Each MA mission will be different. The following is a list of potential HNSF development organizations that could be established and manned from JTF and CC organizations to provide effective training, assistance, advisement, and mentorship at the tactical level, operational HQ level, and ministerial levels.

   (1) **Ministerial Advisory Group.** The ministerial advisory group (MAG) is a partnering organization that can help the HNSF and their respective HN government ministries develop their security force apparatus at the highest levels. Most of these ministries will already exist, so the focus will be more to provide advice and mentorship to existing ministerial elements and help them refine their processes that ultimately provide the political G&D to higher ministry and
respective military, intelligence, and police force strategic HQs. The MAG will typically be comprised of senior NATO officers and civilian staff, as well as non-NATO civilian SMEs.

(2) **Special Operations Advisory Groups.** The SOAGs were designed at the later stages of the ISAF SOF mission in order to support the new RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission. Originally called the Partnering and Liaison Directorate, then just the Partnering Directorate, the new SOAG was designed to tackle the myriad of issues plaguing partnering with GDPSUs and later general command police special units (GCPSUs). The SOAGs provided advice and mentorship within the GDPSU HQ for C2, administration, intelligence, operations, planning, logistics, and communications. While not there to do the job for the GDPSU/GCPSU staff and solve all the problems for them, these mentorship or advisory teams would help guide the GDPSU/GCPSU staff to make their own decisions based on sound planning efforts.

(3) **Special Operations Partnering Teams.** While the term special operations partnering team (SOPT) might be new, the concept is not. In the past, NATO and its SOF allies have called their training teams by various names to include operational mentoring and liaison teams, embedded training teams, etc. The term **SOPT** has been developed as a generic term for a team that can be established and deployed to train, assist, advise, and mentor, as required. The term **partner** is considered the link between a SOF member and his HNSF counterpart(s). To train, assist, advise, and mentor are why they are there to partner. For example, Captain Marcus, an S4 logistics SME from the Greek SOPT, is partnered with Major Watuso, a logistics officer from the HNSF; Captain Marcus will be the advisor. SOTG X from Canada is partnered up with SPU Y from the Congo and will train and assist the SPU for future security operations. Figure 3-3 provides a notional but simple organization that could be partnered with HNSF at the tactical level. It covers all functions of C2, shoot-move-communicate-medicate functions, and sustainment.

| Red Flag. Remember, SOF trainers are still SOF operators—they need to operate. “The first casualty happened much sooner than I had expected. SAS (special air service) soldiers are fighting men; you do not train tigers and expect them to sing like canaries. British Army training teams (BATT) while operating in Oman and Dhofar had to get some SAS soldiers on to the jebel as fighters or morale would have suffered. Besides, BATT needed to learn all they could from the SAS and the only way to do that was to accompany them on operations.” – Jeapes, Major General Tony. SAS: Secret War. Oxford: Harper Collins, 1996: 61-62. |

(a) The focus on the SOPT should seek to establish capable indigenous personnel as primary instructors as soon as possible. This builds:

1/ Rapport
2/ Credibility
3/ Friendships
4/ Capable HN trainers and forces more quickly

(b) Methods of instruction used by the SOPT should be:
1/ Hands-on training
2/ Demonstration
3/ Step-by-step walk through
4/ Practice
5/ Test

(c) Use training to legitimize leaders.
1/ Train leaders and let them lead.
2/ Coach and assist them to train soldiers.
3/ Collaborative learning is best.

3-9. Coordination, Deconfliction, and Synchronization of Partnered and Non-partnered Operations. Figure 3-4 attempts to show the reader just how complex partnering coordination,
deconfliction, and synchronization can be. During the ISAF SOF mission, the level of partnering coordination increased tenfold. A number of training, mentoring, and advising organizations had to be established, and links between all had to be maintained. For the first few years, as the PRCs and GDPSU NMU became more and more capable of conducting partnered or independent operations, the need for a more robust mentorship network was required. The structure was designed in such a way that as the ISAF mission came to a close and the new NATO RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission began, the SOAG was well placed and already established to carry on the mentorship role as Afghanistan transitioned to the lead for their full security. In the end, NATO adopted a SOAG, special operations liaison element (SOLE), and SOPT concept at the three major levels of Afghan national security forces (ANSF) mentorship.

3 Figure 3-4. International Security Assistance Force and Afghan National Security Force Partnering Network

3-10. Operations Coordination Group

a. Another way to provide effective mentorship is through an organization called the operations coordination group (OCG). The OCG could be formed by the SOCC. Respective HN ministries or HQs involved in operations within the HN could provide liaison officers (LOs). The OCG helps facilitate the collaboration required to ensure that all parties concerned within the HNSF are talking to each other on a daily basis and sharing information that is relevant and critical to the success of each other’s operations. Both ISAF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) SOF used the OCG concept to great effect. It provided a mechanism by which NATO and U.S. SOF units would notify the ANSF of upcoming partnered operations. The LOs from the various military, police, and intelligence organizations would then brief their respective higher HQs to ensure that the information was being passed back down to the respective ANSF coordination centre, provincial governors, and chiefs of police before an operation took place. The OCG forced the ANSF units to talk to each other. While painful at times, it was extremely

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3 IJC stands for ISAF joint command; OCCD stands for operations coordination centre district; OCCP stands for operations coordination centre provincial; PAKML stands for Pakistan military; P/DCoP stands for provincial/district chief of police; P/DGov stands for provincial/district governor; SOFFC stands for special operations forces fusion cell.
successful in increasing the level of coordination between police, military, and intelligence units working in the same Afghan battlespaces. More importantly, it was able to reduce the number of blue-on-blue incidents within the ANSF since it was found that in a number of prior incidents, different police or intelligence forces were going after the same targets without any prior coordination. The OCG could be viewed as the first step to creating an effective JIATF organization.

b. At the tactical level, just as much time and effort had to be exhausted to establish a good mentorship network. SOTG commanders had to use their initiative to approach the various GiRoA and ANSF provincial levels of influence. This would mean COM SOTG and his staff had to advise and mentor district and provincial chiefs of police, governors, police unit commanders, judicial officials, prosecutors, etc. For the SOTG to be successful, considerable time and effort had to be invested prior to deployment to understand the social network and who was who in the MA operating environment and from there, come up with a mentorship network strategy that would work based on individual requirements.

**Best Practice.** This icon highlights networking with the ANSF. “Every relationship we built with the ANSF was meant to bring them together (the Afghan unity of effort was sometimes difficult to coordinate due to the fact that there are many different tribes, landlords, sects, and multiple other factors). The idea was to network these groups together, not just us with them, really. Many times we had to start bilateral *us and them* activities. This idea then transformed into them (the ANSF) working with their entities to slowly bring them together in order to achieve the objectives.” – Interview with the commanding officer of the 601st SOG CZE during deployment to Nangahar province Afghanistan 2011.

3-11. **Building the Right Military Assistance Team**

a. Each MA mission will be unique. The skill sets and attributes required will vary from task to task or mission to mission. While many NATO SOF nations strive to build a SOF team that can be applied to any kinetic situation, the same may not be achievable for MA. Nations will need to develop their MA plan accordingly and decide which SOF, conventional military, para-military, or police or non-military assets will be best suited for the MA mission at hand. Detailed country studies, understanding the cultural terrain, and understanding the needs of HN will all be key. Detailed PDSS will facilitate in this aspect.
b. MA requires a new breed of SOF soldier. Many SOF operators and staff are trained for the world of SR and DA in which the missions for SOF were more easily defined as operations achieving relative superiority through the principles of simplicity, security, rehearsals, speed, surprise, and sense of purpose. MA has brought a new dimension to the world of the SOF operator. MA will take time, patience, and a deep understanding of the culture where the mission is conducted. The MA team needs to be one that can design, develop, and sustain a long-term mission that will take time to bear significant fruit. The typical SOF attitude of let's get her done will have to be tempered with a lot of just how long is this going to take? The SOF operators and support personnel selected for this unique mission will have to be the more experienced and mature of the group. Once the team is together, it needs to stay that way for a long time. Missions of 90 days, typical for most DA-centric deployments, will not work. MA will take a lot longer and will require the SOF trainers, advisors, and mentors to remain partnered with their HNSF elements for 6 to 12 months at a time.

3-12. **Continuity Requirements.** While not a problem for extremely short duration missions, anything over 12 months should be considered long-term, and as such, NATO SOF and respective nations should try as much as possible to maintain continuity when partnering up with an HN force. U.S. SOF proved during OEF that SOF teams staying longer, as well as rotating in and out of the same areas with the same partnered units over a several-year period, was a major factor in their overall success.

3-13. **Language Requirements.** According to linguisticsociety.org, there may be as many as 6,909 languages in this world. It is, therefore, impossible for NATO and its SOF elements to know all of them. Instead ensure SOF organizations have access to linguists (military or non-military). Conduct some sort of basic language training before deployment. Create small cultural handbooks that include basic greetings, questions, and comments that are common to the new deployment area. Once on the ground, show an effort to learn the HNSF partnered unit’s language.
3-14. **Working with Others.** Developing indigenous security forces means working with others. The following are some well-developed ground truths and observations captured and used by Canada Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM) units when conducting MA. They should be considered by all NATO SOF when conducting any sort of train, assist, mentor, and advise mission.

a. **Be patient.** Western military members are not immune to the world of instant gratification that engulfs many industrialized nations. Indeed, the aggressive, hyper, military work ethic and results-orientated attitude of SOF operators can simply add fuel to the fire when requirements are not being met. These characteristics, which are generally seen as desirable among SOF operators, can nonetheless contribute to misunderstandings, frustrations, and even personal conflict when interacting with other people’s expectations and beliefs about how the world works, or at least should work. When working with others, it is important to realize that SOF’s schedule is not always a valid blueprint for success. Not all countries, cultures, and people are accustomed to, or accepting of, the Western industrialized tempo of activity, much less that of a SOF level of activity. Impatience and trying to force others to work at SOF’s accepted rhythm can be counterproductive and create alienation and bad feelings. Patience is an important quality to minimize stress and maintain personal equilibrium. It is also important in maintaining good relations with those with whom SOF are working. Additionally, it demonstrates professionalism and an ability to adapt and innovate.

b. **Be adaptable and manage expectations.** The key to adapting and providing valuable training is the realization that NATO SOF are there to work with the partner nation or training audience and, more often than not, they will determine the schedule. The fact of the matter is that not all countries have the same resources as NATO SOF. Their organizational culture will often be dramatically different. As a result, try to learn as much about the training audience as possible. Develop a plan that meets the aim of the mission and do the best to execute it, but realize adjustments may have to be made to the schedule, plan, level of instruction, and/or outcomes. Do not let this become frustrating, but rather remain open-minded and agile in order to rise to the challenge and create the necessary effects. Remember it is better to under-programme and be able to add extra activities that were not

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scheduled than over-programme and not achieve the promulgated training.

c. Recognize that actions speak louder than words. As the adage goes, talk is cheap. It is easy to create a verbal image of oneself or one's organization in an attempt to create credibility. However, with an unknown training audience, this verbiage will likely be inconsequential. Never explain what can be demonstrated. Credibility and trust are based on actions, not just words. The sooner SOF can show the training audience that they are experts at what they do, the sooner the training audience will give SOF their undivided attention. Conversely, it is important to also consider the reverse. The description of capability that the training audience may have expressed is not always an accurate reflection of their ability. Before undertaking complex, potentially hazardous activities, ensure the level of competency and capacity of SOF partners has been determined through actions, not just words. This knowledge will help SOF determine the level of training, rehearsals, planning, etc., that will be necessary prior to the event.

d. Appreciate that perception is more important than reality. How the target audience or partners perceive NATO SOF or the mission is more important than the reality NATO SOF are convinced exists. For example, the mission might be critical to providing them with important training, and the team may be the eminent experts in the field and the best and most personable operators on the globe. Nonetheless, if those being helped feel the activity is a waste of their time and that the trainers are a bunch of arrogant, pompous, over-rated or second-rate players, the task will become difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish. In this case, the perception is more important than the reality. When trying to get buy-in from others, what is important is not what NATO SOF think but rather what the target audience thinks. Therefore, ensure NATO SOF operators keep abreast of atmospherics and the general prevailing attitude and that they work quickly and aggressively to clear-up any misunderstandings, grievances, or complaints. This can be key down the road when trying to mitigate or counter insider-threats. In the end, communication is key to developing any partnership.

“Polish crews came in and they used to do the Polish work with us and they were marvellously aggressive. I sometimes questioned my own aggression after I had the Poles. They would go as briefed: fly across the Skagerrak, the tip of Sweden, to Bomholm island. Then in Poland they would navigate by the POW camps, because, in line with the Geneva Convention, they had to have their lights on, and they'd do their drops, as far as east of the Vistula, which was a long way to go, and come back. Now the British would come back the proper way, as briefed, but you'd be very surprised to come back and find that the Poles were about an hour ahead of you, because they'd come back through the middle of Germany, and they never had a bullet left. Having got rid of the packages to be dropped or the men, they would go on a shoot-up in Germany. And, of course, in many places the aircraft got hit and then we had to repair them. They were hard to discipline, they were difficult, and yet you couldn't help but admire them. You'd have to say, 'Look, we want this aeroplane back tomorrow in good condition.' They would smile and you'd assume they'd listened, they'd understood, but they'd go off and do it again. But they were magnificent chaps. There was no turning back with the Poles.” — Squadron Leader Frank Griffiths, Halifax pilot, 138 (SD) Squadron, RAF

e. Remember that the message sent is not always the message that is received, and it is the message that is received that is acted on. Communication is often *lost in translation*. Simply put, the message the sender thinks he is sending is not always the message the intended recipient understands and acts on. There are a number of reasons for this disconnect. First, words, jargon, slang, and concepts are often used that may have different meanings to different people, particularly when they are from different cultures. Even within the same language set, the meaning is not always the same. In addition, everyone is often guilty of a lack of clarity in communication. In someone’s mind, they may understand the situation, and what they are thinking and communicating is crystal clear to them. However, what often happens in communicating is that key information is left out because it is assumed as *understood* between the parties. As a result, for those not privy to the inner workings of another’s mind, it becomes difficult to follow, and the message or intent is confusing. Therefore, ensure the message is properly formulated, and do not assume the receiver is privy to everything the planners know or are thinking.

f. See the world through the eyes of those with whom SOF are interacting. Western assumptions of the world and how things are done are not universal. How SOF do things will not always be how others will conduct drills and/or training activities, nor will it be necessarily representative of how they want to conduct their business. What SOF take for granted (e.g. availability of transport, logistical and administrative support, training area) may be a major challenge for others. To achieve a desired effect, it is important to see their perception of reality. Additionally, this perspective will help SOF appreciate how others see them. SOF personnel mannerisms, assumptions, attitudes, and behaviours may not be acceptable to those SOF are working with. For example, although most NATO SOF personnel pride themselves on being *straight shooters*, *speaking truth to power*, or being able to critically assess and challenge one another in an open setting, these types of behaviours are often seen as aggressive and offensive to others given their organizational culture. Taking all of this into consideration, SOF personnel should learn how to read the body language of others in order to gain cues about how SOF behaviour is being interpreted. Additionally, learn to self-reflect and assess personalities involved and personal approach prior to working with others. However, if self-assessment fails, be prepared to adapt behaviour and deportment accordingly based on the reactions from those around us. If SOF feel they must apologize for their behaviour prior to even beginning a statement, such as beginning a talk with the words “I don’t mean to be rude, but …,” then stop immediately and reassess the situation. If what is about to be said is identified as potentially offensive, then it probably is, and a different way of expressing the point should be found.

g. Do not judge the behaviours of others. Instead, observe, learn, and try to understand. It is always important not to exude an attitude of arrogance and/or
superiority. Many of the personnel who are part of the training audience quite often have a depth of operational experience in their own country or from other missions. They all have unique operating circumstances, cultural dynamics, and traditions, habits, and attitudes. Simply because it is not how we do things does not mean it is wrong, invalid, or inappropriate to the specific situation or socio-cultural-geographic area. It is best never to simply judge behaviour without fully understanding it. Rather, observe and learn what may assist personal skills and comprehension of working in the geographic area. Provide commentary on how NATO SOF would handle a similar situation, but try to do so in an anecdotal and descriptive manner that explains the methodology and philosophical approach rather than providing a judgemental comparison or critique. In the end, do not try to tell others what to do or how to do it. NATO SOF advisors and mentors do not live in their reality. Something may work well for NATO SOF, but it may not fit in their context/reality. However, do not give anyone the benefit of the doubt. Check and confirm that they have the requisite kill/knowledge/background/qualifications required before undertaking an activity, particularly if it is a hazardous one.

h. Always be respectful. Everyone is more cooperative when treated respectfully. Nonetheless, quite often we fail to demonstrate respect. In fact, on many occasions, individuals, without even consciously knowing it, will act disrespectfully or at least can be perceived to be doing so. Particularly when in a training or mentor role in a foreign cultural setting, one’s behaviour might be seen as being dismissive, overly casual with those of senior rank, and, at times even rude, especially when things are not going as planned or according to the time table and patience is wearing thin. How one treats and interacts with others is important. Treating others with respect conveys a valuable message of what the SOF advisor/trainer and the SOF organization deems important. It demonstrates character, humility, and professionalism. Within the military, nowhere is this more evident than in according the proper deference and respect to military protocol when dealing with those of higher rank, a fact that is sometimes neglected by SOF personnel. This behaviour underscores respect of the individual and their national armed forces and speaks to professionalism and humility.

i. Deal with frustrations privately. It is always important to be conscious of how others see SOF. At times, one’s true feelings may be counterproductive to the task at hand. On these occasions, it is best to remain focused on the goal and to refrain from showing counterproductive thoughts and/or emotions. This advice is particularly valid when frustrated; one must be particularly conscious of his/her body language (e.g. rolling of the eyes, posture, muttering, and impatience). Although easier said than done, remain calm and unperturbed at all times since showing frustration will only erode trust and credibility and make the task more difficult. Deal with frustration in the privacy of living quarters. Rant and complain to close colleagues. Discuss the frustration and pet peeves with the team in private when those being training are not around. Always ensure others cannot overhear the conversation. However, in the presence of those being trained, calm, cool, patient behaviour will earn trust and respect and will strengthen personal relationships. Failure to do so will have exactly the opposite effect.

j. Do not adhere to unrealistic standards. Striving for excellence is a noble pursuit, and one should never adopt an attitude of accepting mediocrity. However, one must be conscious of time and resource realities and how much one can realistically achieve under these circumstances. Incremental steps to improve should be accepted and applauded. Excellence can only be achieved once the foundation is solid. Building a foundation takes time and experience which may not be immediately available. Learning
incrementally in these instances may be the best course of action. It is better that the training audience accomplish a task themselves, even if it is a bit rougher around the edges, than if NATO SOF had conducted the major actions for them. Remember NATO SOF are there to help train and mentor, not to overtake their areas of responsibility (AORs). View excellence as a long-term goal and always strive toward it, but do so along a graduated scale so that the training audience develops the necessary skills and attributes, as well as confidence. This process will help build a solid foundation upon which to improve and attain professional excellence.

3-15. **Advisors and Mentors**

a. Advisors and mentors are the most influential group of personnel who serve with an HNSF and HNSI. They should know something about everything but don’t need to be masters at any one thing, as well as understand issues associated with HN culture and communication, rapport building, insider threats, human rights issues, and counter-corruption. Advisors, trainers, and mentors must all have a sound *baseline* of training delivered pre-deployment in accordance with their national guidelines. They do not command HNSF units or direct ministerial actions. Nonetheless, advisors may operate at the ministerial level, with the national institutions, or with HNSF at the highest army command or chief of police levels. The ministerial level consists of the MOD and MOI along with their general staffs and deputy ministers, respectively. National institutions consist of the national training centres, academies, recruiting commands, central supply depots, and national hospitals.

b. For the purposes of this handbook, advisors are SMEs who serve with HNSF to train, advise, assist, and counsel their counterparts. Advisors observe, evaluate, and report on the performance of their assigned unit. While not LOs, advisors communicate with their JTF and CC superiors, functional SMEs, and HNSF counterparts to resolve problems and gain confidence. The advisor’s purpose is to create a professional relationship based on trust that will inspire and influence their counterparts to effective action. Advisors must understand the processes and systems associated with their functional area and location in the advisor network. They must know the institutions and commands, both HN and SOF, that are part of that network. Finally, advisors must perform their role in developing a sustainable HNSF and HNSI.
c. Figure 3-6 provides a pictorial representation of the importance of cultural and situational awareness to an advisor’s mission.

(1) **Trust.** Mutual understanding.

(2) **Partnership.** Recognize insider threat indicators and take action to de-escalate.

(3) **Communications.** Communicate with and not about them.

(4) **Reliability and Professionalism.** Do what you say and say what you mean. Do not over-promise or under-deliver.

(5) **Patience, Listening, and Respect.** Treat others as one would want to be treated. Master the basics: understand the culture and human terrain in one’s own area of operations (AOO). Know the red lines.

(6) **Insider Threats Disrupts the Coalition and HNSF Bond; Understand and Prepare for It.** Combine FP TTP and basic cultural awareness; prepare, anticipate, de-escalate, deter, prevent, and mitigate.

3-16. **Advisor Characteristics.** Not everyone is qualified to perform advisory functions. As a result, TCNs must properly select personnel to ensure each individual possesses the required knowledge, skills, abilities, and correct temperament required to work closely with HNSF and HNSI personnel. Experience suggests that the following characteristics significantly enhance an advisor’s ability to adapt and thrive in a foreign culture:

a. Rank, age, and technical expertise.

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5 ISAF SFA Guide 2.0.
b. Empathy, flexibility, and perceptiveness.

c. Open-mindedness, tolerance for ambiguity, and ability to withhold judgement and set realistic goals and tasks.

d. Ability to motivate oneself and others and a strong sense of self-reliance.

e. Tolerance for differences, ability to accept and learn from failure, and a sense of humour.

f. The ability to work in a transactional environment.

g. Patience and knowing when it is right to step away.

3-17. Advisor Considerations. Advisors need to be ambassadors, communicators, and negotiators. Effective advisors gain their counterparts’ trust and then leverage it to influence action. In addition to the 15 principles of SFA provided in Chapter 1, advisors operating at any level of the HNSI or HNSF should consider the following advice:

a. Networks. Operational success of SFA is directly related to the advisor’s knowledge and utilization of established advisor networks. Every advisor should know and communicate with their counterparts at least two levels up, two levels down, and laterally. For example, an advisor to a corps commander or provincial chief of police (PCoP) should know the advisors to the general staff or deputy minister (two up); the corps support battalion or DCoP (two down); and the regional training centres, regional logistics centres, and other corps/PCoPs (lateral) mandate. Everything advisors do must be fully integrated and HNSF-led.

b. Personal Involvement. Advisors assist their counterpart in developing ways to overcome obstacles and accomplish difficult tasks. A critical indicator of an effective advisory effort is the amount of personal involvement the HNSF take in their own operations and duties.

c. Empathy. Empathy can be defined as identifying and understanding another’s situation, feelings, and motives. This understanding requires getting to know people, as well as the broader culture in which they operate and the history of the community/communities they are a part of.

d. Limitations. Much like empathy, advisors need to understand the limitations of their partners. While it is beyond the scope of this handbook to describe all the limiting factors that may challenge an advisor, a few to consider include illiteracy, culture, religion, patronage, and corruption.

e. Relationships. Developing a solid relationship based on mutual trust and respect significantly increases the ability of advisors to influence their counterparts, as well as to overcome difficult periods. Resources and expertise will not take the place of a personal and professional relationship.

f. Humility. People who benefit from assistance sometimes feel defensive. In accepting assistance, they are, in a sense, admitting their own shortcomings. Advisors should not expect gratitude but should instead take satisfaction in the progress they may make, even though progress tends to occur very slowly and is difficult to track on a day-to-day basis.
g. **Expertise.** Professional competence is critical to personal credibility. Advisors do not command HNSF; instead, they provide advice, training, and access to SOF support as needed. Without a high degree of credibility, advice is likely to be disregarded. Demonstrated professional competence in one area leads to a presumption of competence in others. That said, advisors must be careful not to overstate the applicability of their particular expertise or risk losing their hard-earned credibility.

h. **Uncertainty.** Advisors must be comfortable operating with little supervision and dealing with complex moral and ethical dilemmas. Advisors need to be capable of balancing maintaining rapport and mission accomplishment with the urge to enforce every rule and/or tenet. Dealing with a corrupt counterpart is a prime example. While SOFADs may find corruption abhorrent, they must assess the impact of instances of corruption on mission accomplishment.

i. **Rank.** HNSF counterparts who are senior in grade should be treated accordingly. Advisors should refer to such individuals by their rank and show appropriate respect and deference. While HN officers have no command authority over advisors, effectiveness is greatly enhanced when advisors show respect for their counterparts and the HN chain of command.

j. **Expectation Management.** Advisors will never have everything they believe they need to succeed. As SOF forces draw down, access to past resources and enablers will decrease. Advisors must manage their HNSF counterparts’ expectations with respect to resource availability.

k. **Negotiations and Conflict Resolution.** The study, development, and honing of negotiation skills are critical to advisors. Cross-cultural negotiation brings with it a series of unique challenges, such as language, behaviour, and conflict-resolution mechanisms. Cultural differences will complicate negotiations with Afghan counterparts.

l. **Working with Interpreters.** Interpreters are a critical link between advisors and their counterparts. Consider the following when advising through an interpreter:

   (1) Try to use two-man interpreter teams to provide a thorough understanding of the conversation.

   (2) Prepare interpreters for technical terms. They must know the relevant subject areas and translate advisors’ meaning, as well as their words.

   (3) Establish rapport with interpreters through personal contact. Learn their background and show genuine concern for their families, aspirations, and education. Without a cooperative, supportive interpreter, communication will be damaged.

   (4) Prepare interpreters for specific meetings. Tell them in advance what is going to be discussed with the HNSF counterpart to allow them to confirm technical terms, intent, and meaning.

   (5) Double-check that interpreters understand. Some may attempt to save face by concealing their lack of understanding.
(6) Avoid looking at interpreters during discussions; remain focused on the interlocutor.

(7) Use small, logical, translatable segments while communicating.

(8) Instruct interpreters to never hold back anything said by the source. Selective interpreting, regardless of how insignificant interpreters may find it, will adversely affect the conversation and potentially the mission.

(9) When planning meetings or communications, allow additional time for interpreters to do their job. A 10-minute conversation may take up to 30 minutes, depending on the interpreter’s ability.

m. Solutions. Encourage HNSF partners to develop solutions to HN-specific problems. Just because the coalition solution works well for the advisor’s country does not mean it will work for the HN. Solutions must be HN-achievable and sustainable well beyond the coalition’s presence in the advisory role. Advisors must ensure their counterparts seek HN solutions for HN problems. Successive questioning and probing by the advisor until the counterpart arrives at a solution is the best methodology.

n. Continuity. The relationships among the advisor, counterpart, and interpreter will develop over time. Remember the friction involved with developing this bond and formally capture LLs in a continuity book or similar document to improve the transition between advisors. These lessons are critical in the handover process to facilitate successors’ relationship with their counterparts.

o. Language Skills. Advisors must learn the basic greetings and phrases associated with the region and the advisory role prior to arrival in country. While basic courtesies will be the same for all advisors, technical phrases will vary based on one’s position within the advisory network. Critical to this language acquisition is the development of a phrase list; it is imperative, therefore, that advisors update COM JTF advisory and assistance team’s (CAAT’s) online version of this guide to capture job-specific terminology.

p. Target Audience. Know the target audience. Understand the context of the group dynamic, whether experienced personnel or trainees; NCOs, enlisted personnel or officers; civilians, military, or police.

q. Be Inquisitive. Ask probing, open-ended questions that drive counterparts toward HN solutions.

3-18. Additional Issues Affecting the Advisor. There are a number of other issues that will affect the development of an HNSF and HNSI. Unfortunately, there are no template solutions to these issues. It becomes the job of the trainer, advisor, and/or mentor to deal with each in his or her own way for the betterment of the mission. The following are some of the issues that will affect the development of HNSF:

a. Insider Threats

(1) NATO’s new and future AOOs will always include many threats—such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs), indirect fire, small arms fire, and deliberate attacks—but insider threats pose the greatest risk to advisors and mentors.
Insider threats are the potential for an attack by, or facilitated by, anyone who has a position of trust within a combined team of coalition and HNSF partners. An insider attack occurs when someone in such a position initiates an act of violence against the coalition. Advisors need to be knowledgeable of their country’s national insider threat countermeasures. This section covers the key functions for countering insider threats.

(2) Insider threat incidents can be caused by personal confrontations that involve something as avoidable as cultural insensitivities. Instruction on conflict de-escalation and conflict resolution techniques should be a core part of pre-deployment training. Effective integration of insider threat intelligence indicators into mission planning and execution reinforces ISAF FP, limits casualties, and helps set conditions for future success. Similarly, security and small arms TTP should be developed and routinely practiced for confronting an insider threat incident. Finally, conducting an assessment of the events that led up to the attack, what transpired during the attack, and post-incident actions will provide vital LLs that can be used to restore relations, continue development, and regain combat effectiveness.

(3) Insider threat countermeasures fall into a conceptual framework with six functions made up of three proactive functions (prepare, deter, and detect) and three reactive functions (respond, recover, and exploit). Prevention is paramount since needing to actually respond to an insider threat could erode many months or years of trust with the HNSF unit with which the advisor works. Annex A provides a snapshot of the various functions that MA personnel should consider when preparing for and dealing with insider threat actions.

b. Human Rights Violations

(1) All law of armed conflict (LOAC) violations require attention, but special provisions apply to human rights violations that may subject a unit, group, or state to sanctions for its actions. Examples of human rights violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; punishment or prolonged detention without charges or trial (detainee abuse); the disappearance of persons by abduction; clandestine detention of persons; politically motivated rape; and other flagrant denials of life, liberty, or the security of the person. Human rights violations also include extra-judicial killings, which are deliberate killings lacking due process of law and directed, encouraged, or committed by a public official or security/defense force member.

(2) Advisors are postured to professionalize HN security and defense forces. It is important for the HN government and HNSF officials to abide by internationally recognized norms for human rights. Failure to do so will adversely impact the HN’s relationships with its international partners and may jeopardize opportunities for training and funding in accordance with U.S. and other coalition partner national laws. Many nations are prohibited by their own laws from providing MA to foreign military units or governments that engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.

(3) All advisors assigned to the JTF or persons operating in the JTF AOO are subject to LOAC at all times. LOAC includes that part of international law regulating the conduct of hostilities and is premised upon four principles: military
necessity, distinction, proportionality, and limitation of unnecessary suffering. LOAC imposes an obligation not to commit human rights violations and to report suspected violations through the chain of command.

(4) Most likely to be one of COM JTF’s commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and a stipulation of LOAC, advisors are required to report suspected human rights violations in the following manner:

(a) Gather information for the incident description when aware of a possible human rights violation.

(b) Immediately report incident information to commander or intelligence operations officer. Incident description will include who (alleged perpetrator), which unit, what, where, when, why, how, witnesses, and other pertinent information (context).

c. Corruption

(1) The level of corruption across an HN’s public and private sectors represents a threat to the success of NATO and the JTF’s mission and the viability of the HN state. It serves as a barrier to the HN’s economic growth by robbing the state of revenue and preventing the development of a strong economy, thus perpetuating HN potential dependence on international assistance. This dependence threatens the process of transition, as institutions weakened by criminality will be less able to accept the transfer of responsibility for security and governance.

(2) Corruption, broadly defined as the misuse of positions of power for personal gain, undermines the effectiveness of HN’s government and security forces, allows criminal networks to fill power vacuums left by weak governance, fuels discontent among the population, and contributes to active and passive support for the insurgency.

(3) The impact of corruption includes an increased risk of state failure, increased active and passive insurgency support, increased insurgent freedom of action, decreased capacity of critical state institutions and functions, continued dependence on the international community, decreased support from the international community, and increased negative views from the HN’s population.

(4) The JTF’s transparency and accountability mission will be to support the HN in the development of the security ministries—MOD and MOI—as legitimate and credible government institutions and to set the conditions for self-regulating oversight of the HNSI and HNSF. COM JTF will likely have three desired effects for the transparency and accountability mission across the JTF’s AOO: protecting international donor funds while ensuring the coalition does not fuel corruption; ensuring transparency and accountability of funding to the HNSF; and combating predatory/egregious corruption.
Important Note. Mentors and advisors cannot be in all places at all times. Therefore, the importance of good relationships cannot be overstated. This will encourage HNSF senior leaders providing SOFADs with incidents of corruption due to mutual trust and respect. The SOFAD network can then bring these incidents to the attention of the COM, who in turn can decide upon punishment for misconduct.

(5) The advisor may observe blatant corruption, such as the abuse of entrusted power for personal gain. Corrupt acts could include an HN senior leader showing favouritism based upon family/tribal affiliation (nepotism), using their position for personal gain, misuse of government property and revenue, theft of public assets, fraud, misuse of authority, and bribery. Bribery involving promotions, assignments, contracts, or training is the most prevalent type of corruption an advisor will encounter. HN local nationals might also provide advisors information about corrupt individuals or activities.

(6) Advisors will not actively investigate corrupt activities but instead will report them through their chain of command. They will assist in the reduction of corruption so that it no longer poses a threat to key HN institutions and functions vital to security. To achieve this end, advisors will ensure HN leaders recognize the nature, scope, and corrosive effects of corruption; influence HN leaders to support transparency and accountability; and work closely with HN leaders to operate within established procedures to restore accountability. These efforts will help combat corrupt behaviour and restore essential confidence in key HN institutions.

3-19. Pre-mission Training. Those nations that create a realistic MA training environment in their home countries prior to deployments have had more success than those who have not. Conventional forces can and should be used to represent potential HN security forces to be partnered with SOF. By doing so, SOF will understand the complex dynamics involved in planning for and executing MA missions. If the opportunity exists, HN local nationals that live in the respective NATO SOF nation’s home country should be sought out from within their respective militaries or civilian communities and hired to help support some of the MA planning and training early on. This will be discussed in depth in Chapter 12, Pre-mission Training.

3-20. Assessments. Assessment is the continual measurement of progress toward intermediate and strategic objectives. The JTF and its subordinate CCs will establish various levels of assessment. The following are just some of the assessments that may be conducted by the JTF and its subordinate elements to include SOF:

a. Joint Task Force Assessments. The JTF strategic campaign assessment enables COM JTF to document campaign progress toward achievement of JTF’s campaign objectives and NATO’s mission goals. This continuous process integrates assessments from its subordinate CCs with assessments from the JTF HQ staff. The primary output should be something akin to a quarterly strategic assessment report, providing a comprehensive strategic picture for COM JTF and higher HQs of progress, transition states, opportunities, challenges, and risks to inform commander decisions.

b. Ministerial Advisory Group Assessments. The MAG will use a system to assess elements of the HN MOD and MOI called capability milestones (CMs). CM
ratings will be used in conjunction with the quarterly strategic assessment report, some sort of regional or provincial HNSF outlook report, and other NATO reports to provide assessments of capacity and capability within the individual ministries. Ministerial development plans (MDPs) and CM ratings are designed as evolving systems and should be periodically evaluated and modified to ensure they remained relevant to the evolving organizational and ministerial development campaign. The MDPs and resultant CM ratings assess the ability of a directorate within the ministry to execute their stated roles and responsibilities under varying degrees of coalition supervision. While the ultimate goal of the MDP is for an office to operate independently of coalition support, use of a capability scale allows the coalition to alter the level of advisor support based on competence. This allows the coalition to mitigate risk by reallocating personnel resources to areas with lower CM ratings.

c. **Joint Interagency Task Force.** An HN major crimes task force may be established to assess the HN MOI’s organizational management, administration, training, investigations, deconfliction, and crime scene investigation to determine their ability to conduct operations without the need for JIATF mentor assistance and coaching.

d. **NATO Training Mission.** NATO may decide to create a NATO training mission (NTM) much like they did in Afghanistan. The NTM HQ would be the focal point for all HNSF development. The CCs will likely be directed by the JTF HQ to work through the NTM on all HNSF development issues to include assessments. If so, the NTM will produce a training assessment of every unit that is fielded through some sort of consolidated fielding centre. This records fielding statistics such as personnel and equipment (shoot, move, and communicate) and assesses all of the key HNSF personnel (officers and senior NCOs) that will be of significant utility to security force advisory teams assigned to the unit.

e. **Special Operations Component Command.** The SOCC should conduct 5-pillar assessments of partner HNSF capabilities using the five functional pillars of C2, sustainment, training, leadership, and combined arms integration. These assessments should be conducted for each of the SOCC's primary partner forces: HN army and naval special forces, air force special mission elements, SPUs, and their respective C2 HQ, coordination centres, and liaison elements. Each month, advisors at all levels should conduct an assessment of their partners and assign a readiness level of *fully capable*, *capable*, *partially capable*, or *developing*, using the functional pillars as a guide. Additionally, SOFADs should provide comments on the current status, major issues, and planned engagement of their partner force. The 5-pillar assessments can be used for a variety of products, such as NATO and national assessments, as well as for requests for information (RFIs) and operational planning.

f. **Special Operations Partnering Team.** The SOPT will be required to provide assessments to the SOCC on a regular basis. The SOPT will need to develop an assessment form that captures the key aspects of the HNSF’s ability to plan, rehearse, execute, and report on their operations. Annex B provides a possible template that could be used (and modified as required) to provide assessment for each mission conducted by the HNSF. This information would then be consolidated and summarized and sent to higher HQs in an assessment form dictated by the SOCC.

g. **Host Nation Security Force.** HNSF should be directly involved with assessing their own growth and development through the readiness reporting system. Because it will progressively provide the bulk of the information in all coalition assessments, the
readiness reporting system will become increasingly important as coalition forces draw down. The JTF HQ should be heavily involved in advising the HNSF’s general staff of the army and assisting in the development of HN readiness officers for the army to conduct future assessments. Additionally, the HN police should develop a similar force readiness report, with lead advising efforts provided by some sort of established international police coordination board.

h. Joint Task Force Commander Advisory and Assistance Team. The CAAT will conduct embeds throughout the advisor chain in order to observe and report on the SFA framework and coordination process. While not assessments, these embeds will help identify and address systemic issues within the framework and serve as a 2-way information conduit that complements assessment programmes. These embeds will occur at all levels and will be coordinated and in- and out-briefed with the appropriate commanders.

3-21. Partnering Force Ratios. In order to develop HNSF, the SOCC will need to establish some guidelines on PFRs. The PFR number is typically given as a percentage and identifies the percentage of HNSF taking part in a partnered mission. For example, a PFR of 30% would mean that 30% of the task organization for a high-risk arrest partnered mission comprised of 100 NATO SOF and HNSF personnel, 30 are HNSF. As the MA or SFA mission progresses, the PFR should increase. See Annex C for a PFR example.

3-22. Summary

a. Partnering is a complex problem within the MA environment. Nations will have the final say based on their foreign affairs interests as to the level and scope of the partnering mission. Whatever the level of commitment, it should be approached with eyes wide open and a solid plan that includes the eventual withdrawal of partnering teams. When the mission is announced, SOF need to conduct a country study and a PDSS of the HN where the MA is to be conducted. A solid appreciation of the partnering task and the HN elements SOF will be partnering with must be established. The partnering preparation of the battlespace is key. Once the partnering task has been defined and described, SOF elements involved will develop the partnering COAs in line with the usual NATO SOF planning procedures.

b. Partnering should not just focus on the tactical elements of the HNSF. It must also include the various C2 elements at each of the respective HNSF levels. A robust partnering, mentoring, and advising organization that can span the requirements at the tactical, operational, and strategic/political levels will be the organization that ultimately is able to produce a realistic, sustainable, and effective partnering programme. Organizations such as a JIATF, SOAGs, SOPTs, and OCGs, as described in this chapter, will help the HNSF coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize their efforts long after NATO SOF have finished the MA mission.
CHAPTER 4 – HUMAN TERRAIN

4-1. General

a. In the 21st century, operations that have the greatest success are those that resonate within the local cultural human terrain. Just as having an awareness of the air, land, and sea conditions when planning an operation is a necessity, the same is equally true about understanding the swells and troughs of the human terrain. This is by no means a new concept, but its significance has been amplified due to global interconnectedness through internationally accessible media even in remote parts of the world. Because of this external actions, including those of NATO SOF’s in an HN, can make a greater ripple through the human terrain. A constant understanding of the shifting human terrain is necessary for any successful mission, including MA. This is a growing field of study that includes social scientists, political risk analysts, and intelligence analysts.

b. By its very nature NATO SOF are composed of a collection of partner nations with a range of perspectives on how best to engage a problem. This is both a strength and a potential vulnerability if not accounted for in planning joint operations. When NATO first draws up a legal framework with the HN, a major factor that needs to be considered early is what the human terrain is in the area of interest (AOI) for MA operations. The human terrain consists of these factors: political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII). PMESII is essential in feeding the information required for the find, feel, and understand phases of F2UID. It is also crucial in identifying the ability to use influencing non-kinetic targeting, as well as to disrupt via hard kinetic targeting. Chapters 5 and 6 cover F2UID in more detail, but it is important to understand the link between PMESII and F2UID.

c. This chapter will explore each of the factors that build the cultural terrain, and what steps or considerations can be made to ensure that NATO SOF can more effectively conduct MA. This chapter will highlight key areas that must be tracked throughout the MA operation. While not every consideration within PMESII will be outlined, this can provide a strong starting point to aid in formulating further questions for analysis.

4-2. Human Terrain

a. Human terrain is composed of elements of all areas of a culture and must be understood to operate effectively. This is not a stagnant system where each factor acts within a stovepipe. Instead, factors within each subcategory impact each other. This chapter will help identify key areas that one must explore to understand the overall conditions within which one is conducting MA. The information is broken down into PMESII. Social scientists will often break this information into broader categories of social, political, and economic factors (Figure 4-1).
Figure 4-1. PMESII as Political, Social, and Economic Factors

b. To build an understanding of the human terrain, there are a wide range of factors that must be analysed. This can be perceived as covering areas that do not impact MA, but that is a dangerous assumption. In the 21st century, just as having an awareness of air, land, and sea conditions is tantamount when conducting an operation, the same is true regarding the importance of having an awareness of the human terrain.

c. At one level, a snapshot of factors that impact the human terrain can be visualized in Figure 4-2. Each sub-factor listed in the graphic below could be impacted by the other main factors. International media is a possible example under the broader category of information since it can have an effect on all of the other main factors. In this way, it is important not to rely on lists when compiling information about the human terrain, but to instead understand how each factor impacts the other. This way one can avoid tripping cultural triggers when conducting MA and also build robust programmes that resonate with the local fabric. Annex D provides a suggested tool, the cultural aid matrix, that could be used when compiling information regarding the human terrain. Engaging with experts regarding political, social, and economic factors in the HN is most helpful when calibrating this information.

d. In conducting MA, one must understand the operating environment, and this includes the human terrain. As a part of understanding the human terrain, one is also exposed to the vast range of players involved in the same space. This is where a comprehensive approach, or collaborating as appropriate with groups who are looking to gain the same end state, is key. It would be unfeasible to assume that an MA mission can stabilize all aspects of the human terrain of an HN, and that is not the role of such a mission. However, having an awareness of what actions other actors operating within the HN are taking (e.g. UN Development Programme mission) can provide an awareness as to how those actions are impacting the human terrain.
4-3. Political and Military Factors. When engaging with a partner to conduct MA, one should know which organizations or groups work under their national flag and those working against it. A key tenet in conducting MA is helping bolster the power base of the political process under the national flag being supported. This can help strengthen the bond to the HN of HNSF, as well as other relevant organizations.

a. Political Considerations. There are a series of questions about the HN that should be answered. These will help SOF understand how robust the HN infrastructure is, as well as that of any opposition groups. Governance gaps that will impact the effectiveness of MA should also be identified.

(1) What type of government is in power, and what is the relationship of the government with its military? Is the government an authoritarian or democratic regime? Very democratic and very authoritarian governments tend to be more stable. However, an authoritarian nation that is shifting toward openness can rapidly become unstable. An example of this could be seen in Iraq under Saddam Hussein and the years that followed the regime change. Ian Bremmer is a political risk analyst who stated that this trend follows a J-curve. See Figure 4-3 for an illustration of this theory. When conducting MA, it is important to consider where along the J-curve the government or organization that SOF are assisting is located. If the HN was formerly authoritarian, be aware that there will likely be a major drop in HN stability, and conditions will be very turbulent. It is also important to track if and how the national military plays a part in keeping the stability in that nation. Is it used as a machine to subdue popular uprisings, or does it primarily focus on defence of the nation’s sovereignty?
(2) What level of governance is felt throughout that HN?

(a) Moving away from the seat of power, is the presence and support of central government felt throughout the HN? Ensure that SOF knows what areas are undergoverned and potential voids in society where threat networks or opposition groups might look to operate. Also explore why these voids exist. For example, is it due to ethnic divisions, lack of job opportunities, and the inability of the HN to support those locals, or is it due to a political divide or lack of security provided by the HN?

(b) When conducting MA, having an updated understanding as to the wants and needs of those living in undergoverned spaces can help mitigate risks and highlight potential opportunities when conducting MA. For example, if appropriate, ensuring that members of society from these undergoverned spaces are included in MA training could be a way to bolster their link with central government, as well as build kinsmanship among its fellow citizens. This is for SOF’s MA partners to decide, but it is something to consider discussing, if the circumstances warrant it.
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are a semi-autonomous portion of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. This region was cordoned off during the time of British Indian rule of the region and used as a buffer zone to keep potential invaders away from British India. This rugged terrain is home to primarily Pushtuns who adhere faithfully to their code of conduct, Pukhtunwali. So much so, that the British Indian Empire made no attempts to extend its rule into this buffer zone. In 1947, when the British Indian Empire collapsed and two new nations emerged, India and Pakistan (West and East), the Pakistani government adopted the FATA in its semi-autonomous, semi-independent state. In this way, the governance gap continued, despite the efforts of the Islamabad-appointed political agents who marshalled each of the seven agencies within FATA. As a result, the writ of power of the government and governance is not strongly felt within the FATA, other than when there are military operations in the area.

While the overall population of the FATA is approximately 3.18 million per the 2008 national census, it is considered a safe-haven for threat networks that have launched deadly attacks against Afghanistan and Pakistan, with the possibility of extending beyond that remit as well. What might the impact of operations by both threat networks and military operations have on the people of the FATA who have decided to move to other towns and cities while these areas have heightened security issues? These are the types of considerations that must be made when assessing undergoverned spaces within an HN. What caused those areas to become undergoverned, and what efforts, if any, are being made by the HN or other organizations to bring governance to these spaces?

(3) What is the access to legal justice like, and is the RoL promoted by the HN in synch with local sentiments? Is legal access the same throughout the HN, or does it change depending on the region or influence of government?

(a) This is a key consideration, as the local perception of central government can be heavily influenced by the answers to these questions. If the RoL is robust and there is equal access to justice throughout the HN, then this positively impacts the perceived strength of the central government. This can help ensure that MA will resonate more effectively as those institutions under the central government’s flag may be deemed the legitimate central power by the local populace.

Important Note. If there is uneven access to justice, due to corruption or lack of investment in RoL infrastructure, then this negatively impacts a local populace’s perception of central government as fulfilling its social contract. As a result, a governance gap is created that other entities, including threat networks, may look to fill.

(b) These are the types of questions SOF must consider when analysing the environment MA will be conducted in. Local and national perceptions of the accessibility to justice can determine if there are any governance gaps, as well as how strong the social contract is with the central government. The HN’s established RoL must be observed as to not undermine the authority set out by that writ of law.
An example of this could be seen in Afghanistan where the ancient *jirga* system is how traditional justice had been provided since pre-Islamic times in the region. Local matters have traditionally been heard by the jirga and resolved using that area’s case-law, passed down through oral history. The jirga consists of local hereditary tribal chiefs, or *maliks*, discussing a case and deciding an outcome. While these maliks are not representatives of central government, this system has provided a devolved system of governance, and central government would not traditionally interfere with this system. However, over time, this system has not been as robust as it was when the population of the country was much smaller. In particular, the increase in the youth population of Afghanistan and those wanting a means by which to gain social mobility have put pressure on this hereditary system of power. Local chiefdoms have also faced a decline in popularity when the local maliks are deemed to be corrupt or open to bribes when dispensing justice. This governance gap, produced by a crumbling local chiefdom system, has opened up spaces that other actors have looked to fill. This has included other power brokers in society such as the local religious leaders or *mullahs*, as well as threat networks.

Since there has not been a traditional link between the central Afghan government in implementing justice at the local level, trying to ensure that governance gaps are not left open for other groups to fill is a deep challenge. There has been an effort to build a justice system managed by courthouses run by the central government, with judges and lawyers implementing the justice per a centralized set of case law. While this system is not indigenous, there has not been an all-out aversion to this system of justice, particularly when cases are deemed to have been seen in accordance with traditional law and in line with their perception of *Sharia*, or Islamic law.

The stronger the local perception that the centralized Afghan government is seen to be providing true justice and showing an understanding of the wants and needs of society, the stronger the social contract that is formed. As a result, any MA conducted in such an environment is likely to be more robust. When there is not a belief in the robustness of the central government, then one can face a number of issues that need to be considered. Does the counterpart with whom SOF are conducting MA have an allegiance to that nation’s flag first, or do they empathize with a particular ethnic group, region, or segment of the population? In nations that are developing their state infrastructure, it is not uncommon to find challenges such as this. Even in developed nations, one may also find that subsections of society feel discontent with central government.

(4) What is the level of corruption, and how does this corruption influence the people, the government, the military, the private sector, etc.?

(a) Following on from the previous consideration regarding access to justice, the level of corruption in society can have a devastatingly immediate impact on the stability of that HN. If central institutions are deemed to be corrupt, this poses a great challenge when conducting MA and looking to support the infrastructure of central government. When corruption becomes widespread, impacting every facet of society, this is a rot that deeply impacts the stability of that HN.
Important Note. When conducting MA, it is crucial to have an awareness of what is perceived as corruption by the local populace. What might be perceived as corruption in one’s home country might not be deemed improper in the HN.

(b) There is a growing focus on research regarding corruption in societies due to the increasing link between the corruption of a society and its instability. One can get access to open-source, in-depth reports by groups such as the World Bank and the UN. NATO HQ also conducts research on this issue of growing importance.

(c) Understanding how corruption impacts the stability of the HN, including the strength of the central government, can help better prepare SOF when conducting MA. In immediate terms, understanding if corruption impacts SOF MA partners, and how SOF can look to mitigate these risks, helps to ensure that one is not adding to these destabilizing factors.

Important Note. Local populaces can resent external funding flooding their markets if they are not the ones benefiting from these funds and if it inflates the price of previously existing bribes, such as for local goods and services, to unbearable levels. NATO can bring with it big budgets to ensure an operation is being conducted to the best of one’s ability. This is both a strength and a potentially destabilizing factor that one needs to be acutely aware of when conducting MA.

(5) What is the relationship of the HN with its neighbours? Is the HN landlocked or does it have protected borders? External actors and countries can play a key role in the stability or instability of an HN. Be aware of historical relationships between countries, as this can play out in the relationship of those HNs while conducting an MA mission. For example, Afghanistan is a landlocked country, and every neighbouring country has exerted its influence due to their own sovereignty concerns. Understanding such dynamics can help one pre-empt any issues that may arise due to external influences, including those that may find the MA mission boosting the HN’s military capabilities as a potential threat.

b. Military Considerations. The political considerations deeply impact the military considerations as they both act to support the national interests as determined by the central government of the HN. A way to visualize this is to see these two sets of considerations as being those that look to support the flag that waves for the HN or group being supported. It can pose a challenge when there is a disconnect between the central
government and the local populace. An example where these factors can become more complex is in operations where the goal is to oust a leader or central group from power. This is where the central flag being supported is more of a concept; it is the flag of the group that is yet to take power. An example of such operations is the war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR in Libya. In these types of operations, there are greater unknowns regarding how well the new government will be perceived by the local populace. However, proper research and engagement with informed analysts can help in assessing what the cultural human terrain will be when looking to conduct MA. Some specific questions for consideration regarding military factors follow.

(1) What relationship does the military of the HN have with the broader range of players operating in the same environment? It is helpful to understand the dynamics that the HN military has with organizations and actors that operate within the same environment. Understanding what each group does in this space, and what the relationship is with the government and military can be of benefit in understanding how robust the comprehensive approach is in the area. This list can include NGOs, IOs, as well as the private sector.

Best Practice. NATO should look to operate within a comprehensive approach when conducting MA missions.

(2) What is the demographic of the military? Does this demographic match the national demographics?

(a) Find out the demographic of the military with whom SOF are looking to conduct MA. This can be broken down by ethnicity, economic status, gender, and age. How does this compare to the national demographics? While the demographic need not match up with exact percentages, be aware of any disparity that might have a consequence on MA.

The ethnic composition of Afghanistan is roughly 42% Pushtuns, 27% Tajiks, 9% Hazara, and 9% Uzbek. The Pushtuns have traditionally held central power in Afghanistan and enriched their power bases. With the overthrow of the Taliban and implementation of the new central power under President Karzai, there have been more Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara power brokers than in the past. This has occurred despite Karzai being a Pushtun. The Afghan National Army has a large percentage of Tajiks and in greater proportion than found in society. This is perceived by some Pushtuns as an aggravation and part of the reason why they support the Taliban over the central government.

(b) Having an awareness of the demographics of the military and how these interact with the human terrain is something NATO must consider when conducting MA.

(3) What influence does the military have on the population, and how does the population view the military?
(a) Looking at the origins of a county’s military and tracing its historical relationship with the full strata of society can help in reading the cultural barometer within the human terrain.

**Important Note.** Explore the relationship between the military and the HN. This relationship can either put pressure on or ease the ability of NATO in conducting MA missions with an HN’s military.

Egypt’s army was developed under the leader Mehmet Ali (Mohammad Ali) who ruled from 1805-1848 and who took his troops for missions abroad. In doing this, Egyptian nationalism was first created. Until then, there was no sense of national identity under one flag. This concept transcended beyond religion, social standing, and race. The Egyptian army is in fact the most developed political infrastructure in Egypt.

In more recent decades, the Authoritarian rule under Hosni Mubarak left little room for the development of independent democratic infrastructure. Instead, he ruled with an iron fist, using the power of the military as a means by which to keep control over the population. However, after the Arab Spring, where all of Egypt stood up to Mubarak and revolted for a non-authoritarian leader to lead the Egyptian people, the army eventually stood back and sided with the people. Mubarak was ousted, and when it came time for elections, the only other organized national party won the elections, with Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood taking the presidency. This transition proved uncomfortable for the Egyptian elites, as well as those protestors who felt the revolution had been hijacked by the Brotherhood.

The Muslim Brotherhood was deemed to have overstretched their political remit when Morsi looked to change parts of the Egyptian constitution. Alongside this, violent outbursts in Cairo affiliated with the Brotherhood agitated public views on the democratic intentions of the Brotherhood. Morsi was arrested and removed from government. The Egyptian army’s al-Sisi put himself forward to be the replacement president and won the elections. While part of the battle cry during the Arab Spring in Egypt was regarding the brutality of the Egyptian Army under Mubarak, the Egyptian people embraced al-Sisi as their new leader despite this seeming to be a regression toward the Mubarak style of rule. The army in Egypt, despite being known for its ruthlessness with those who step out of line, is also heralded as being the provider of stability to the country. Refer to Figure 4-3, and this move back toward a potentially authoritarian-style rule with greater stability conforms to the J-curve theory regarding state stability post-authoritarian rule. An HN needs to be prepared for the full range of consequences, including economic instability, when moving from an authoritarian to democratic state. The masses of Muslim Brotherhood supporters, many of whom identify themselves as everyday Egyptians as compared to the elites of the country, fear the strong reprisal from the army now that it is back at the helm of control.

(b) When analysing the cultural barometer in the cultural human terrain, one must understand the relationship and pressure points between the military and the varying segments of society. This is also the case when conducting MA with a country’s military.

(4) Is there any sort of militia, and what is the military’s relationship with them?
(a) In some countries, there are militias that are formed to supplement the army. These are either created through targeted drives, or else formed locally to fill a governance gap. These groups can either work alongside the same goals as the military or undermine the sovereignty of the HN. Militias can also be armed mercenaries and guns for hire.

In Afghanistan, there have historically been militias that formed as and when required to protect a family or clan’s interests from outside invaders or interests. These are called lashkars and are not regulated by the Afghan Army or government. These stopgap measures are in place to fill governance gaps, particularly when it is felt that the government’s security forces, including the military, are unwilling or unable to help with local disputes.

The usage of proxy militias in the Horn of Africa continues to destabilize the region. These groups act essentially like mercenary groups, armed with ideological causes to further fuel the loyalty of these groups. Some of those groups are privately funded by threat networks, but others are state-sponsored, essentially generating a proxy war between neighbouring countries.

(b) By boosting the robustness of indigenous military and police forces, NATO can employ MA as a means to strengthen those institutions, leaving locals with less of a need to arm themselves to protect their interests. Also with more robust institutions, privately funded militias can be tackled more effectively to ensure that they no longer pose a threat to stability for that nation.

Red Flag. One note of caution is that it remains key to be aware of how militias play a part in the human terrain of both the country being supported and the neighbouring countries. One must be aware of potential repercussions that may occur as a result of MA. For example, a country whose neighbours’ military capabilities are bolstered through MA might trigger them to engage in a proxy war to try and ensure that those new capabilities are not used to act aggressively against themselves.

(5) How well trained and compensated is the military? What is the motivation for joining?

(a) Ensure that you have an awareness of what the pay structure is for the military with which MA is going to be conducted. How does this compare to the pay structure of militias, mercenaries, or threat networks operating in the area? Be aware of how this might impact the effectiveness of an MA mission. SOF will also need to determine what the motivation for joining is for members of the groups with whom they will be conducting MA. Is it due to family ties, a deep seated belief in the honour of being in this profession, or is it purely for economic reasons? How does society view members of the military, and how might this impact those individuals?
(b) In some countries, serving within one’s national military is mandatory. This often brings about a strong sense of nationalism and support of national interests. In others, it is just a job, and there is always the chance that individuals might join the adversary if they feel that they can get better pay, or feel that the adversary group is stronger than the national military infrastructure. This gamble can be a real detractor to the success of MA missions, but is one that, if tracked, can be prevented if one is aware that the human terrain is unstable and desertion may be a potential vulnerability.

(6) What ideological influences impact the military in the nation with which MA is being conducted?

(a) Every military is shaped by an ideology, and this can shift with changes in leadership. It is common for the influence to be felt both within the military sphere, as well as political; however, this is not always the case. Examples of types of ideological influences can include colonial rule, that of communism, democratic rule, as well as an East-Asian style military drive. Religion can infuse itself at the military level, even if that influence was instilled centuries ago, such as those nations that took part in the crusades. Sometimes militaries can be influenced by military ideology they find elsewhere, and this impacts the way in which they operate within the cultural human terrain. Nations taking part in NATO MA missions can influence and be influenced in the process.

| Red Flag. While a goal of MA is to train, advise, and assist an HN in bolstering their capabilities, it is important to be mindful that it could be perceived by the HN that the participants may be looking to impose their military and national ideology as well. This need not be the case and is a particularly nuanced concept that is worth discussing with experts. |

(b) Careful consideration should be made in ensuring that the HN’s military does not perceive blurred lines between the MA mission and imposing the participating nation’s military ideology on the HN. While it is inevitable that cultural translations of how best to bolster one’s military capabilities may not always synch smoothly, this is a key to building true partnerships and looking to have the greatest MA success.

c. Political and Military Considerations Conclusion

(1) Broadly speaking, when looking to engage with an HN in conducting an MA mission, SOF must be aware of all who support the flag of that political and military institution and who are against. It helps to further break this information down in understanding why these parties feel the way they do about the institutions being supported by a NATO MA mission. This can help identify areas in which an MA mission might or might not have success, as without the support of all the populace, conducting an MA mission can be a challenge.

(2) In addition to looking at external factors, it is important to understand what internal influences there are that impact the way in which the political and military institutions conducting MA may operate. While they may be flying under the same
flag, understanding the dynamics between these groups can also build a better awareness of the cultural human terrain within which SOF will be conducting MA. Working with intelligence analysts and also engaging other open-source networks, such as political risk analysts, think tanks and universities, can help in building this picture.

4-4. **Social and Information Factors.** The cultural human terrain is also impacted by social factors, to include information exchange. These are the elements that impact the terrain from household to household and influence individuals in the military and government as well. This section will explore some of the broad social influences on the human terrain that one needs to be aware of when conducting an MA mission. These factors can be some of the more challenging ones to track, be it before you have started an MA mission and are building your awareness of the cultural human terrain or even during an MA mission. While it can be challenging to get this type of information, it is worth the investment in time and resources if necessary.

| Red Flag. Given the fast changing dynamic of conflict and the swift movement of information in even the most remote parts of the world, it is critical to understand social influences to the cultural human terrain so one can avoid getting caught by a cultural trip-wire. |

a. **Social Considerations.** Learning how individuals interact within their societies and with external groups is part of building one’s awareness of the social elements that impact the human terrain. An understanding of what languages are spoken, including dialects, is a crucial starting point. Are the languages or dialects spoken by particular ethnicities, or are they geographically dispersed? Can all people living within the country where MA is being conducted communicate with each other? Is there a national language that is taught throughout the country, or is that something only those who can afford to go to school are taught? Some specific questions for consideration regarding social factors follow.

1. What is the level of literacy in the country, and are there areas or groups who have significantly higher or lower literacy levels?

   a. There are some societies where people are educated through oral history and within one’s household. It is important to distinguish the difference between being educated and being literate. An educated individual might not be literate. Having basic literacy skills can help inform people within a society about what is happening within their environment. More crucially, it can, in many societies, increase the likelihood of employment opportunities. Literacy, when coupled with an education on critical thinking, can act as an immunity to being manipulated by outside influencers, be they threat groups or even national interest parties. When conducting MA in a society that has a low literacy rate, one needs to be sensitive to this reality. What may be deemed as the straight facts regarding what a mission is about, and why the group being supported is being provided MA, may not be the perceived reality on the ground.
Important Note. It is important to understand that individuals who are illiterate can be educated when it comes to understanding their own history, the push and pull factors in society, and why it is that an outside group might be deemed more appealing to support than central government. This is an extremely good example of a social factor that has strong ties to all of the other factors within PMESII. Lack of job opportunities due to lack of literacy can disenfranchise a group from the central government. The type of messaging that threat groups may use to effectively engage these groups may be through traditional means, such as word of mouth campaigns versus written documents.

(b) When gaining information regarding literacy rates, it is crucial to get this broken down by age bracket as well as gender. If there is a major disparity in these numbers between males and females, consider how this is going to impact an MA mission.

(2) What is the ethnic make-up of the area, and is there any tension between these groups? Which group has influence, and which are repressed? What is the relationship of these groups with the HN? If the HN has a range of ethnic groups within its borders, understanding the historical relationship between these groups is critical in reading where friction or alliances might take place. This is important in building a strong SA and can help ensure that an MA mission does not accidentally set off conflict along ethnic-based lines by supporting one group over the other. As discussed under military considerations, having an understanding of this history and identifying potential cultural fracture lines can assist SOF engaging with partners conducting MA. Having an awareness of how their ethnic background might impact their perception of their human terrain is key in operating ethically. This is a great challenge, and in part a reason why a deep understanding of social considerations that build a cultural human terrain is invaluable to the success of NATO SOF MA missions.

(3) Is there a history of conflict in the area where women are made active targets? Traditionally, women and girls are the first victims of conflict, where violence against these groups has been used both as a strategic weapon, as well as when troops have not been controlled centrally and have acted on their own. Given that this is a known effect of war that can be avoided, it is necessary to plan an MA mission with specific considerations as to how the impact of supporting an HN does not inadvertently exacerbate such crimes. If it is possible to remove the chance of these types of crimes occurring in a responsible manner, there is an onus to do so. NATO has gender advisors who can provide guidance when planning an MA mission, and this is a resource that should be utilized whenever possible. This includes the office of the gender advisor.

Important Note. It is mandatory to explore options that reduce any chance of gender-based conflict, especially against girls and women, before launching any NATO mission, as per UN Security Council Resolution 1325.
(4) What ideology or ideologies influences the HN? Each nation is influenced by ideology. This can be based off of economic principles, such as socialism or capitalism. These can also be religious-based ideologies. There are a vast array of ideologies that exist, and knowing what the fabric of the nation was built on historically, and what the dominant ideology is that impacts that nation at present can help one operate more appropriately in an MA context. Having awareness as to whether different demographics of society subscribe to different ideologies is also important when conducting MA missions that will impact the entire nation. Is there freedom of expression for all ideologies in that society, or are some suppressed or discriminated against? Knowing what ideologies influence the HN, as well as the full spectrum of society, can help identify potential friction points and provide a cultural framework for MA missions.

(5) Does the country have a national religious body as part of its government infrastructure? Following on from the previous consideration, if a primary ideology is religious-based, find out if that religious body is represented within central government, or if its main power-base is located outside of government.

As an example, the Church of England is formally included within the governing structure of the United Kingdom. This dates back to the times of Henry VIII, before which point there was a separation between church and state. The U.S. on the other hand has a formal separation of church and state. There are cultural references to religion that one may find (e.g. on the back of U.S. currency is the phrase “In God We Trust”); however, there is no formal link between these institutions.

Either system can provide for a stable environment, but it still builds an important understanding of the human terrain. If a nation is facing an internal crisis that is faith based, for example in Afghanistan where the ideological culture code of Pukhtunwali has been usurped by branches within the Taliban who look to redefine Pushtun culture, there is no centralized religious branch of government that can look to counter those cultural attacks with any authority. At the local level, there are religious leaders, known as mullahs, but they are not centrally organized and operate according to their religious understanding and teachings as deemed appropriate for the area within which they operate.

These types of dynamics are important to understand when conducting MA missions.

(6) Are its citizens able to practise their beliefs freely and without persecution? Are there some groups who are targeted? This is a broad category that covers both ideological and personal preferences in society. For example, are certain branches of a religion persecuted in a country? If so, do those groups have other networks from which they can gain support? Are these networks based within the same country, or from expatriate communities abroad or other countries? This can help identify potential hot spots within the human terrain, and again when conducting MA, it is crucial to ensure that one is not exacerbating these types of friction points if possible, and to certainly be aware of them.

(7) Is the society democratic or hierarchical by nature? The nature of the social organization of society within an HN heavily impacts the peaks and troughs of the cultural human terrain. Some considerations might be felt more strongly by some segments of society over others. Be aware of hereditary or social classism that
may exist. In addition to the human terrain being impacted, the organizations with which MA missions are being conducted might reflect the same form of structure, and to operate effectively, one must be mindful of these nuances.

(8) What is the housing like for all segments of society, and are there property laws to protect people’s ownership of land?

(a) Maslow’s triangle of needs (Figure 4.4) from 1954 is often referenced as covering basic tenants of human needs. One of these categories is safety and includes security and shelter. Certainly having an awareness of all of the factors highlighted in the triangle is beneficial when assessing the human terrain. However, when it comes to housing, it is imperative to understand what form of housing the full spectrum of society resides in. How secure are these structures against the types of weather conditions the individuals living in them may experience? How secure are they against outside intruders? In addition to the above, what are the housing laws that protect an individual’s ownership over land?

(b) In Afghanistan, a study conducted in 2009 by the Asia Foundation found that 52% of disputes at the national level were land based. Knowing what types of impacts within the human terrain can have the greatest effect is necessary information when conducting an MA mission.
(9) What access to health care is there for those living in an HN? Another social factor that can impact how individuals or groups within a society might act within the human terrain is what health care there is available, and who provides these services. When an HN is the provider of basic health care needs throughout society, this builds the social contract between those individuals and the HN. If, however, there are segments of society, or a geographical span, that are not covered by such support, this opens the possibility for outside groups to fill those needs. This can be in the form of NGOs or even other networks, including threat networks. Knowing where all segments of society within an HN gain their health care provides a valuable insight into the day-to-day realities of these individuals. If this is a contentious issue, then this can provide turbulence within the human terrain, and these conditions are important to be aware of when conducting an MA mission.

(10) What is the ease of movement of people within the HN? Are all segments of society able to move freely and without impediment throughout the HN? If not, what are the conditions behind the impediment in movement, and who has control over these conditions? If it is due to HN-imposed blockages, such as curfews, how does this impact the full range of society, and how do they react to these impediments? If the obstructions are caused due to non-governmental groups, what efforts are being made by the HN to remove non-sanctioned blockages of movement? Freedom of movement of goods and people can directly impact individuals within a society and their ability to access health care, education, and economic movement. This too can cause serious turbulence within the human terrain and is another consideration when conducting an MA mission.

(11) Is there a thriving independent arts and academic scene within the HN? While this may seem like an irrelevant factor, the arts are often used during times of conflict as a means by which society can express its frustrations and perceptions. It can provide a snapshot of what that demographic perceives as being relevant at that given time. In addition to the arts, tracking conferences or papers being written by local academic sources, including universities and think tanks, can provide further insights on the state of play with the human terrain.
These perceptions are invaluable when assessing the human terrain and should form part of one's preparation both before and while conducting an MA mission.

b. **Information Considerations.** In the 21st century, advances in technology have meant that the movement of information across the globe has increased drastically. With this movement of information, a wider range of influences can impact the human terrain, even in the most remote parts of the world. Media sources can amplify and distort events in real time, and one of the most hotly contested battlegrounds exists within the information space. Understand what sources of media exist within the area an MA mission is to be conducted, and how information can influence the human terrain within which one is conducting MA.

(1) Where do the population, government, military, and threat groups gain their information? Become familiar with the media outlets used by the range of actors within the HN. These might include newspapers, radio, and television broadcasts. They may also include more traditional forms of information exchange such as word of mouth, perhaps amplified through the increase in mobile phone towers in many parts of the world. Ensure that research on this is broken down by demographic and includes gender and age considerations. This research must include an understanding of how social media is used as a means by which to communicate, share ideas, or vent frustrations. This is a significant undertaking, but remains critical particularly when trying to assess how a local populace perceives an MA mission is going in its country. Are there any groups that are trying to undermine the mission by spreading false information or trying to shape the human terrain to be less hospitable to an MA mission?

(2) What are the ideological leanings of media providers, including adversary groups?

(a) Knowing who owns which media outlet and what the ideological leaning is of that outlet can help one understand what messages resonate with that channels' target audience.

(b) Use your understanding of these media sources as a barometer in tracking the pressure that society is experiencing at that given time within its human terrain.

(3) Can one access local information regarding local perceptions of what’s happening in their neighbourhood or the HN as a whole? While this may not always agree with the facts that NATO SOF may believe are correct, when operating within a foreign human terrain, it is local perceptions that can dictate what will happen next in that space. Due to advances in technology, accessing this information can be done remotely by visiting social media groups regarding the area in question. The most effective means of gathering this information is by
travelling into the space in question and gathering these atmospherics. This may not always be feasible due to language and safety constraints. If the home nation of one of the NATO mission partners has a diaspora community from the area in question, then this can be an invaluable source of culturally translating information so as to build a more accurate reading of the human terrain.

Best Practice. Some of the most valuable information you can gather in understanding the human terrain is locally sourced information. This can include perceptions shared through word of mouth or even conspiracy theories. The reality, as individuals at the local level perceive it to be, is what defines the human terrain on many levels.

c. Social and Information Considerations Conclusion. This section highlighted key considerations as to how social and information factors impact individuals and groups within an HN, and how these in turn impact the human terrain. In many ways the social and information considerations are those that can ply pressure on the political and military institutions under which the HN's flag is waved. Since an MA mission, by its nature, consists of partnering with the military of the HN, these considerations are critical to understand before embarking on the mission and need to be continuously tracked while conducting MA.

4-5. Economic and Infrastructure Factors. While having an overview of the economics and infrastructure of an HN may not seem pertinent when conducting an MA mission, this information provides an equally significant contribution in building the human terrain. In the post-2008 financial crisis world, there have been significant uprisings that have occurred, from the Arab Spring to Occupy Wall Street movements. While it would be naïve to say that economic factors alone caused these social uprisings, there is a growing field of study tracking the impact of economic factors in these movements. Infrastructure has been grouped with economics because the state of infrastructure and trade are often tied to economic policies of an HN. If a budget is being spent on other considerations, the infrastructure to include roads, water access, and sanitation might be neglected in some parts of an HN. This can have a most direct effect on the success of an MA mission.

a. Economic Considerations

(1) What are the economic conditions within the HN, and how do these impact the population?

(a) Economists look at financial indicators to assign a sense of how stable a nation is at any given time.
**Best Practice.** IOs such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank produce yearly reports that track these trends, providing open-source analysis that should form a part of assessing the human terrain.

World Bank country reports link:  

IMF country reports link:  
http://www.imf.org/external/country/Index.htm

It might be worth considering contacting an economist, such as the World Bank or IMF’s country representative’s office, to gain further insights that can span from understanding the broader macroeconomics to the more narrowly focused microeconomics that operate within the HN.

(b) An overall perception that can shape the human terrain is how the full range of society feels about the fairness in the economic distribution of wealth. Does a strong gross domestic product necessarily mean that this growth will be felt throughout the nation, or will it take years before that impact is felt at the local level? What is the unemployment rate, both by gender and age?

(2) Has there been a decrease in social mobility of a segment of society? Professor Paul Collier of Oxford University proposed in his paper “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy”, dated Apr 06, that fast population growth and economic decline are major contributing factors in civil wars breaking out. He analysed data from conflicts between 1965-1999 before coming to this conclusion. In particular, if an individual in a society feels that their ability to move up the social ladder has been stifled, particularly if it is felt that this is due to the incompetence or lack of care on the part of the government, then this can be a spark that can lead to waves within the human terrain.

(3) Is there a youth bulge?

(a) A *youth bulge* is a phenomenon where a population has a larger youth population than any other age bracket. It is most common in developing countries where infant mortality rates have decreased, but a high fertility rate remains. Figure 4-6 looks at data collected in 2009; when referencing this figure, one can see that the age distribution in Afghanistan consists of a major *bulge* toward the younger age bracket, as compared to the U.S. where the percentage of population is fairly consistent, tapering off as the population is older.
Having an awareness of whether the HN faces a youth bulge, particularly if coupled with declining employment rates, can help one assess what the current human terrain conditions of that nation may be, and how best to ensure one does not aggravate these conditions when conducting an MA mission.

(4) Is there a potential water conflict within the HN or with its neighbours? These can be exacerbated due to environmental factors, as well as man-made issues. Many nations depend on water not just to quench the thirst of its nation, but also for agricultural purposes. There are water conflicts that can occur both within the border of an HN, as well as with neighbouring countries. Water projects, including dam-building projects, can spark violent conflict in developing nations experiencing water scarcity. When conducting an MA mission, be aware of this politically charged issue that has deep economic and social consequences.

**Important Notes.** Water conflicts are likely to be the sparks of future conflicts within our lifetimes.

(5) Are there any economic pressures on the HN?

(a) Does the HN face inflation pressures? Inflation is the rising cost of goods and services. Developing nations often face highly inflationary...
environments due to a combination of rapid growth, loose monetary policy, and variable exchange rates. Another factor to consider is local currency volatility. Are there any monetary policy challenges? Developing nations often face challenges in setting benchmark interest rates at levels that allow for both sustainable growth while also limiting excess inflation. Does the HN have a reliable and secure process for raising the necessary taxes to fund ongoing government expenses? How does the HN’s level of employment, both public and private sector, compare to other countries of similar development?

(b) Also, does the HN have natural resources such as oil or minerals? If so, are these resources being explored utilizing corporate social responsibility within the parameters of national and international laws? If not, this is a major destabilizing factor and can make for a more volatile human terrain.

Africa is rich in natural resources, but many of its nations are deemed to be unstable due to the lack of corporate social responsibility being shown when exploring these resources. An example of this could be seen in the Niger Delta where the extraction of oil impacted the rivers and the local residents’ way of life. They faced a decrease in social mobility, as well as a removal of their livelihood. Seeing foreign companies gain wealth from the oil that they believed belonged to them coupled with no job creation by these companies led to the creation of a rogue element referred to as the Lost Boys. The Lost Boys would kidnap oil workers for ransom. This is a similar pattern that has been found in other parts of the world where the feeling of social and economic injustice has sparked the creation of a violent anti-government group.

(c) Perhaps there are no natural resources, but economic embargos on the neighbour of an HN. How might that impact the way in which they operate with each other?

(6) How robust is the private sector in the HN? Is there a thriving private sector within the HN, or are there outside companies investing or operating within the HN? What is the ease of doing business within that country? The World Bank ranks each country regarding ease of doing business; this report can help guide one’s understanding of what the influence of the private sector might be in that nation. As mentioned earlier, if local and international laws are adhered to within corporate social responsibility, this can be a stabilizing factor in a nation. If, however, the opposite is the case, this can agitate segments of the population and put a strain on the social contract between the HN and its subjects.

b. Infrastructure Considerations

(1) Does the HN fund and manage infrastructure projects, or are there other groups that fulfil this role? What are the conditions of basic infrastructure? Who pays for, manages, and executes infrastructure projects throughout the HN? This research needs to cover not only the urban centres, but also rural areas, particularly if combined with any of the other economic considerations mentioned in the previous section. For example, who identifies and pays for infrastructure projects in a rural area where there is a youth bulge, low employment, and a
recent decrease in social mobility? If the answer is anyone other than the HN, it is worth exploring why other groups are managing such projects. Schooling and health care are two basic necessities for many societies, and if the HN is not providing these, then the social contract between those individuals and the HN will be weaker. This is part of the geography of the human terrain for SOF consideration.

**Important Note.** Are the roads, bus terminals, airports, hospitals, and schools well maintained in their physical infrastructure and safe for those using them? Even in remote parts of the world, the decay of a road can have a grave impact on those who use it. In fact, it can be life threatening if the only safe road that allows access to health care or employment is closed or damaged.

(2) Is there electricity or other energy to power homes or factories? Power shortages can have an immediate impact on the economy of an HN. Factories cannot operate, unless they are able to afford and have been fitted with generators. Households suffer if the electricity cuts out and the weather temperatures are dangerously high. Having a sense of how much energy costs for the full spectrum of society, and what their access to such sources is can help when identifying pressures on the human terrain.

(3) How does weather impact the infrastructure? With extreme weather conditions impacting many parts of the world, how do seasonal, as well as unforeseen, storms impact the infrastructure of the HN? If a storm hits an HN and the economically disadvantaged members of that society are the ones most strongly impacted, how might that impact an MA mission in that country?

(4) What is the broadband or mobile phone access? Tied in with the information section, who provides broadband and mobile phone service in the HN? Have they provided coverage throughout the HN, or is it isolated to certain urban pockets?

c. **Economic and Infrastructure Considerations Conclusion.** There is a great deal of interweaving between strands that build the human terrain. The economic and infrastructure considerations add additional levers that can add or reduce pressure within the political, military, social, and information spaces.

4-6. **Summary.** This chapter explored the political, military, social, information, economic, and infrastructure elements that build one’s understanding of the cultural human terrain. While each individual factor might not be overly complicated, pulling the full spectrum together can be complex. It is a necessary task, however, both ahead of launching an MA mission, as well as when one is conducting that mission. There are certain nuances to these factors that SOF’s partner within the HN may be able to provide, and gaining a wide perspective regarding the push-pull factors operating within the HN can help ensure a more successful MA mission. As mentioned earlier, just as one takes into consideration land, air, and sea conditions when moving forward with standard operations, in MA missions, a crucial element for consideration is the human terrain. Additionally, the information on PMESII gathered when analysing the cultural human terrain is also used in F2UID. This concept will be further explored in the following chapters.
Important Note. The cultural aid matrix (Annex D) is an example of a tool used to analyse the environment before conducting MA. Each matrix needs to be tailored to the AOI and should have heavy input from those with a deep understanding of the cultural terrain in question. The matrix in Annex D was developed with Afghanistan in mind, but can be adapted from HN to HN.
CHAPTER 5 – INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE

5-1. General

a. When NATO SOF deploy into the joint operations area (JOA) to conduct MA, they do so with a number of intelligence-related issues that affect them and the HNSF that they will be working with. From the NATO SOF perspective, SOF will need to conduct the usual comprehensive preparation of the operational environment (CPOE) that drives the SOF planning process and the development of MA COAs. SOF then need a robust intelligence apparatus that will help feed and support the deployed SOF units so that they can conduct their MA tasks effectively and, when required, launch seamlessly into SR and DA tasks in support of the MA mission.

**Important Note.** SOF must help the HNSF they are partnered with develop an intelligence structure that is sustainable long after SOF have left.

b. The primary aim for this chapter is to describe how intelligence can support the NATO SOF MA mission, specifically, how intelligence can provide HN teams with timely and actionable intelligence for planning, execution, and support of military operations in peace, crisis, and conflict.

5-2. Intelligence Support to Military Assistance. Intelligence support during MA missions can be divided into two separate tasks: support to SOF and support to HN forces. Intelligence support to SOF during an MA mission should be the same as with other missions with some additional considerations. First, supporting the planning process is essential. In most cases, an MA mission will be conducted in a COIN environment, so additional cultural and human terrain factors should be considered in the estimate and CPOE. Intelligence support will also be provided to the DA and SR missions conducted within an MA operation. The additional considerations for these missions are the effect the operation will have on the HN forces and the population itself. Intelligence personnel have a responsibility to help monitor FP issues, including insider threats. In coordination with the J3, intelligence personnel should keep a database of HN personnel, preferably with biometrics enrolments. They should also help make the commander aware of sensitivities for HN personnel in operations. For example, depending on the situation, it might not be good for an HN member to participate in an operation in their own village if it is likely to bring pressure on them or their family from enemy forces.

a. **Situation Awareness.** During the SA phase of the planning cycle, intelligence analysts are expected to develop RFIs, make initial judgements about threats and risks, build a knowledge base, initiate the CPOE, identify collection requirements, and make initial assessments. This phase is likely to begin well before a deployment occurs. The intelligence analyst should be looking ahead to areas where potential MA missions are and gathering basic intelligence data to build the knowledge base. This assessment should include detailed information on the geographic area, the enemy and

“The reason why we were able to proceed relatively quickly in the beginning was that we started our planning very early and we shaped the environment.” – Col Karel Rehka, COM, 601st SFG, Czech Republic

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7 For additional details on CPOE refer to the NSHQ SOCC Planning Handbook, dated Apr 14.
his activities, and the weather. The analyst should also begin building a threat database, as well as an understanding of the human terrain factors in the region. The intelligence personnel have a responsibility to provide as much detailed, up-to-date information for this initial stage as possible to aid in the planning process.8

b. **Intelligence Process.** At this stage, intelligence analysts should be also considering the following factors:

1. **What are the collection resources that are available in the area?** Analysts should consider traditional ISR assets, as well as non-traditional resources. Potential sources of information should be identified as soon as possible.

2. **How will intelligence be disseminated to coalition partners, as well as HN personnel?** Standard processes and procedures for dissemination should be established early in the planning process to ensure interoperability and maximize sharing.

3. **How can classified information be made releasable to HN forces?** This is often a difficult process and may not be required immediately, but it will soon be necessary for the MA mission to be successful. The earlier in the planning these processes are established, the more seamless the sharing of information will be and will likely prevent frustration on the part of the HN forces.

4. **What intelligence training material should be available to HN forces?** Like the question of releasability, this process will take time and should be started as soon as possible. Materials will need to be approved for release and most likely translated into the HN language.

c. **Appreciation.** During the appreciation phase of the planning cycle, intelligence analysts are expected to initiate the estimate process, develop the CPOE, expand collection requirements, and make sure the requirements are prioritized realistically to gain the information that is most important. In an MA environment, this phase is critical to developing an effective plan. The J2 should be able to help planners understand the nation, national challenges, cultural issues, and national restraints and constraints. The CPOE should take the human terrain into account and consider long-term and psychological effects of historical events and cultural developments. The J2 should strive to identify root causes of the situation and not merely the symptoms. In addition to the basic information provided in the CPOE, it should also include assessments of:

1. **The insurgent or criminal movement, including underlying causes, demographics of the members, history, objectives, claims to legitimacy, and methods.**

2. **The HN government, military, and other institutions that exercise power formally or informally.** There may be times when analysts are expected to provide information that would help assess the HNSF units identified to receive MA or SFA. This assessment should include:

   a. Strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and actual sources of power

   b. Interrelationships among the organizations

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8 Col Karel Rehka quotes from the NSHQ Lessons Learned Bulletin, dated 31 Aug 12.
(c) Goals and motivating factors for each group

(d) Relationships with NATO

(e) Other advisors or foreign influence

(3) The population. Factors to consider are the demography, culture, taboos, beliefs, customs, history, goals, needs, ethnic composition, and expectations. Most importantly, the dynamics and interrelationships of the groups within the society should be understood, including who can influence whom and how this influence is exercised. Since most MA missions will have the ultimate goal of transitioning security and legitimacy to HN forces, it is important to identify and understand what the population views as legitimate. The analysts should also identify areas of development with the greatest effect on the population or greatest detriment to the enemy.

(4) Experts. As early as possible, experts should be identified and consulted to help place facts into cultural context. This will help prevent analysts from mirror imaging or interpreting facts based on their own cultural bias, which would lead to the development of incorrect COAs.

(5) White forces in the area. This may include other GOs or NGOs. Their location, goals, and influence on the population should be identified.

“The key is to understand the operational environment. It is not just the intel, it is not just the enemy, but it is also about friendlies, locals, economy, and so on. It is not about reading intel reports. It is about actually going out and speaking to people. Speaking to interpreters, to locals, go to the OCCP and talking to various people.” – Col Rehka

d. Support to Operations. This includes the orientation, CONOPS development, plan development, and execution and assessments phases of the planning cycle. A complete understanding of the human terrain factors will help in analysing the actor systems to be influenced and critical collection requirements. It will also help in identifying requirements for interaction with relevant international or national actors and centres of gravity (COGs). This will help in developing effective lines of operation (LoOs). During the CONOPS development, the effect of friendly and opposing COAs on the population and the capability of HN forces should be considered.

e. F2UID. The F2UID cycle (detailed in Chapter 6) is an effective tool for understanding the operational environment. During the find phase of the cycle, appropriate collection requirements should be identified based on gaps in knowledge. Without collection efforts to fill these gaps, it is unlikely that desired objectives will be achieved. The J2 and J3 targeteers should work closely to develop collection requirements that meet the operational objective. During the feel phase, analysts may find it useful to combine the areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events (ASCOPE) and PMESII concepts described in the targeting and human terrain chapters respectively (see Figure 5-1). This chart should not be considered an intelligence product that must be fully filled out to be useful, but rather should be used as a guide to help the analyst ensure all aspects of the operational environment are
considered. As Chapter 6 mentions, the understand phase of the cycle is the most important phase and can also be the most difficult. Using tools such as the ASCOPE/PMESII chart help identify key components, and the analyst can then use other methods, such as network analysis tools and geospatial analysis tools, to help fully understand the complex dynamics in an MA environment, as well as the enemy’s network and key vulnerabilities. Some considerations that are often overlooked are:

1. How will the local populace react to the use or threat of force? Will they respond by submitting, protesting, or revolting?

2. What is the historical relationship between HNSF and the populace?

3. Are there complicating factors that exist in the internal relationships between security forces (e.g. police and army)?

4. Are there secular or religious factors (e.g. sheikhs, imams, clans, tribes) to the security picture that may affect how security forces are organized, manned, or deployed?

5. What infrastructure (e.g. transportation nodes, energy production/storage areas, cultural/religious icons) needs specific/dedicated protection?

6. What coalition, international, or NGO formal agreements, treaties, or cooperation were in effect prior to engagement? Are they still in effect?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>POLITICAL</th>
<th>MILITARY</th>
<th>ECONOMIC</th>
<th>SOCIAL</th>
<th>INFRASTRUCTURE</th>
<th>INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District/provincial boundaries, party affiliation areas, threat shadow government influence areas</td>
<td>Friendly bases, historic ambush sites, threat bases</td>
<td>Business/trade areas, farming areas, livelihood dealers, smuggling routes, legal/illegal exchange, natural resource areas</td>
<td>Gathering places, shura locations</td>
<td>Irrigation networks, water tables, medical service areas</td>
<td>Radio/TV/newspaper coverage areas, word-of-mouth gathering points, graffiti, posters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRUCTURE</td>
<td>District/provincial centers, shura halls, polling sites, judiciary buildings, mobile courts</td>
<td>District/provincial police headquarters, threatened/occupied buildings/businesses</td>
<td>Bazaars, food/green storage, banks, mining structures, industrial plants</td>
<td>Mosques, wedding halls, restaurants</td>
<td>Roads, bridges, electrical lines, dams</td>
<td>Caliph/radio/TV towers and buildings, print shops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPABILITIES</td>
<td>Dispute resolution, local leadership, threat influence of state (judiciary, police, politics)</td>
<td>Local security forces protection of population, QRF presence and effectiveness, threat strength/weapons/recruiting</td>
<td>Access to bases, ability to withstand drought, development, rate of black market</td>
<td>Ability to build/maintain roads, walls, dams, irrigation system, sewage</td>
<td>Availability/influence of media, access to phone/internet/TV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION</td>
<td>Political parties, threat affiliation, government, NGOs, judiciary system</td>
<td>Friendly, government, threat, local militia</td>
<td>Banks, large landholdings, businesses, black market</td>
<td>Tribes, clans, families, shuras</td>
<td>Government ministries, construction companies</td>
<td>News, mosques, threat information cells</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEOPLE</td>
<td>Governors, councils, shura members, elders, relatives, parliament members, judiciary, threat shadow politicians</td>
<td>Friendly, government, threat, local militia members and leaders</td>
<td>Bankers, landholders, merchants, money lenders, smugglers, financiers</td>
<td>Multi-later, elders, shura members, influential families, entertainment figures</td>
<td>Builders, contractors, local development councils</td>
<td>Media persons, elders, elders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVENTS</td>
<td>Elections, shuras, trips, provincial council meetings, speeches, significant trials, threat courts</td>
<td>Kinetic events, leadership, operations</td>
<td>Drought, harvest, business</td>
<td>Friday prayers, holidays, weddings, funerals, births, boxer days</td>
<td>Road/bridge/wall, school construction</td>
<td>Road/bridge/wall, school construction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

f. **Defeat the Network.** The understanding of the operational environment developed in the planning and targeting process should help ensure that appropriate actions are taken in the influence and disrupt phases of F2UID. The effects on the population from targeting the threat should be particularly considered in the MA environment. The primary duty of intelligence analysts in MA is to produce intelligence
that will help prevent insurgency or lawlessness. In most cases, individuals involved in
these activities are also part of the society.

Important Note. The threat should be engaged discriminately
to avoid alienating the population. Targeting operations
should be carefully weighed to determine potential gain versus
potential cost. Often, focusing on the enemy’s infrastructure
rather than his tactical units can mitigate the risks.

g. **Collection Considerations.** Often in an MA environment, due to the insurgent
environment, politics, and military tactics, intelligence requirements can only be met by
reporting minute details on a great variety of subject areas. Each detail may appear
unrelated to others and insignificant by itself; however, when mapped and chronologically
recorded over long periods and analysed with other reported details, may lead to
definitive and predictable patterns of insurgent activity. For these reasons, intelligence
must come from the tactical level and shared with higher. Atmospherics, such as
population and HN forces’ attitudes and capabilities, can only be gathered by the forces
on the ground. Because of their proximity and access to the local populace, SOF
involved in an MA mission have a unique ability to collect this information. Higher HQ
intelligence agencies may provide some help, but they will only be able to analyse and
fuse the information that is provided to them. Patrol reports and training reports are
essential for evaluating the effectiveness of the operations. This information would be
very difficult for more distant collectors to obtain. Care must be taken, however, to
ensure that the relationship with their HN counterparts is not damaged by these activities.
h. **Handover/Takeover.** Intelligence personnel should remember that MA missions are not often short and will require turnover of personnel. Databases of information and a common intelligence picture should be established early to facilitate handover/turnover. The intelligence personnel should ensure that the incoming forces are provided continuous intelligence updates and the most current common intelligence picture, and help them become familiar with the ongoing priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), intelligence requirements, and collection efforts. The incoming forces must also have the latest intelligence on enemy forces that affect the mission. This will include data on terrorists, insurgents, criminal elements, and related incidents over the past several months. The incoming MA force should also be aware of the capability and status of the HN force, as well as local problems within the civilian populace.

5-3. **Analyse Host Nation Intelligence Capability.** The second task for intelligence support during an MA mission is providing support and enabling the HN to support their own forces with intelligence. In order to effectively do this, J2 personnel should first analyse HN capability to conduct intelligence operations. In this process, care should be taken not to equate technology to capability or intellectual level. Aspects that should be evaluated are:

a. **Processes.** Does the HN intelligence organization have the capability or structures in place to complete each step of the intelligence cycle (Figure 5-2)? Can they get G&D and translate them into collection requirements? Do they have mechanisms in place to take information from collection sources and process it so that it can be used in intelligence products? Can they effectively analyse and fuse the information so that it can be disseminated in a timely manner to provide required support to operations?

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“The best human intelligence was gathered by Allen Dulles and his office in Bern, which, through star agents like Fritz Kolbe, uncovered crucial information on German diplomatic efforts and war plans.

“OSS operators in the Mediterranean pinned down numerous German divisions. In Greece in particular, the Germans paid a heavy price as they withdrew north toward the Reich. Even the failed Sparrow Mission to Hungary drew German divisions from the front, degrading their operational effectiveness for the Normandy invasion.

“In France, OSS's Jed, OG, and SO teams helped mobilize the Resistance, engaging thousands of German soldiers, and seriously interfering with the ability of the German army to move troops to the beaches during the crucial early days of the campaign. As the campaign in France unfolded, agents provided crucial tactical and strategic intelligence.

“OSS provided the bulk of the intelligence for the invasion of southern France, pinpointing German defenses, supply depots, and order of battle information, helping make Dragoon one of the most successful Allied landings of the war.”

b. **Assets.** What collection assets do they have available? Often they will not have technologically advanced assets but should maximize those that are available.

c. **Integration Into Operations.** Does the intelligence organization contribute to the planning process for operations? Are they included early in the planning process and continue to be involved throughout?

d. **Exploitation.** Do they have the capability of gathering information during operations that have intelligence value? Again, the focus should not be on technological capabilities but fundamentals of exploitation, such as document exploitation and tactical questioning. Do they provide input to the mission planning that enables the collection of relevant information? Can they process the information and use it in fused intelligence products?

e. **Dissemination.** Do they have an established system for disseminating intelligence? Is it secure? Do the appropriate people have access to the system? Does everyone contribute intelligence in a timely manner?

f. **Training.** Have they established a training programme for intelligence analysts? Can their current capability be sustained?

5-4. **Build Host Nation Intelligence Capability.** After the analysis of the HN intelligence capability, the MA mission is to help build it further. As mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the earlier required training materials are identified, the sooner capability building can begin. More than likely, the classification of the materials will have to be validated and, depending on the languages spoken by the HN forces, they may need to be translated.
As Col Rehka, COM 601st CZE SFG put it, “I am convinced we were there to develop the Afghans, not to change them. They are not going to be Europeans or Americans. They need to be good enough; they need to use their own strengths. We need to make sure we teach them about some of their weaknesses to make it right. Basically, I believe they can operate all the time from the very beginning because they will operate anyway, with or without us. So we should not try to change them. We should just help them and enable them and let them do what they can.”

Ideally, HN intelligence organizations should apply the principles of intelligence within their own culture and structures.

a. Intelligence Principles

(1) Centralized Control. Intelligence must be centrally controlled to avoid duplication of work, provide mutual support, and ensure the efficient use of all resources.

(2) Timeliness. Intelligence is useless if it arrives at its destination too late. The system through which sources and agencies are tasked must be capable of reflecting, without delay, any significant changes in the operational situation.

(3) Systematic Exploitation. Sources and agencies must be systematically exploited by methodical tasking, based on a thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations.

(4) Objectivity. Any temptation to distort information to fit preconceived ideas must be resisted.

(5) Accessibility. Relevant information and intelligence must be readily accessible to intelligence staffs and to users.

(6) Responsiveness. The intelligence staff must be responsive to the intelligence requirements of the commander at all times.

(7) Source Protection. All sources of information must be adequately protected.

(8) Continuous Review. Intelligence must be continuously reviewed and, where necessary, revised, taking into account all new information and comparing it with that which is already known.

b. Personnel/Command and Control Structure

c. Increase Intelligence Collection Capability. Help the HN intelligence force develop more collection capabilities. Keep in mind that the end state of an MA mission should include transfer of responsibility to the HN forces. Therefore, the development of their collection capabilities should focus on methods that they can sustain. As Col Rehka put it, “I believe that we are getting spoiled. Recently, some of our forces went too hi-tech with too much nice technology during tactical missions. We are forgetting the real
body of SOF: to get on the ground, to get there quickly, with very limited resources, to take risk and basically do whatever you can with these very limited resources." Keeping this principle in mind will help the MA force identify valid sources of information without relying too heavily on technology.

(1) Human intelligence (HUMINT) is the most basic form of intelligence collection and requires very little in the way of technology. It does require training to learn to develop sources (J3 role) and to evaluate the sources of information. HN intelligence forces should be taught the importance of evaluating the sources of information and providing feedback to the collectors. They should also understand methods for evaluating information critically to remove bias. Even though HN forces should understand the culture and mindset of the population (and therefore sources), they must recognize that everyone has biases based on their own personal experiences. Critical thinking and structured analysis will help them understand how to be more objective in their analysis.

(2) Signal intelligence (SIGINT)/electronic warfare (EW) are collection disciplines that are difficult to do without some advanced level of technology. However, often the HN will at least have tactical-level SIGINT/EW collection capabilities, and the MA force can help them use these most effectively. They can also help them identify non-traditional sources of SIGINT collection. For example, if law enforcement agencies have the capability to intercept signals, developing relationships with these organizations can provide a great deal of intelligence for the HN force.

(3) Imagery intelligence is also a collection discipline that can require advanced technology. Much like SIGINT though, there are often capabilities that can be enhanced. For example, ISAF use cameras on helicopters, not as dedicated collection assets, but to increase unclassified imagery collection in the areas they are already flying. If the MA force has any airborne assets, they may consider some non-traditional methods for increasing coverage in the JOA. Geospatial intelligence can also be complicated, but there are many open-source tools available that HN forces can use to evaluate the terrain.

d. **Introduction to Major Intelligence Products.** HN forces should also be taught about the various types of intelligence products and how they can assist in operational planning and mission support. Some of these products are:

(1) Intelligence preparation of the battlespace. This should be similar to the CPOE performed by the MA force, without the evaluation of the HN forces. HNSF should understand the importance of evaluating the effect operations have on the population.

(2) Current evaluations of the adversary situation. HN forces should understand the importance of maintaining an up-to-date assessment of the enemy situation and communicating it in a timely manner. This is related to the principle of intelligence known as continuous review. As the situation changes, the intelligence must be re-evaluated to ensure continued accuracy.

(3) Threat assessments. FP assessments are an important aspect of HN intelligence products. HN intelligence forces should continually evaluate the security of their own forces and threats to that security.
(4) Evaluations of operation’s effectiveness. HN intelligence forces must understand that to maintain a current understanding of the adversary situation, assessments do not stop after an operation. The effects of the operation must be monitored and evaluated to determine the impact on the threat, as well as the population, and help inform decision-makers for future operational planning.

(5) Target intelligence packages based on timely, operationally accurate information. HN intelligence forces should be able to evaluate the environment and select appropriate targets to achieve the desired effects. The information provided needs to be as up to date and accurate as possible to ensure operational success.

(6) Future target development. HN intelligence forces should understand that target development can be a time-consuming process. New target development cannot be effective if future targets are not continuously being identified and developed.

e. **Integration with Their Own Host Nation Teams.** HN intelligence teams should understand the importance of being fully integrated into the planning process early on. They should provide assessments that help inform operational planning, as well as tactical mission support. Regular updates on the air and ground situation should be provided and specific intelligence requirements should be collected and answered.

**Important Note.** The intelligence assessments should never be conducted in a vacuum. There should be constant information sharing with other HN sections to ensure everyone has the same current intelligence picture.

f. **Employment Considerations.** As mentioned previously, the MA force should direct intelligence assistance efforts toward creating a self-sufficient HN intelligence and communications capability. HN intelligence members should be made aware of the importance of rules of engagement (ROE), especially as it relates to targeting. Knowing what the ROE are will enable the selection of appropriate and legal targets. Assistance should be tailored to the level of the threat, equipment, and technology in support of the HN.

5-5. **Intelligence Challenges**

a. **Operations Security.** One of the first challenges an HN intelligence force will face is how to ensure information is protected. Operations security (OPSEC) will require establishing procedures for assigning security clearances and limiting access to information for those who are properly cleared. HN forces should also be trained on counter-intelligence (CI) concerns.

b. **Counter-intelligence.** CI is a critical FP asset that offers the SOCC varied support including operations, investigations, collection, and theatre analysis. The SOCC J2X (if established) coordinates with the JTF HQ J2X (if established) to acquire support for special operations. The SOCC may consider early deployment of CI personnel to establish communications with HNSF. An effective CI programme can detect, counter, and where possible, exploit foreign and/or adversary intelligence collection activities directed against SOF. CI contributes to the overall aspects of OPSEC and FP by
detecting and dealing with possible breaches in security. CI activities support the commander by detecting, evaluating, counteracting, and preventing hostile intelligence collection, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, or assassination operations from occurring. The focus for CI includes:

(1) How the adversary’s intelligence structure works.

(2) Intelligence systems and platforms available to the adversary.

(3) How vulnerable SOCC forces are to adversary intelligence.

(4) How the adversary has been known to target and how planners can anticipate where the adversary might target deployed forces.

(5) Success of adversary intelligence efforts as indicated by operations executed against the population and security forces.

c. Non-traditional Threats

(1) Non-traditional threats, such as the insider threat, can undermine MA activities, as well as the cohesion between the MA and HN forces. Strategically, they can undermine the overall efforts of the international community. Tactically, the breakdown of trust, communication, and cooperation between HN and MA forces can affect military capability. Eliminating and/or minimizing the insider threat, especially by proper preparation and training of forces, is critical to mission success. However, more stringent FP controls and measures that are overtly heavy handed must be well balanced yet culturally sensitive enough to not send the wrong message to the very people and organizations the MA force is trying to assist.

(2) Adversaries may view attacks against coalition forces as a particularly effective tactic, especially when using co-opted HN forces to conduct these attacks. While these types of insider or green-on-blue attacks have been context-specific to a particular theatre, MA forces should nevertheless ensure that their FP plans take into account the potential for these types of attacks and plan appropriate countermeasures as the situation dictates. To reduce the potential for insider attacks, HN forces should be further vetted to identify individuals whose motivations toward the HN and coalition are in question.
The dangers of not establishing a process for vetting HN forces early are illustrated by the following excerpts from Robert M. Gillespie’s book, *Black Ops, Vietnam: The Operational History of MACVSOG*.9

“Sleeping with the Enemy”

“The real problem for MACSOG was its collaboration with, and dependence on, its South Vietnamese counterparts. All of SOG’s Timberwork long-term agents and its civilian employees were hired and vetted by the South Vietnamese National Police Force, known as one of the most corrupt components of one of the most corrupt regimes on earth. U.S. intelligence agencies had long known that the South Vietnamese government and military were riddled with communist dich van agents, the numbers of which were estimated to range anywhere from 5,000 to 30,000.

“Of course, most of these agents were low-level sources, but many had served for years under false covers, during which time they could have risen to prominent and trusted positions within the political, economic, and military structure of South Vietnam. One did not have to go that far, however. The nature of the American disposition in South Vietnam (with its gargantuan logistics bases and plethora of amenities) provided ample opportunity for the communists to infiltrate agents in the guise of cooks, laundresses, clerks, secretaries, interpreters, and so forth. It was, therefore, more than probable that most MACSOG and STD programs were compromised, at some level, from their inception.

“That MACSOG was prey to these agents is amply documented. For example, Lieutenant Hong Tran, a MACSOG STRATA team leader, was captured by the communists in southern Laos in 1971. When he was interrogated by North Vietnamese authorities, he was shown photographs taken from the water tower inside the main SOG compound at Da Nang.

“While Maj. Pat Lang, intelligence officer with the STD advisory team, was going through counter-intelligence investigation files, he noticed that there were severe discrepancies in the polygraph examinations given to Vietnamese civilians who provided support activities for MACSOG in Saigon. Two of these individuals (whom Lang had very serious doubts about) were the driver of Colonel Singlaub and the bartender at House 10, the transient billet within SOG's headquarters itself.

“Attempts to include the South Vietnamese authorities in the embrace of the American effort in order to enhance their confidence and cooperation were rife and probably self-defeating. As an example, Gen. Joseph McChristian, chief of MACV intelligence, advanced a policy of releasing classified information to the South Vietnamese up to and including those bearing the NOFORN (No Foreign Dissemination) classification. After a review by the DIA, most of this material was released by MACV on a need-to-know basis.

“Two examples should suffice to describe the detrimental effects of such policies. Colonel Singlaub reported in his memoirs that he held briefings and discussed all of his operations with Colonel Ho, head of the STS/STD. Only later did he learn that Ho then briefed President Thieu on agent team operations in North Vietnam. Only later did he discover that there was a communist spy present at every briefing.

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9 MACVSOG stands for Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – Studies and Observations Group; STD stands for strategic technical directorate; STS stands for strategic technical service.
“Almost two decades after the end of the war, intelligence analyst Sedgewick Tourison reported to ex-SOG major George Gaspard that North Vietnamese newspapers and television had hailed agent "Francois," who had helped the Ministry of Security to thwart many U.S. spy operations; he was cited as a senior South Vietnamese officer working at MACSOG headquarters. After comparing the agent's face to Gaspard's extensive photo collection, Tourison recognized the man as a major who had run the long-term agent program.

“Agent Francois was the alias of Do Van Tien, who had worked with MACSOG since its creation. After the fall of the southern regime, Tien was sentenced to three years (1975-78) in a political re-education camp. According to his fellow prisoners, Tien's sentence was reduced in return for his cooperation in providing to the Vietnamese security apparatus a complete inside account of STS/STD and MACSOG methods and activities. According to authors Kenneth Conboy and Dale Andrade, who conducted interviews with the agents who had been captured in North Vietnam and had been incarcerated with Tien, the man had not been a spy during the war. Such are the vicissitudes of the intelligence business.

“Perhaps even more problematic was CIA and U.S. military intelligence penetration of the entourages of both President Thieu and Prime Minister Ky. They were both probably well bugged as well. American interests may have best been served by avoiding security investigations of the top South Vietnamese leaders.”

“During the year the Security Branch began to collect and collate counterpart organization biographic files, all MACSOG detachment commanders were ordered to begin maintaining personnel files on their counterparts. Background security investigations of indigenous personnel were also begun (they were previously handled by the South Vietnamese Liaison Service), but security checks were completed on only 2,800 men during the year, leaving 5,000 more to go. This was hardly reassuring for a covert organization that had been in operation for four years.”

d. **Classification.** Intelligence-sharing procedures between NATO allies and counterparts should be agreed upon early in the SOCC planning process. The SOCC J2 should have knowledge of foreign disclosure policies and procedures. TCNs should obtain disclosure authorizations through the SOCC as early as possible when the SOCC will be involved in multinational intelligence activities. Procedures should be put in place to expedite new releases once operations have begun and all nations, agencies, and centres are encouraged to provide information or intelligence that could be used to enhance the success of the NATO mission. If not in conflict with security regulations and caveats, the principle write for release should be considered for intelligence products, though the distribution of intelligence products will always follow the well-known need-to-share principle. Procedures for sharing information to and from HN forces should also be established as early as possible.

5-6. **Summary.** Intelligence support to MA is essentially two distinct tasks that should appear to be seamlessly integrated. Intelligence personnel have a responsibility to provide threat information to SOF to reduce risk for them during deployments and operations. This is more difficult to accomplish in the complex operating environment where MA normally occurs and

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requires constant focus on collecting and analysing the right types of information. Also given the possibilities of insider threats when working with HN forces, there is a responsibility to provide information to our own forces for their own protection. However, the collection and reporting can cause tension between MA forces and HN forces if they are not handled properly. At the same time, MA forces should be enabling the HN intelligence forces to provide accurate and timely intelligence to deter and defend against transnational and internal threats to security. This training and mentoring should always be done with the goal of helping the HN forces establish a self-sustaining intelligence process that will help them provide support for their own operations.
CHAPTER 6 – TARGETING EFFECTS

6-1. General. MA is a powerful tool used by SOF, as well as conventional forces (or general purpose forces), to influence the various targeted audiences within the NATO JOA. Depending on the crisis area, political sensitivities of the HN, and SOF objectives, MA may include a combination of lethal and non-lethal actions. NATO SOF conducting MA may have to take part in the planning, rehearsal, and execution of lethal and non-lethal operations with selected HNSF. As such, NATO SOF must understand the effects that their MA task will have on both the social and threat networks in their AOO, as well as all audiences, both internal and external to the crisis area.

6-2. Military Assistance Targeting

a. The overall goal of targeting is to achieve operational objectives by creating effects upon an adversary, a potential adversary, or undecided audiences through the use of lethal or non-lethal means. Targeting during MA should not only focus on achieving the desired effects against an adversary, a potential adversary, or undecided audiences, but also must focus on achieving desired effects with regards to developing the partnered HNSF. SOF accomplish this through the application of activities that influence these critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, and/or the conduct of combined operations.

b. SOF must implement a comprehensive approach when conducting the targeting process during MA, which advocates that all audiences, military and non-military, be considered. This approach ensures that the effects of lethal and non-lethal actions are considered logically with an understanding of how those actions affect the targeted (intended) and non-targeted (un-intended) audiences.

**Important Note.** During MA operations, HN officials and security force leadership must be part of every process. NATO SOF’s processes and methodologies must be combined with those of the security forces and political leaders of the nation being assisted and must be in sync with their national, regional, and local priorities. Any process done unilaterally by NATO SOF excludes an audience we must influence.

(1) **Find, Feel, Understand, Influence, and Disrupt**

(a) F2UID is a targeting tool that can be used in order to develop an operational picture and to describe the operational environment. It provides the baseline understanding of the HN population and the complex networks of the audiences and connections forced by ethnic divides, tribes, economics, crime, and internal conflict. Once

![F2UID Diagram](image-url)
information about the environment and potential target audiences is developed and processed, users of the information can begin to develop ways to influence or disrupt targets through lethal or non-lethal means.

1/ **Find**

a/ During MA, the *find* stage is the opportunity to begin to understand the operational environment. Once information is collected, the relationships between various networks, actors, and audiences that may be active in the AOO or AOI are identified. These networks, actors, and audiences (to include their associated supporting networks, actors, and audiences) must be analysed and evaluated to determine if they are a positive influence that contributes to the stability and security of the AOO or a negative influence that threatens it.

b/ All resources and relationships should be exploited in order to provide increased clarity to the development of the operational picture. While ISR is the key to many aspects of targeting, information provided through partnering with HNSF, KLEs, and interactions with the local population is increasingly important for a more complete understanding of the operational environment.

2/ **Feel.** In order to appreciate the AOO, it is useful to utilize the PMESII (as detailed in Chapter 4, Human Terrain) or the ASCOPE concept. During this process, a number of civil considerations are analysed from various perspectives: the population, the opposition, and the HN forces involved. This helps to identify areas of influence and weakness, leading to more accurate and effective targeting. This analysis also identifies those areas, groups, and individuals that may be of interest for exploitation, influencing, or direct targeting.

a/ **A – Areas.** Developing knowledge on the demographics in the AOO and where particular tribes, ethnicities, religious communities, or criminal networks exist and operate, helps to shape the understanding of where in the AOO the targeted audiences may be susceptible to targeting and influence. These identified areas may be supportive, permissive, or hostile to NATO SOF and the partnered HN.

b/ **S – Structures.** Consider how certain structures of interest are used by the opposition, HNSF, and the local population. If NATO SOF plan to use a structure, ensure that the impact on the local population is low or effectively mitigated. Examples of key structures include government buildings, television and radio stations, electrical power plants and dams, oil refineries, sewage treatment plants, churches/mosques, and schools.

c/ **C – Capabilities.** The ability of the local authorities or HN forces to provide the essential services that impact quality
of life, especially for the neutral sect of the population. If the local government cannot provide basic services (e.g. administration, security, emergency services, public health, food, water, or sanitation) for the population, then the area becomes an AOI for the opposition to work against the established government.

d/ **O – Organizations.** Analyse all of the key organizations within an area. This can include religious, political, labour unions, criminal organizations, and community organizations. Additionally, evaluate other actors in the AOO, to include IOs, NGOs, and other forces (HN and other coalition) that might have different aims, objectives, and purposes.

e/ **P – People.** Continue to build on the previous step to determine the background, motivations, and goals of the human infrastructure within the AOO. Knowledge gained during analysis should be used to determine the best way to influence key individuals or groups to achieve the desired effects in support of NATO SOF objectives.

f/ **E – Events.** Certain events trigger emotions within the population. Some examples are national and religious holidays, changes in seasons, and elections. These particular events should be analysed to determine if NATO SOF can use them to their advantage to extend their influence and the influence of the partnered HNSF in an area. Analysis should also identify actions or activities that should be avoided during these particular events that could be detrimental to the NATO SOF MA mission or exploited by the opposition for their own benefit.

3/ **Understand.** All information collected must be analysed and fused as if it is going to be used for operations. For this reason, the understand phase of F2UID is the most important. It requires a level of cooperation between the intelligence and operations cells. Intelligence drives the process of understanding, but it is led by operations. Analysts have a variety of tools and processes to develop, display, and manage information in order to mould it into a useable form for understanding purposes.

**Important Note.** Intelligence drives the process of understanding, but it is led by operations.

4/ **Influence.** Influence is the action or the process of producing effects on the behaviours or opinions of an actor. A detailed analysis of potential audiences will identify those actors who are most likely to be susceptible to influence and have the accessibility to be reached
by the influencing message. Analysis will also identify which key actors can be employed as an influencing agent for SOF objectives. Once potential audiences and actors or identified, targeting activities should be coordinated through the targeting process.

5/ Disrupt. To disrupt is to prevent the effective interaction or the cohesion of the adversary combat, influence, or support operations. If the desired effect is not possible through direct or indirect means, NATO SOF may look to disrupt an adversary’s activity by conducting lethal or non-lethal operations.

(b) F2UID is not a quick process. Time and resources must be invested to ensure that the information and the products produced are relevant. If done successfully, the F2UID process can greatly enhance operational effectiveness. Once the information gained from F2UID is processed, it allows users to develop ways to influence and disrupt targets through lethal and non-lethal means using a targeting process like find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate (F3EAD).

Important Note. The vital link between intelligence and operations in targeting helps assure that well-informed decisions are made based on the detailed information collected from the F2UID process that leads to a potentially high tempo F3EAD targeting process directed against key targets/audiences and networks that may be dynamic or time sensitive in nature.

(2) Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse, and Disseminate. F3EAD provides NATO SOF with a methodology that enables the organization of resources and the array of forces to quickly apply lethal or non-lethal effects against deliberate or dynamic targets. F3EAD is well suited for engaging personalities or high-value individuals who are persons of interest (adversary, potential adversary, neutral, or friendly) who must be identified, tracked, and influenced through the use of information (non-lethal effects) or fires (lethal effects).

(a) Find. The knowledge of the environment, actors, audiences, and networks gained through F2UID produces the information that generates the find during the F3EAD targeting process. The find is the starting point for target nomination and intelligence collection. As NATO SOF continue to expand their knowledge of the AOO during the conduct of MA, the collection of additional key information will lead to further refinement of the intelligence required to transition from the find to the fix phase of F3EAD.
(b) **Fix.** Once a target has been identified during the *find* phase, the full extent of intelligence collection assets can be applied to develop operational triggers to *fix* the target in time and space. During MA, the traditional use of ISR and other forms of intelligence collection to fix the target can be greatly enhanced by the HNSF’s ability to collect HUMINT about the target. This depends on the operational capability and credibility of the HNSF with the actors and audiences in the areas where the collection is taking place.

(c) **Finish.** The *finish* phase is the application of force against the identified target. Depending on the capability of the partnered HNSF and the operational environment, the *finish* phase may be conducted by the HNSF and enabled by NATO SOF. The effects (see paragraph 6-4 for more information on effects) achieved through the use of HNSF to conduct the *finish* phase may be greater overall than NATO SOF conducting the mission unilaterally.

(d) **Exploit.** The *exploit* phase is the most important step of the F3EAD targeting process because it leads to finding, fixing, and finishing the next target. The exploitation is the process of examining, interrogating, and processing captured adversary personnel, equipment, and materiel for intelligence purposes. The overall aim is to produce enough actionable intelligence and/or procedural evidence to perpetuate the F3EAD process as quickly as possible.

(e) **Analyze.** The *analyze* phase is where the information gained in the *find, fix, finish, and exploit* phases is turned into intelligence that can be used to drive future operations.

(f) **Disseminate.** *Disseminate* is the final step in the F3EAD process. The dissemination of the intelligence and information acquired establishes a NATO SOF network throughout the AOO focused on disrupting or defeating the adversary networks. This wide dissemination of information and intelligence helps to prevent intelligence stovepipes and enormously contributes to the success of future F3EAD targeting cycles.

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**Important Note.** Developing the targeting capability of HNSF will be heavily dependent on the existence of HN organic collection assets and the HNSF access to those assets. Additionally, the availability of a trained HN specialist to operate those assets and conduct the detailed analysis of the gathered information will be critical to developing the HN targeting capability.

6-3. **Military Assistance Target Audiences**

a. During MA, NATO SOF must consider a myriad of potential target audiences that could be influenced in support of the operational objectives. These potential target audiences include, but are not limited to:

   (1) Partnered HNSF
1st Study Draft

(2) Local, regional, or national government leadership
(3) Local population
(4) Adversary leadership
(5) Adversary followers and supporters
(6) Potential adversary leadership, followers, and supporters
(7) Local business owners
(8) Local media outlets
(9) Local or regional religious leaders
(10) Local or regional opinion leaders

b. This list is not all inclusive and should be broken down further based on the analysis conducted during F2UID. The F2UID process should determine who the key communicators and influencers are in the AOO. These key communicators and influences should become non-lethal targets for NATO SOF to influence toward the achievement of the operational objectives.

6-4. Military Assistance Targeting Effects. All actions, whether lethal or non-lethal, generate a message. These messages can and do generate intended or unintended effects. It is important to consider what the desired and potential effects that SOF actions may have on the environment during the targeting process. Planners must consider what direct effects an action may have and anticipate what indirect effects that action may produce. Planners can then use information activities (see paragraph 6-5b(2)) or other direct effects to shape the indirect effects to achieve the overall desired objective.

**Important Note.** The employment of SOF significantly influences the public perception of NATO, not only within the local or regional crisis area but also worldwide. Consequently, most SOF missions will create certain effects in the environment. These effects will likely attract the scrutiny of local and international media and the public, before, during, and after the operation. Almost any aspect of NATO SOF operations can or will be reported to a global audience in near real-time.

a. Direct/First Order Effects

(1) First order effects are associated with the physical dimension of the environment. First order effects are the result of a direct, physically observable action in the physical environment with no intervening effect or mechanism between the act and outcome. First order effects are usually immediate and easily recognizable, and can trigger additional effects or outcomes (second and third order effects).
During MA, the direct physical actions of SOF, whether the lethal application of force against a target in support of HNSF, the non-lethal application of support to the HN by providing training on a specific subject, or the non-lethal support provided to a local community through CIMIC, are the direct actions that create the first order effect. These examples all occur in the physical environment and are easily seen and recognized by members of the targeted audiences (adversary, partnered forces, or local population). All of these direct physical actions have the potential to generate additional effects (indirect effects) in the informational, systemic, and cognitive environments that can ultimately shape the behaviours of multiple audiences.

Indirect Effects. Indirect, or higher order effects (second and third order effects), generally stem from a first order effect. Indirect effects have a systemic or informational effect than can ultimately produce a cognitive or psychological effect that achieves a desired objective (audience behaviour change). Indirect effects are often not immediate and can be generally difficult to recognize or assess.

Second Order Effects

(a) Second order effects are associated with the systemic or the informational dimension of the environment. Second order effects are changes created in the system or to the quality and integrity of the information resulting from the first order effect. Changes in the quality and/or the integrity of the information flow to and through the members of the target audience can shape the third order effect to achieve the desired objective.

(b) During MA, as NATO SOF plan lethal or non-lethal actions (first order effects), they must consider the effect their actions have on the system and take additional actions to effectively shape the resulting information that will pass through the environment to achieve their desired objective.

(c) For example, if NATO SOF are supporting HNSF in the lethal targeting of an adversary cell or leadership, NATO SOF must consider how to shape the resulting information that comes from the lethal application of force. Information activities can be applied to prevent the spread of information within the adversary network to allow additional targeting, prevent the spread of misinformation in the form of adversary propaganda, or portray the event and the reasoning for it in the manner that NATO SOF and the HN want the event to be understood as a means for shaping the perception of the audience.

Third Order Effects

(a) Third order effects are associated with the cognitive/psychological dimension of the environment. Third order effects are related to the decision-making and perceptions of the target audience with regards to the first and second order effects.

(b) During MA, the application of information activities by NATO SOF to shape the second order effects from lethal and non-lethal activities will shape the understanding, the decision-making, and ultimately the behaviour.
of the target audience. The achievement of third order effects should be tied directly to the desired NATO SOF operational objectives.

c. **Relationship of Effects to Military Assistance.** NATO SOF planners must consider the operational objectives and the desired effects to be achieved during the MA targeting process. When planners consider the direct physical actions (first order effects) to be taken against a specific target, they must additionally consider how to shape the transmission of the resulting information through the system (second order effects) to achieve the desired objective (third order effects). Planners must also consider the intended target audience and the unintended audiences. This process is the same when considering lethal and non-lethal targets.

![Figure 6-3. Shaping Indirect Effects](image)

![Figure 6-4. Indirect Effects Shaping Example One](image)
Military Assistance Measures of Effectiveness. Measuring the effectiveness of MA operations involves more than just simply observing cause-and-effect relationships or evaluating the feedback resulting from a direct physical action. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) are the criteria that commanders use to assess the changes in audience behaviour, audience capability, or the operational environment. MOEs are used to determine the achievement of the desired end state, the operational objective, or the creation of a desired effect. The criterion for a MOE depends on the situation. During MA, NATO SOF may be solely tied to the evaluation of the capability, credibility, and effectiveness of the HNSF to perform their mission. Thus their MOEs will be heavily focused on the capability of the partnered HNSF. MOEs have four characteristics:

1. **Measurable.** MOEs must be measurable by either qualitative or quantitative means.

2. **Discrete.** Criteria for MOEs should measure a distinct part of an operation.

3. **Relevant.** MOEs should be relevant to the desired outcome and focused on the simplest and most accurate indicator of it.

4. **Responsive.** MOEs must be able to detect changes in audience behaviour, capability, or the environment quickly enough to allow commanders to respond quickly and effectively.

Examples of MOEs at the tactical level may include:

- Increase in the capability of Company A’s leadership to plan local security operations.
- Increase in the capability of 1st Battalion’s logistics staff to provide supplies to the companies during operations.
- Increase in statements from the local population in village X that support the HNSF.

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12 CNO stands for computer network operations.
Lethal and Non-lethal Targeting. The need for lethal and non-lethal targeting will ultimately be determined by the NATO SOF operational objectives, the desired effects to be achieved, and the crisis area that NATO SOF are deployed for MA.

a. **Lethal Targeting.** Lethal targeting requires the application of force (including deadly force) with the aim to achieve the neutralization of a target. During MA, SOF may be required to conduct lethal targeting in support of the HNSF to assist in the disruption or destruction of an adversary or adversary capabilities.

b. **Non-lethal Targeting.** Non-lethal targeting is not defined by NATO but is considered to include all other means apart from lethal/kinetic targeting, e.g. Info Ops, influence activities, CIMIC, reintegration/reconciliation, EW, cyber-attack, economic sanctions.

1. **Information Operations.** Info Ops are a military function that provides advice, synchronization, and coordination of information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding, and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries, and other NAC-approved parties and audiences in support of Alliance mission objectives.

2. **Information Activities.** Information activities are actions designed to affect information and/or information systems. They can be performed by any actor and include protective measures. Information activities and capabilities, such as psychological operations (PsyOps), deception, EW, OPSEC, computer network operations, and physical destruction play a critical role in shaping the information environment. These activities and capabilities are integrated, synchronized, and leveraged to accomplish operational objectives through the achievement of the desired third order effects.

3. **Psychological Operations**

   a. PsyOps are planned operations that convey selected messages and information to influence the perceptions, attitudes, and behaviours of approved audiences in accordance with the NAC PsyOps objectives. Unlike public affairs (PA)/public information (PI), PsyOps retains direct control over the content, dissemination, and audience. PsyOps’ capabilities include print, radio, television, loudspeakers, face-to-face engagement, Internet, faxes, pagers, and telephones. In addition, PsyOps employs the use of HN media and key communicators.

   b. PsyOps forces in support of MA operations can have a significant impact on achieving desired objectives. During MA, PsyOps forces can be employed to:

   1. Increase target audience support for HN government or security forces at the local, regional, or national level.

   2. Decrease or counter-malign influence from adversary propaganda.

   3. Increase target audience compliance or non-interference with NATO SOF operations.
4/ Increase target audience understanding of the NATO SOF mission (i.e. why NATO SOF are here).

5/ Increase target audience support for NATO SOF and general purpose forces.

6/ Increase the pride and esprit de corps within the HNSF.

7/ Decrease adversary cohesion by planting doubts about adversary leadership.

8/ Degrade the morale of the adversary and the effectiveness of adversary leadership and networks.

9/ Decrease adversary exploitation of the target audience.

10/ Decrease local support for adversaries.

11/ Increase the cooperation between civil authorities and population with NATO SOF.

12/ Develop HN influence capabilities.

Best Practice. Use key communicators from the local population to help develop and disseminate information and influence messages. These information and influence messages are more credible if they come from a local public figure who has already developed prestige among members of the target audience and is considered a trustworthy individual.

(4) Presence, Posture, and Profile. The effective use of presence, posture, and profile during MA can send a powerful message to multiple intended and unintended audiences. When considering the application of presence, posture, and profile, it is important to consider all three for NATO SOF and the HNSF. The proper application of presence, posture, and profile for the HNSF can potentially send a powerful message about their capability and credibility as a security force. Poor application can have the opposite effect.

(a) Presence. The mere presence of NATO SOF can have a significant impact and effect on the perception of the target audience. The deployment and employment of SOF with HNSF, even in a limited capacity, can send a message about the commitment of NATO forces in assisting with the establishment or improvement of local and regional security. The presence of NATO SOF and HNSF can also add substantial credibility to PsyOps messaging or deception operations, and provide a significant contribution to deterrence of adversary activities. Care must be taken to ensure that the presence of NATO SOF is combined with the right messaging to prevent negative impacts on the perception of the target audience or the use of SOF presence to bolster adversary propaganda.

(b) Posture. The posture of NATO SOF working with HNSF during MA can demonstrate both commitment and intent to the target audience, whether
that be the local population or the partnered forces. For example, the decision to wear or not to wear combat helmets while on mission or interacting with the local national population can make a considerable difference in the perception of NATO SOF in the eyes of the target audience. This simple difference can transform what the target audience perceives as an almost robotic machine in war gear into a human being that they are more likely to interact and associate with. However, the need for FP must be considered and balanced with the need to achieve a desired effect with the target audience by demonstrating a specific posture and intention.

(c) **Profile.** The public profile of commanders at all levels can have an impact on perceptions of the NATO SOF mission. The public role of the commander must be carefully analysed and key opportunities capitalized upon to transmit key messages. The profile of key HNSF commanders and key local and regional leaders must be considered as well. When selecting HN commanders and key local and regional leaders, their ability to achieve the desired effect on the target audience must be analysed. Influential leaders who have the ability to generate popular support within the target audience are more likely to achieve the desired effect than leaders who are distrusted by the target audience because of their poor profile.

(5) **Deception**

(a) Deception comprises actions executed deliberately to mislead adversary decision-makers as to NATO SOF capabilities, intentions, and operations, thus causing the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the desired SOF objective. Deception can also make an adversary more vulnerable to SOF or HN weapons, maneuverer, PsyOps, or operations.

(b) Deception operations deceive adversaries through manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence or facts, and force them to react in a manner counter to their interests by increasing the adversary uncertainty of NATO SOF and HN intent or reducing their certainty of NATO SOF or HN COAs. Used offensively, deception can cause an adversary to act or react based on inaccurate impressions or understanding of the situation. Used defensively, deception can conceal NATO SOF or HN capabilities and intentions.

c. **Counter-command Activities**

(1) **Physical Destruction.** Physical destruction is the application of direct physical actions by SOF against an adversary to destroy, disrupt, or degrade his sources of information, C2 systems, or infrastructure. Attacks against adversary C2 systems greatly affect his understanding and his ability to apply his will against SOF and HNSF. Additionally, the use of physical force by SOF and HNSF sends a strong message that can play a major role in deterrence and coercion of an adversary and reduce the adversary’s ability to exercise command. However, SOF must weigh the potential benefit created by physical destruction against the potential for collateral damage and unnecessary causalities. Both of these risks can have a potentially detrimental effect on public perception and support for SOF operations.
Electronic Warfare. EW has a wide application during military operations. The effects of EW can be temporary or permanent. EW has the ability to minimize the use of force, thus reducing the potential for causalities or collateral damage. EW can provide support to operations so that critical information, or the systems that store or carry that information, used by an adversary to make a decision can be affected to a SOF advantage.

(a) Electronic attack enables both the countering of adversary command functions and actions against adversary IT systems. Electronic attack additionally supports other information activities, such as PsyOps or deception, by providing broadcast capability to members of the target audience in denied areas that cannot be penetrated or reached by other means of dissemination.

(b) Electronic protections contributes to countering adversary hostile information capabilities and protects SOF’s use of the electromagnetic spectrum.

(c) Electronic support measures are an integral part of information collection and provide the SOF commander with a wide variety of information from MOEs to information for targeting.

d. Information Protection Activities. OPSEC is the process that gives a military operation appropriate security by using passive or active means to deny an adversary the knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities, or intentions of NATO SOF. In particular, OPSEC is used to identify and protect information that is critical to the success of the operation. OPSEC aims to deny the adversary decision-maker information, thereby affecting his understanding.

e. Other Non-lethal Activities

(1) Civil-military Cooperation. CIMIC seeks to create meaningful relationships between military, civilian agencies, and the local HN population. CIMIC is the coordination and cooperation between civil and military actors and involves the resources and arrangements that support the relationship between SOF and the HN authorities, IO and NGOs, and the civilian population in areas where SOF are deployed or plan to be deployed. CIMIC operations during MA can have an effect on social and political change in communities and regions through infrastructure development and the provision of social services. These changes and improvements can have a significant effect on target audiences.
**Non-lethal Targeting Example, Afghanistan:**

Planners must consider aspects and potential implications when developing non-lethal targets such as civil support projects. Failure to take into account factors such as gender considerations may result in the loss of influence with a segment of the audience.

Water is a primary basic need and providing the local population with access to clean water often creates a challenge. Building wells is a way to support the civic environment in local villages and influence the local population. However, planners must consider the gender perspective when planning civic projects like wells. Since most Afghan women fetch the water for the household, they use this trip as a social event to interact with other women from their village. By selecting a well location that reduces their social interaction or creates routes of travel through dangerous areas, you have negatively impacted an influential sect of the target audience that you are trying to help and influence by altering things that are important to them.

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(2) **Public Affairs/Public Information.** PA/PI and Info Ops are separate but related functions. Both directly support military objectives, counter adversary misinformation, and deter adversary actions; however, the efforts of PA/PI and Info Ops differ with respect to audience, scope, and intent. Therefore, coordination between PA/PI and Info Ops must be assured at all times and at all levels to ensure consistency in the message released by the military to outside audiences and to promote overall effectiveness and credibility of the campaign. PA/PI can contribute significantly to gaining and maintaining public support for the MA operation. PA/PI is not only focused on informing the regional and international community about the MA operation but contributes to informing the local population. PA/PI must work closely with PsyOps to ensure that their information messages do not conflict with the PsyOps influence messages.

6-6. **Summary.** SOF conducting MA may have to participate in both lethal and non-lethal targeting to achieve the desired effects in support of operational objectives. As SOF develop their knowledge of the environment and AOO through the use of the F2UID process, the information and intelligence gathering will allow for the targeting of individual actors and networks through the use of F3EAD. NATO SOF must incorporate HN government officials and security force leadership into the targeting process to ensure that a critical audience to be influenced is incorporated. Planners must ensure that during targeting, all audiences, intended and unintended, are considered and that the hierarchy of effects (first, second, and third order) are anticipated and effectively shaped using influence activities to achieve the desired objectives.
CHAPTER 7 – PLANNING FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE

7-1. General

a. When NATO is conducting planning for MA, all planning entities on the different levels are involved almost simultaneously. While the strategic level is going to prepare the framework for the campaign, including the requirement for MA, the operational level, with the input from the tactical level SOCC and SOTGs, will develop the campaign and related operations to be executed. NSHQ, the SOFAD, and the SOCC play the critical role of shaping the planning environment from the beginning to ensure the integration of SOF expertise and advice.

| Important Note. | All planners should be reminded that SOF represents unique capabilities that, when employed appropriately, will significantly contribute to the achievement of the operational and strategic effects and the desired end state. |

b. Even though NATO SOF are relatively small in size, they are able to provide unique capabilities that are non-existent within conventional forces. These capabilities may enable NATO decision-makers to use SOF as a weapon of choice to achieve a desired strategic or operational effect and at the same time to avoid the deployment of a large and cost-intensive conventional force.

c. Whatever situation occurs, SOF planners should support higher-level planning and conduct their own planning simultaneously. This includes SOF interaction, collaboration, and coordination with conventional entities from strategic down to tactical levels, involving SHAPE’s Director Special Operations (DSO) and NSHQ, as well as a potentially identified SOCC and its assigned SOTGs.

7-2. Planning Principles for Military Assistance

a. In recent years the operating environment has changed and has become more complex with many diverse actors, as well as their respective interests and agendas, both military and non-military. Therefore, NATO has tailored the planning process to the new requirements, which resulted in the COPD as the baseline document for strategic and operational planning. This COPD emphasizes a comprehensive approach to planning and incorporates additional actors.

| Important Note. | For planning and execution of MA, it is critical that the political and higher military decision-makers clearly define the related strategic, operational, and, if necessary, tactical objectives. |

b. Planners should comprehend and apply the COPD on the strategic and operational levels; however, this will not replace the recommendation to utilize the NSHQ SOCC Planning Handbook, dated Apr 14. This handbook specifically looks at the process from a SOF point of view, provides additional clarity on the process, and facilitates the planning for the SOF missions at the SOCC and SOTG level, especially for SOF MA.
c. Key principles for planning MA are:

(1) **Collaborative Planning.** Throughout the planning process, all entities plan in parallel and provide permanent coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction, as required. This minimizes time and simultaneously ensures the early incorporation of tactical expertise to operational and strategic planning efforts and the respective incorporation in the different products to be developed by higher HQs. At the same time, it ensures a permanent informational update of the tactical level for higher planning considerations and draft and final products. These principles are shown in Figure 7-1, which additionally expresses the requirement to incorporate non-NATO actors, as well as actors from the civilian environment, thus reflecting a comprehensive approach. Parallel planning requires a permanent process of coordination and collaboration. This reduces the amount of time necessary for planning, as well as simplifies the process by increasing efficiency, effectiveness, and improving the quality.

![Figure 7-1. Collaborative Planning](image)

(2) **Comprehensive Approach to Planning**

(a) As already stated, the operational environment for NATO has changed. As parallel planning has received more weight within the COPD, there is a high degree of emphasis on a comprehensive approach to planning. Today military activities require intensive coordination and collaboration with non-military actors from the international community and/or NGOs. Both provide opportunities for military planning, as well as challenges, since their activities are within the AOO, thus potentially impacting military planning and operations. Finally, the HN is the most critical factor to be incorporated into comprehensive planning. HN requirements, both in the military and civilian sectors, define the approach
necessary to plan and execute MA. While the primary activity of SOF MA will most likely be focused on a respective HNSF counterpart, additional effort from SOF has to be put into supporting assisting efforts (e.g. security sector reforms within MOI or MOD) since the SOF counterpart is part of these institutions and, therefore, affected by their decisions and actions. This calls for the creation of sustainable conditions because resourcing, financing, and recruiting, together with the inherent administration, is an HN responsibility. Figure 7-2 shows the requirement to incorporate these actors into comprehensive planning with a graduated and tailored integration at the strategic and operational levels.

Figure 7-2. Comprehensive Approach

(b) NATO plans its approach with a set of military effects necessary to achieve the military objectives in support of the desired end state. By doing so, NATO often complements the non-military effort. SOF MA is potentially part of the NATO approach, and it is the primary task of the SOCC to plan MA in support of the joint commander and for the achievement of NATO’s desired end state. As military actions and the respective effects may have an effect on the non-military activities and vice versa, there is the need for coordination and collaboration throughout planning and furthermore in execution.

(c) Strategic plans and the operational campaign plan specifically reflect a comprehensive approach while SOF, on the tactical level, support these plans with the specifically required special operations.

(3) Military Assistance Objective. The ultimate objective of MA within an overall military approach is to conduct SFA and improve the HN situation by
creating competent, capable, sustainable, committed, and confident security forces. These forces support the HN effort to provide stable and secure internal conditions and/or contribute to an effective deterrence and defence against external aggression. SOF are well suited to operate in both areas, either to support operations or to support the creation of sustainable forces and structures. Both options imply the need for accountability to ensure trust and support from the population. Fundamental preconditions for the achievement of SOF MA objectives are planning imperatives.

(4) **Planning Imperatives for Military Assistance**

(a) Effective planning requires the incorporation of some essential imperatives; otherwise there is a good chance that the developed campaign, plan including the complementing MA, may fail. Therefore, planners have to ensure the following principles:

1/ **Understand the Operational Environment.** Understanding the operational environment is fundamental for the planning of MA. Based on a thorough CPOE, planners have to specifically seek understanding and clarification of factors like areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, events, and relevant details of the analysis of the PMESII or ASCOPE system. This includes the role and intention of regional players and transnational actors, who have the potential to influence the HN security environment, as well as a full comprehension of the cultures, ethnicities, and the variety of interdependencies.

2/ **Ensure the Unity of Effort.** Comprehensive planning normally includes multinational partners and non-military actors like IOs or NGOs. Due to the complex system of actors, respective relationships, and often divergent interests and goals, there will be no unity of command. Nevertheless, unity of effort is imperative for a successful MA effort. A clear delineation and understanding of military command relationships and other relationships between the various actors are essential for effective MA.

3/ **Effective Leadership.** Leadership is a key factor for the execution of MA. Leaders must comprehend the operational environment and be prepared so that MA activities are successful. This also includes leadership on the HN side, as this has an important effect on sustainment. As planning and execution of MA affects all levels, careful selection of leadership is critical. Additionally, exemplary SOF leadership will facilitate the development of effective HNSF leadership. Depending on the military culture of the HN, SOF may emphasize education on mission command and initiative. The importance of the human factor cannot be emphasized enough, as a failure in personal performance (including building relationships and strong rapport with HNSF counterparts) will potentially lead to mission failure.

4/ **Promotion of Legitimacy.** By achieving the ultimate goal of MA as stated above, there will be a significant contribution to
legitimate governance of the HN population. Planning has to reflect and execution has to achieve the desired positive public perception as that is the decisive condition. This is not exclusively based on capabilities and effectiveness but also on the incorporation of sociocultural factors.

5/ Information Management. The handling of information can be an effective enabler for MA, or it can significantly hamper it. Both the overall military campaign or operation and comprehensive planning and execution are heavily dependent on effective information sharing and synchronization. It is critical to unity of effort and will contribute to legitimacy.

6/ Self-sustaining Forces and Structures. The overall sustainment effort has two major components. On one side, it is the ability of the TCN, or organization providing MA, to sustain its activities in the HN while simultaneously conducting its own operations and MA in the short term. On the other side, it is the requirement to build sustainable HNSF and structures over the long term. More details are provided in Chapter 13.

(b) In addition to the planning imperatives for MA, other factors should be considered to achieve the best outcome, such as respect of the law, transparency, and the full incorporation of security forces into the legal framework of justice and the rule of law. These additional factors emphasize the importance of incorporating non-military actors, as a part of a comprehensive approach, into the planning process for the overall benefit of the campaign.

7-3. Special Operations Forces in the Planning Process

a. NATO crisis response planning is using the COPD to ensure effective planning. The different phases are linked to each other both horizontally (phase by phase) and vertically (parallel planning on all levels). As SOF is nested in the overall campaign plan developed by the JHQ at the operational level, the main effort of all SOF activities is conducted in Phases 2–4 of the process. Here SOF has the opportunity to shape and influence desired strategic and operational end states and objectives, as well as to develop their SOF-specific MA approach. Figure 7-3 highlights the critical phases and products where SOF can insert and emphasize the requirement for SOF MA. First, the strategic decision will be influenced the contribution to the strategic and political military estimate. The designated JHQ for the campaign will submit its operational advice with SOF expertise, as required. This leads to the political strategic decision of how to utilize NATO military power, providing the JHQ the strategic framework for campaign planning. During campaign planning, SOF will support the concept and plan development (main effort in Phase 3 by the JHQ) while also developing their own approach in support of the JHQ. While on the strategic level, the SOF input may be very generic and the level of SOF detail will significantly increase down to the tactical level.
Figure 7-3. NATO Crisis Response Planning
b. The current NATO planning process is strongly based on parallel planning and a comprehensive approach. Within this complex process there are phases and products that are critical for planning and implementing SOF MA. The planning process provides opportunities and chances to exploit, as well as risks to avoid. Therefore, SOF has to have representation and planners on all levels who are familiar with the planning process and know how to shape the environment and to integrate and influence. These planners are plugged into the different SOF organizations and entities from the strategic level down to the tactical and are rely on networking for effectiveness. In Figure 7-4 the different SOF entities are shown within the different levels.

Figure 7-4. Special Operations Forces in the Planning Process
7-4. **Special Operations Forces Military Assistance Planning.** While planning for MA, SOF planners may prepare for both combat and non-combat scenarios, according to the situation and environment. Especially in a COIN scenario, there may be a balanced mix of both (e.g. assisting HNSF in fighting the insurgency and at the same time building capabilities and capacities). These optional planning efforts are strongly linked to a thorough CPOE with the inherent analysis of all actors and the assessment of the environment and situation, as well as an early interaction with the HN to assess its requirements and needs. The different colours in Figure 7-5 show the interdependencies between the various levels. Pending the level of command/planning, inputs and outputs affect higher and lower planning elements and provide critical and essential contributions to a successful planning effort.

**Figure 7-5. Planning Phases of the COPD**

a. **Strategic-military Level: SHAPE**

(1) **Strategic-military Level Phase 1: Situational Awareness of Potential/Actual Crisis**

(a) In this phase all involved entities are conducting the same activities out of a routine peacetime structure. During SA SHAPE, the JHQ, and NSHQ/SOCC are routinely monitoring a potential crisis within the means of their capabilities and available tools. SHAPE is using the CCOMC to understand a situation and later to develop a recommendation to SACEUR on how to proceed. As these activities are a normal state of affairs for
SHAPE, SOF representatives from both the DSO and NSHQ support this as permanent members of the CCOMC. The main purpose at the strategic level is an estimate of the situation, based on initial understanding, analysis, and assessment. Figure 7-6 portrays the collaboration and interdependencies.

Figure 7-6. Situational Awareness of Potential/Actual Crisis

(b) SOF-specific considerations are:

1/ Threat to employed SOF (asymmetric/conventional)
2/ Environmental assessment and challenges (situation, actors, terrain, etc.)
3/ Potential SOF operating environment (land/maritime/air)
4/ Potential SOF missions (combat operations/MA or both)

(c) If there is no designated SOCC at this stage, it is critical that NSHQ fill this gap unless NATO has identified a SOCC framework nation to do so.

(2) **Strategic-military Level Phase 2: Strategic Assessment.** To provide the necessary framework for the military to plan and operate effectively, NATO HQ has to ensure the timely provision of respective G&D to the military-strategic level at SHAPE. Since the NAC makes decisions based on consensus, it has to incorporate military and civil expertise and advice for further assessment and resolution. Therefore, SHAPE has to provide the required documents, which are:

(a) **Strategic Warning Order.** This document prepares a selected JHQ and other subordinate entities for the potential need to support planning. It covers liaison exchange with SHAPE, potential strategic assessment team and
operational liaison and reconnaissance team (OLRT) deployment and support, and any timeline important for planning.

**Important Note.** The SOFAD and/or the SOCC should reinforce a deployed OLRT as SOF’s eyes and ears to facilitate SA and planning for MA.

(b) **SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment.** SACEUR’s strategic assessment (SSA) provides the NAC with the necessary background knowledge on a potential or actual crisis.

![Diagram](Figure 7-7. SACEUR’s Strategic Assessment)

1/ The SSA includes a comprehensive appreciation of both NATO and non-NATO actors and their potential contribution to a comprehensive approach, implications including risks and threats for NATO, and potential strategic ends, ways, and means. The inherent military considerations on the applicability of the use of the NATO military instrument conclude the SSA.

2/ The submitted SSA to NATO HQ is the first product that requires SOF advice and input. A thorough analysis of actors and their strengths, weaknesses, capabilities, etc., together with potential NATO strategic ways, means, and ends may identify the requirement
for SOF MA. A graduated analysis of actors can lead to the following example of objective, effect, and respective considerations:

a/ Step 1: Strategic-military Objective: Secure and stable environment in the HN.

b/ Step 2: Strategic-military Effect: HNSF capable of providing internal security.

c/ Step 3: Strategic-military Considerations: Low-profile NATO engagement; requirement for MA; early deployment of SOF.

3/ In the SSA development, it is primarily the task of NSHQ and the DSO to ensure adequate SOF contribution. Parallel to that, NSHQ may conduct initial engagement with potential SOF TCNs to provide these nations with the opportunity to prepare for possible requests from NATO later in the planning process. During this phase, the JHQ (with its SOFAD) and the designated SOCC will continue to refine their CPOE and to analyse all available documents and other information, differing only in the level of detail.

(3) **Strategic-military Level Phase 3: Military Response Options.** The military response option (MRO) selection is the consensus-based political decision on the kind of approach to be used to solve the crisis. It outlines the military mission, strategic-military objectives, military-strategic effects, strategic-military actions and capability requirements, as well as possible complementary non-military actions. This contributes to the desired NATO end state within the context of a comprehensive approach.

(a) The SSA will identify potential requirements for improvement of capabilities within a set of actors by analysing reasons for their weaknesses, while the MROs state in detail what specific actions have to be taken to create specific conditions to achieve the desired NATO end state. Guiding principles for MRO selection by the NAC are probability for success, cost-effectiveness, and acceptable risk. Therefore, there may be a good chance that SOF will be the preferred weapon of choice, reducing the size of the conventional footprint. This potential solution is heavily based on the SOCC’s tactical advice and input, merged into the JHQ operational advice on all different MROs, and submitted to SHAPE for incorporation and further recommendation. Each MRO may differ in the SOF arena for:

1/ Graduated role for SOF

2/ Deployment timeline for SOF

3/ Evaluation of SOF role and achievable effects

(b) The DSO, NSHQ, and SOFAD are in supporting roles and will emphasize and facilitate the SOCC contribution.
(c) With the reception of SSA and MROs, NATO HQ will finish the political military estimate and release the NAC initiating directive with a precise direction on how and when to plan. This military approach complements the other instruments of power like political, economic, and civil, and expresses the requirement for a comprehensive approach. Simultaneously SHAPE has concluded the strategic military estimate process.

![Figure 7-8. Military Response Options](image)

(d) As NSHQ is continuing to support SHAPE planning, it is now of increased importance to engage potential NATO SOF TCNs. With the provision of SOCC tactical advice, via the JHQ operational advice, NSHQ now has an oversight of potential SOF tasks and capability requirements for the specifically selected MRO. Therefore, NSHQ should be aware of SOF TCN intentions, limitations, and interests.

**Best Practice.** For the NSHQ and SOCC planning and execution of MA to be successful, it is critical that the TCNs’ political and higher military decision-makers clearly define their related strategic, operational, and, if necessary, tactical objectives, as well as the SOF capabilities they are willing to provide. This allows NATO SOF planners to plan and coordinate accordingly.

(4) **Strategic-military Level Phase 4: Strategic Plan Development.** Strategic-military level Phase 4 is split into two sub-phases—strategic CONOPS development and strategic OPLAN development. Within this process SHAPE will
develop the strategic framework to enable the operational and tactical levels to conduct problem-focused planning. Nevertheless, from now on the main effort of detailed planning will switch to the selected JHQ and the subordinate components.

(a) **Strategic-military Level Phase 4a: Strategic CONOPS Development**

1/ Once NATO HQ has selected a specific MRO as a baseline for further planning, it will task SHAPE with a NAC initiating directive to develop a strategic CONOPS. With the establishment of SACEUR’s intent, guidance, and vision, planners at SHAPE will develop a strategic planning directive for release to the JHQ. This strategic planning directive enables the JHQ to conduct its own Phase 3 operational estimate, including timely guidance for the planning process. Additionally, with the development of the strategic CONOPS, planners can coordinate important requirements for areas such as the military-strategic contribution to a comprehensive approach (including civil-military collaboration, liaison), operational requirements (statements of requirements, ROE, etc.), and strategic communications.

2/ Throughout CONOPS development, its value and areas of consideration are heavily driven and influenced by the inputs and collaboration of the JHQ, which will, at the end of Phase 4a, provide its own draft of the operational CONOPS for approval.

3/ During CONOPS development, SOF on all levels are continuously performing a critical role by providing SOF expertise and advice that will be executed by the SOFAD, SOPLE, SOCC, and NSHQ.

4/ NSHQ’s role is twofold in the process. First, it is supporting the development of the strategic planning directive to the JHQ, and secondly, it will engage SOF TCNs at a specific point in time to facilitate a timely availability of required SOF capabilities. There are specific activities that affect potential SOF missions like MA and/or combat operations, especially within the strategic planning directive submitted to the JHQ. Inherent G&D on ROE and use of force, targeting, FP, civil-military cooperation, interagency coordination, and exit criteria, in conjunction with the service support and C2 concept, will either impose restrictions on the SOF freedom of action or provide opportunities for SOF use.

5/ Logistically, this CONOPS provides the framework for SOCC sustainment and determines theatre logistic architecture (access to theatre, options for host-nation support (HNS), theatre lines of communication), logistic roles and responsibilities, HNS arrangements, and the deployment and sustainment concept.
6/ For SOF, strategic CONOPS development will affect both planning and executing MA, as well as their own combat operations, if applicable. Therefore, it is the responsibility of NSHQ to influence and shape this critical strategic product. Chapter 13 emphasizes the challenging task of establishing and maintaining sustainable MA conditions.

7/ Additionally, in the further development of the strategic CONOPS, the SOCC, via its SOPLE and the SOFAD, and NSHQ have to put specific emphasis on operational requirements for an effective contribution of SOF to the success of the mission. Force and capability requirements, as well as clear ROE, will make the difference between mission failure and success. SOF planners have to be aware that the strategic CONOPS will be approved by the NAC, meaning the approval and consensus of all NATO nations. Failure in having the right SOF capabilities at the right location at the right time or posing limitations on their freedom of action will hamper or negate SOF effectiveness. The appropriate parameters for adequate liaison authority (e.g. with IOs, NGOs, regional organizations, HN, potential transit and staging countries), legal permissions for action and interaction, and tailored-to-the-mission FP are key, especially for a sustainable SOF MA mission. For SOF, this is of specific importance as these actors are either an MA target audience or provide the opportunity for a complementing effort. Details have to be identified and planned at the JHQ and SOCC levels. Finally, SOF have to ensure that any exit criteria developed by JHQ planners matches the
potential effects and contributions SOF can provide as a tactical asset with strategic impact. Conventional planners also have to be aware of the time-consuming effort for SOF MA to achieve effects, as well as the identification and assignment of the adequate SOF MA target audience.

(b) **Strategic-military Level Phase 4b: Strategic Operation Plan Development and Force Generation**

1/ Once the NAC has approved the draft of the strategic CONOPS, SHAPE will develop the strategic OPLAN including the initiation of the force generation process. The purpose of the OPLAN is twofold. First, the strategic OPLAN will specify sequencing of strategic activities and operations including deployment, employment, or sustainment; C2 of NATO-led forces; and required interaction with cooperating non-NATO entities. Second, it will identify and activate forces and capabilities required to implement the strategic OPLAN and to accomplish the mission. This has to be harmonized between the strategic and operational levels to ensure that the OPLAN is adequately resourced. Emphasis is on identification and confirmation of national commitments, balance between force package and mission requirements, and risk appreciation from critical shortfalls. The OPLAN has to fulfil the criteria for timeliness and adequacy.

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13 TCSOR stands for theatre combined statement of requirements, and MNDDP stands for multinational detailed deployment plan.
2/ The strategic OPLAN is the product of consistent coordination between the strategic and operational levels and includes the permanent integration of SOF on both levels. While the SOCC is contributing on the operational level, it is the critical role of NSHQ to do the following to facilitate SOF MA planning at the operational level and even more so at tactical level.

   a/ Influence the development of the legal framework (e.g. SOFA, HNS agreements).
   b/ Identify opportunities for synchronization with non-military actors (e.g. IOs, NGOs, GOs).
   c/ Request the authority to conduct theatre-level activities and functions as required (e.g. liaison with HN government institutions as appropriate).
   d/ Highlight and convince NATO key decision-makers of the unique SOF-specific capabilities and contributions.
   e/ Influence the establishment of sustainment conditions for SOF (e.g. HNS, theatre infrastructure, national responsibilities, voluntary contributions).
   f/ Shape SOF force-flow planning with conventional (e.g. critical enablers, priorities).
   g/ Engage SOF TCNs for timely and adequate force and capability contributions (including SOF TCN caveats and national interests).
   h/ Support the force generation process.

(5) Strategic-military Level Phase 5: Execution

(a) During the execution phase, planning efforts at the strategic level will be less of a priority if not otherwise directed. The major activities in this phase are:

   1/ Monitoring and facilitating the operation and the continued provision of resources as required.
   2/ Assessing current plans with all relevant stakeholders, which may lead to a plan review.
   3/ Generating forces for sustainment.
   4/ Reviewing strategic-level progress.

(b) In this phase, NSHQ is an important interface with SHAPE and the SOF TCNs to facilitate any assessment on progress of SOF MA, the provision and facilitation of SOF MA sustainment, and the initiation of any adjustment in SOF MA, if required. Therefore, it is critical that NSHQ has a permanent overview of SOF MA progress and activities based on an
effective and permanent interaction with SOF representatives (e.g. SOFAD) at the JHQ and the SOCC in theatre. These valuable relationships will increase SOF’s ability to react quickly to unforeseen circumstances or developments and support their effort for initiative and flexibility.

(6) **Strategic-military Level Phase 6: Transition.** Not covered in this handbook.

b. **Operational Level: Joint Headquarters.** With the decision or task to commence operational planning, the JHQ will develop its own view of the problem with a specific approach on how to address the crisis, leading to an operational CONOPS and OPLAN. Linked to this is the level of detail since it is the JHQ’s responsibility to plan and conduct the campaign to achieve the desired strategic objectives and the respective end state.

(1) **Operational-level Phase 1: Situational Awareness of Potential/Actual Crisis**

(a) At the operational level with a more regional focus, the JHQ and the respective SOFAD are conducting the same activities simultaneously. The main purpose is the identification of an actual or potential crisis affecting NATO interests. To provide COM JHQ and even SHAPE with a sound assessment and advice, the intelligence staff of the JHQ, in close collaboration with other staff elements (including the SOFAD), will analyse the PMESII domain for adversaries, neutral and friendly actors, as well as the potential operational environment. Finally, the COM JHQ will receive an assessment and a recommendation on how to proceed in relation to the specific situation. This may lead to the decision to commence operational planning in Phase 2 or to return to routine horizon-scanning activities (if not tasked differently by SHAPE). At the same time, the JHQ may provide its assessment to SHAPE, if requested.

(b) During Phase 1, the JHQ SOFAD has to ensure that the SOF community (DSO, NSHQ, SOCC) is kept in the loop on all ongoing activities so that SOF stay ahead of the wave. It is not mandatory that NSHQ or the SOCC (if available) conduct the same activities or have the same assessments or conclusions due to their different or competing focus or tasks.

(2) **Operational-level Phase 2: Operational Appreciation of the Strategic Environment**

(a) Operational-level Phase 2 spans Phases 2 and 3 of the strategic level and is divided into two steps. The first step begins with receipt of SACEUR’s warning order (WNGO). It includes the activation of the joint operations planning group (JOPG), deploying a liaison element to SHAPE, and the conduct of an operational appreciation of SSA. Phase 2 continues in the second step with the request from SACEUR to provide operational advice on the draft MROs. Phase 2 ends with the provision of the COM’s advice on the draft MROs to SACEUR, including any urgent requirements as identified. The desired outcomes of Phase 2 are:
1/ The JHQ (COM and staff (including JOPG)) has an appreciation of the strategic aspects of the crisis that will determine the context for all operational-level activities.

2/ An operational WNGO has been released to components and supporting commands.

3/ Operational advice, to assist with the refinement of the draft MROs, has been submitted to SACEUR, including:

   a/ The main operational conclusions and concerns for the different MROs (including operational risks and possible mitigation) and an appreciation as to the MROs’ adequacy, merits, and potential for operational activation of the JOPG. This is at the COM’s discretion and will not always be tied to formal SACEUR tasking. This appreciation includes the COM’s MRO recommendation.

   b/ Critical operational requirements, including strategic preconditions for operational success, mission-essential force capabilities, interaction requirements with relevant actors, etc.

   (b) For this purpose, the JHQ will activate its JOPG and, in parallel, request planning support from subordinate commands, like the SOCC, to contribute to sound operational advice on different MROs. The SOFAD has the critical role of keeping both NSHQ and the SOCC informed of any ongoing activities, as well as to facilitate the reception of a deployed SOPLE. As the SOFAD is responsible for providing advice to COM JHQ, it is the SOPLE’s responsibility to provide planning input and expertise to a JOPG on behalf of the SOCC.

   (c) During analysis, the JOPG will analyse the type of military operations that must be conducted within each MRO to achieve the military-strategic objectives and the respective essential military capabilities and resources required to do so. Additionally, planners will identify necessary ROE (including SOFA, technical agreements, or other legal arrangements), requirements for interaction and liaison, and the option for pre-deployment of key enablers. This analysis and assessment may lead to the conclusion for different SOF options like SOF combat operations, SOF MA, or both. The SOFAD, and even more importantly the SOPLE, has to ensure SOF feasibility based on realistically and potentially available capabilities, according to NATO SOF doctrine. SOF provide unique capabilities for a well-defined operational or strategic effect and are not a replacement for conventional forces or capabilities.

   (d) With the provision of the operational advice, the NAC will finalize the strategic and political military estimates at the strategic level and select an MRO. SOF planners have to be aware that with this selection the strategic framework for further campaign planning, including SOCC planning, is set. Any SOF-specific topics or concerns have to be incorporated prior; otherwise SOF may not be reflected appropriately in the way ahead.
(3) **Operational-level Phase 3: Operational Estimate**

(a) As already stated, with the release of the strategic planning directive, the main planning effort is nested within the selected JHQ and supported by the relevant components. At the JHQ, planners will analyse SHAPE’s mission, desired end state and objectives, draft the JHQ mission, and any other information. Planners will also prepare a number of COAs, from which COM JHQ can select the one best suited for operational CONOPS development. Throughout this process, the SOCC, with the SOPLE dispatched to the JHQ, will support and influence.

(b) The JHQ will start the estimate process with a thorough mission analysis and identify the problem that has to be engaged.

(c) During mission analysis, JHQ planners will seek a thorough understanding of the situation. This involves the strategic and operational environments, as well as the complex interdependencies of the PMESII domain, mainly because those pertain to the SOF point of view. Both affect SOF combat operations and/or SOF MA, therefore, leading to specific SOF requirements in terms of forces/capabilities, preparation of forces, and C2 in theatre. To facilitate this, SOF (SOFAD and SOCC) have to be part of any deployed OLRT in theatre, thus being the eyes and ears for SOF planners at all levels. This enables SOF to establish initial liaison with potential target audiences, i.e. for MA, to facilitate the necessary detailed understanding of relevant actors and to perform as a fact-finding team to improve further SOF-specific planning. This may be beneficial for future liaison, basing, or contracting, and may identify early additional requirements not yet known.
(d) Furthermore in mission analysis, JHQ planners will, based on a thorough COG analysis, develop an operational framework. This framework is the visualization of how to address the identified problem. It is consistently based on decisive conditions to be established, effects to be achieved, and tasks to be performed to create those effects. Additionally, this will lead to requirements and requests to execute the framework. The SOPLE, as the SOCC representative, has the critical role of ensuring an adequate SOF footprint by trying to identify SOF opportunities to contribute to, and to incorporate SOF into, the concept, both in different LoOs, phasing, and sequencing. SOF MA may be one solution to support the achievement of the desired end state and the operational and/or strategic objectives.

(e) Once the operational framework is developed, JHQ planners will define an initial force estimate and appropriate C2 requirements, which may be addressed early in the process to SHAPE. For SOF, this is the first opportunity to address requirements that are conventional but mission-critical enablers. Additionally, any potential SOF MA mission may require a tailored liaison structure with direct access and influence to key decision-makers (NATO and HN) and other relevant stakeholders.

(f) Once the mission analysis briefing is provided to COM JHQ, JHQ planners and subordinate components will receive the commander’s planning guidance (CPG), which is the COM’s intent on how to execute the assigned mission, as well as guidance and criteria for COA development.
(g) The components in parallel will receive operational planning guidance that provides provisional missions and further guidance for planning to meet the COM’s intent.

(h) COA development is the logical output of the mission analysis and is based on the approved operational design and the released CPG. As depicted in Figure 7-13, the different COAs will demonstrate the different approaches to the problem. The quality is significantly influenced by the inputs of the components, as the components are the tactical entity responsible for executing the operational plan. These components have to provide the expertise based on available capabilities. A challenge for planners is the requirement to coordinate, synchronize, and deconflict among the various components to achieve synergy.

(i) At the end of COA development, COM JHQ will select the best suited one for further operational CONOPS development and will release in parallel an operational planning directive, thus triggering COA development of the subordinate components.

(j) For SOF, the main effort is the provision of functional expertise to all the different COAs. Inputs have to be based on available capabilities and driven by doctrinally defined SOF missions. The challenge is the availability of knowledge on the SOF capabilities, as the provision of these is either based on already stated commitments of SOF TCNs or on information nations provided to NSHQ as a result of its interaction with SOF nations. Nevertheless, for all COAs it is in common to ensure the balance between
SOF and conventional capabilities and to identify, insert, coordinate, deconflict, and synchronize SOF actions with others to achieve synergy.

(k) For every COA, the degree and type of SOF mission and tasks may differ. The SOCC will provide separate approaches in areas like:

1/ Phasing, sequencing, or timing of integrated SOF operations.

2/ SOF missions and the balance between combat and non-combat operations.

3/ Effects and related actions and the SOF contribution.

4/ Necessary forces and capabilities.

5/ Extent of interaction with other components and non-military actors.

6/ Task organization and C2 requirements.

7/ Sustainment of mission, which will be heavily dependent on role and function of the JHQ, components, HN, SOF TCNs, and non-military actors in theatre (more details in Chapter 13).

(l) Once SOF MA becomes the weapon of choice for the JHQ, the SOCC/SOPLE has to mitigate the rise of false expectations and to ensure that everybody is aware that SOF MA is a time-consuming mission and success is heavily related to collaboration among all relevant actors. Additionally, the JHQ has to establish the conditions for successful SOF MA:

1/ G&D for SOF MA support (e.g. supported/supporting relationships), as SOF needs complementing conventional support due to limitations or non-existing capabilities.

2/ Support to the establishment of sustainable conditions (both for SOF and for the SOF MA target audience).

3/ Appropriate liaison structure with SOF representation and a respective interaction authority.

(m) While planners develop the appropriate approach for MA, there may be, due to the environment and the situation, a requirement to plan combat operations with DA and SR in support of the JHQ/HN or the MA effort.

(n) Finally, prior to any COA selection by COM JHQ, the SOPLE at the JHQ has to ensure that all possible SOF missions in the COAs are cross-checked for suitability, acceptability, feasibility, exclusivity, completeness, and compliance with NATO SOF doctrine. SOF are not a replacement for conventional capabilities and have to remain a tactical asset to achieve the desired operational or strategic effect.
(4) **Operational-level Phase 4: Operational Plan Development.** Phase 4 is split into two sub-phases, which build on each other.

(a) **Operational-level Phase 4a: Operational Concept of Operations Development**

1/ The purpose of Phase 4a is to detail COM JHQ’s concept for the conduct of the campaign or operation in concert with other non-military or non-NATO efforts to achieve the operational objectives. Therefore, the operational CONOPS is the formal expression of COM JHQ’s intent on how to conduct the campaign, including deployment, employment, and sustainment, together with a number of statement of requirements (SORs).

2/ Based on the selected COA, JHQ planners, in close coordination with subordinate components, will develop the CONOPS with an emphasis on the concept (conduct of the campaign, service support, C2, and communication and information systems) and identified required coordinating instructions. The CONOPS will be complemented with selected annexes and SORs, and all will be submitted to SHAPE for approval. The SORs are an especially critical topic, as the provision of the identified resources/capabilities is the precondition for the execution of the plan.

3/ During that process, SOF have to continue to shape and influence the planning environment, either with JHQ planners or and other components. Specific focus has to be on the development of Annex K, *Special Operations*, where the JHQ will assign the mission to the SOCC, together with additional G&D. The SOFAD is responsible for this annex, but the SOPLE should provide necessary input to ensure a feasible mission for the SOCC. For SOF MA, this includes the incorporation in the CONOPS main body and some additional important annexes aside from Annex K. Especially annexes for task organization and command relationships, ROE, logistics and movement, joint fires with targeting, and medical require adequate SOF input to make SOF effective and to mitigate shortfalls. This will be completed by the SOPLE who provides SOF criteria for assessment (measures of effectiveness and measures of performance) and relates to the JHQ expectations for standards, capability, and capacity development of HN forces.

4/ To address the SOF-specific requirements, NSHQ needs to receive a timely notice to enable it to engage SOF TCNs as early as possible. This will allow nations to develop their national framework, which will have an impact on tactical SOCC planning. Even if there is already a designated SOCC with assigned SOTGs, this doesn’t mean that it is the appropriate force package for every type of SOF mission.
(b) **Operational-level Phase 4b: Operational Operation Plan Development**

1/ The OPLAN development is a collaborative process focusing on synchronizing and coordinating deployment, employment, protection, support, and sustainment of the operational force during all phases of the plan. As depicted in Figure 7-14, this coordination includes the non-military actors and TCNs and partner nations.

Figure 7-14. Joint Headquarters Operation Plan Development

2/ Once the operational CONOPS is approved, JHQ planners will transform this document into an OPLAN. Parallel to that, SHAPE will initiate the force generation process and plan and coordinate the deployment (movement and transportation) of forces and capabilities, both with NATO nations and non-NATO nations and actors, as appropriate. Finally, these activities are complemented by the negotiation of the necessary legal framework, especially the appropriate SOFA for the deployed forces.

3/ During the OPLAN development, the SOCC has to support the synchronization of forces and functions for all phases, especially the scheme of manoeuvre, the supported/supporting relationships, and joint fires.

4/ For this purpose, the SOFAD will develop Annex K in close coordination with the SOCC, defining the SOF mission and other relevant topics to ensure SOF freedom of action and necessary flexibility. This effort will be complemented by a tailored contribution to other annexes as required. Here a timely and accurate
coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction with other components and actors are essential.

5/ Furthermore, SOF will contribute to the detailed C2 planning, providing input for:

a/ Specific authorities and responsibilities to ensure unity of command and freedom of action.

b/ Designated AOOs.

c/ Liaison exchange.

d/ Force preparation and sustainment.

e/ Operations and campaign assessment.

6/ This will ensure that from the beginning of the execution of the operational OPLAN all necessary responsibilities, authorities, resources, arrangements, and actions are in place.

(5) **Operational-level Phase 5: Execution**

(a) Once the JHQ is executing the campaign, the major activities of the staff are focused on coordination and synchronization of the different actions at the tactical level, including the operational and campaign assessment and necessary adjustments to the plan. Furthermore, the staff is continuing liaison and will be permanently assessing the relevance of the current plans with stakeholders. Results will be possible operational advice on how to proceed and/or new G&D to subordinates, manifested in joint coordination orders (JCOs) or fragmentary orders (FRAGOs).

(b) A major challenge for the JHQ and subordinate components is the persistent and ongoing liaison and coordination with national and international actors. Specific emphasis has to be put on the civil-military interaction for coordination and synergy purposes. Also the JHQ has to request and assess appropriate reporting of subordinate components and units on mission progress to have a concise and complete picture for use within its boards and working groups. This will potentially lead to new orders or plan adjustments.

(c) The SOCC will provide the necessary input via the SOPLE at the JHQ by providing functional expertise to the different boards and working groups. For SOF MA, it is critical to be represented in these elements because SOF are depending on conventional support and enablers to conduct MA and often have to be the supported command to be effective. These conventional enablers are providing the supporting framework within which SOF will conduct their mission, as SOF in some areas are limited in capabilities and resources. Additionally, permanent liaison with the respective HN authorities is decisive for the development of effective and sustainable HNSF. SOF need to tie into these HN structures, as HN structures are providing the major part of the conditions where SOF are
conducting MA. Throughout this execution, patience is the pivotal factor. SOF MA is a long-lasting and time-consuming effort that requires manpower and resources, as well as nations that are willing to provide both.

(6) **Operational-level Phase 6: Transition.** Not covered in this handbook.

c. **Component Level: Special Operations Component Command**

(1) NATO’s COPD is based on the fact that all involved actors in the process are either a permanently existing HQ of NCS/NFS or an organizational member of the international community, an IO, a GO, or an NGO. NATO SOF, however, does not have a permanent component like the conventional components. This includes the availability of SOTGs for planning support and other related activities. In the case of a missing SOCC, NSHQ has the essential role and function to represent SOF. Additionally, NSHQ has to engage early any potential SOF TCN to facilitate adequate and realistic SOF planning.

(2) For understanding purposes, the following description of the planning process is based on the assumptions that:

(a) The SOCC and subordinate land, maritime, and air SOTGs are available.

(b) SOCC planning is following the phases of the COPD.

(c) Subordinate SOTGs are adjusting own planning efforts to the higher process.

(3) While SHAPE and the JHQ are defining the strategic framework and developing the campaign plan, it is the SOCC (and the other components) that will plan the detailed execution. The SOCC brings to the table the capability, expertise, and experience for effective and high-value MA, contributing to the achievement of operational objectives and desired strategic effects and conditions. During the planning process, the SOCC will develop a graduated approach to MA based on analysis and assessment of information either already available or provided by SOF representatives within an OLRT or from fact-finding teams or national country embassy teams in the HN. It will develop the necessary framework (e.g. liaison structure, persistent key leader engagement, provision of enablers for the SOTGs, support for sustainment, infrastructure and equipment support if required, establishment of training facilities beyond the SOTG level) within which the SOTGs can plan their tactical-level MA with selected HNSF. MA must always be focused on a target audience of operational/strategic relevance for which the SOCC and its subordinate SOTGs will conduct MA through partnered operations openly, clandestinely, or discreetly. Finally, SOF MA can vary between a single contribution up to a multi-agency/multinational approach. SOCC MA activities in support of the JHQ campaign plan are as follows:

(4) **Component-level Phase 1: Special Operations Component Command Situational Awareness of Potential/Actual Crisis**

(a) A designated SOCC (or NSHQ SOCC Core, if appropriate and required) also has horizon-scanning activities as part of a routine structure.
The SOCC staff is trying to appraise the situation to keep COM SOCC informed and to enable decision-making. This requires a thorough analysis of:

1/ The nature and history of the potential or actual crisis.

2/ The environment, focusing on potential adversaries, friendly and neutral actors, and other relevant aspects of the situation (including all organizations related to military, para-military, and security roles and functions).

3/ Implications and potential tasks for NATO SOF.

(b) Based on the initiation of the CPOE, including the HN system analysis through PMESII or ASCOPE, SOF planners can use available organizations like the special operations intelligence branch or a variety of conventional information resources for collection purposes. Additionally, the SOCC will collaborate and exchange information within the SOF network, engaging NSHQ, the SOFAD at the JHQ, and SOF cells within the NCS/NFS, as appropriate.

(c) At the end of this phase, SOF planners will provide COM SOCC with a recommendation and a potential way ahead. With that recommendation there may be the first indication for a potential SOF MA task. Pending the level of knowledge, the staff may develop an initial set of PIRs and also address a rough first estimate on required SOF capabilities. Once COM SOCC is tasked by higher HQs, or when he decides to further SOCC planning, the HQ will move into Phase 2 of the planning process.

(5) Component-level Phase 2: Special Operations Component Command Appreciation of the Strategic Environment

(a) This phase provides the opportunity for COM SOCC and staff to fully develop their understanding of the situation. SOCC planners will analyse the fundamental strategic documents (e.g. SSA, MROs) to understand the strategic appreciation and approach to solve the crisis. This will result in an adequate proposal and component advice for potential SOF contribution.

(b) During this phase, the deployment of the SOPLE to the JHQ to facilitate the planning process with adequate SOF expertise and advice is recommended, either on request from the JHQ or by the SOCC. Additionally, if available or already identified, subordinate SOF elements should be requested to provide liaison to the SOCC in order to ensure adequate and realistic planning in support of the JHQ.

(c) To provide sound, tactical advice to the JHQ, SOCC planners have to appreciate the available information of the strategic environment as depicted in Figure 7-15.
(d) When analysing and assessing the SSA and MROs, SOCC planners have to gain an understanding of the strategic parameters NATO is trying to achieve. End state, objectives, conditions, and effects will define potential tasks for SOF. Additionally, the proposed operational geometry will influence the initial estimate of required capabilities. Simultaneously, the SOCC CPOE is continuing with a thorough analysis of:

1/ History of the crisis
2/ Systems-of-systems (PMESII or ASCOPE)
3/ Actors with their roles, objectives, intentions, capabilities, limitations, and characteristics
4/ Legal framework
5/ Information domain
6/ Comprehensive environment with emphasis on non-military entities

(e) This analysis complements the output as depicted in Figure 7-15. Especially in a potential MA environment, the cultural domain with its link to actors and systems is of critical importance.
(f) Planners will appreciate and assess the potential requirements and opportunities for SOF to provide MA (and DA and SR, as required) by trying to answer some key questions for the COM SOCC prior to providing component advice, such as:

1/ What is the situation, and what are the reasons for the deteriorating situation?

2/ Who are the key actors contributing on both sides?

3/ What is the initial assessment on HN authorities and security forces?

4/ Are there any opportunities for SOF to facilitate and improve?

5/ What is the initial assessment on SOF requirements and limitations?

6/ Does SOF need the early permission to engage HN authorities for further fact finding, initial liaison, etc., for a more detailed assessment to facilitate planning?

(g) By answering these questions, COM SOCC, in addition to his own experience and appreciation, will have a first set of approaches to the different MROs on how SOF may support the operational and strategic levels.

(h) Once the SOCC has finished its analysis and assessment, it will submit the tactical advice for possible roles and responsibilities of SOF in conjunction with an assessment on required capabilities (land/maritime/air, critical enablers, initial mission set for SOF), challenges, and risks that the JHQ has to know and reflect in its operational advice. Especially important factors like time, the necessary mission-essential capabilities for SOF MA, and already identified challenges for effective SOF MA have to be brought to the attention of the JHQ.

(i) As the provision of identified required capabilities is related to the time-consuming NATO force generation process, early interaction and integration with NSHQ is essential. This may provide the SOCC, later in the planning process, visibility on realistically available forces and capabilities.

(6) Component-level Phase 3: Special Operations Component Command Component Estimate. Phase 3 will start with the reception of the JHQ operational planning guidance, which gives the operational framework for the SOCC and triggers SOCC mission analysis. It provides the SOCC with COM JHQ’s intent, the operational design, and a provisional mission for the SOCC. Ideally, it also includes the CPG for JHQ planners and guidance for the JHQ COA development to enhance SOCC planners’ understanding of the operational planning environment. Based on that, the SOCC will analyse the mission to identify the problem to be solved and the respective tasks for the SOCC to execute. In the final stage of this phase, the SOCC will receive the JHQ
operational planning directive, which gives SOCC planners clear G&D for their own COA development.

(a) **Component-level Phase 3a: Special Operations Component Command Mission Analysis**

1/ The ongoing and developing CPOE conducted by the SOCC intelligence staff is the baseline for a sound and consistent mission analysis. Contrary to the operational and strategic levels, the SOCC will be more detailed from a SOF perspective. All deductions and conclusions should answer the question, “What does it mean for SOF …?”, hereby ensuring specific focus in the mission analysis. Specific emphasis for SOF has to be on:

a/ Theatre/geographic geometry with its impact on basing, operations, and sustainment (leading to SOF capability requirements in relation to SOTGs, logistics, enablers, or collaboration with other components and HN).

b/ Political situation with government effectiveness, credibility, and stability.

c/ Military/security situation addressing threats, adversaries, neutral actors, terrorism, and information on HNSF (i.e. leading to potential SOF MA target audience and mission sets/SOF battlefield geometry, and C2 structures/liaison and interaction requirements for SOF).

d/ Sociocultural situation with an analysis of groups and actors within the country and inherent social cohesion or conflict (influencing SOF actions and potentially providing restraints or constraints for SOF).

e/ Infrastructure situation with conclusions for HNS, basing, transport, maintenance, and communications (influencing SOF deployment/basing and sustainment considerations including the additional requirement for construction, contracting, or conventional assistance).

2/ For potential SOF MA, it will help to identify requirements and considerations such as:

a/ Forces, capabilities, and resources for sustainment.

b/ Potential mission set with combat operations and/or MA.

c/ MA target audience and liaison concept.

d/ Building of effective HN institutions and capabilities.

e/ Support to HN process and procedures.
f/ Interaction with conventional and non-military for SA, collaboration, coordination, and synergy.

g/ Engagement concept within a multi-ethnic environment.

h/ HNS approach including potential use of available resources.

3/ The outcome of the analysis of required capabilities, with strong support of subordinate SOTGs (if already available), has to be cross-checked with already assigned or available ones. Otherwise this shortfall has to be addressed as soon as possible to higher HQs (and NSHQ) and potential TCNs.

4/ The CPOE will be complemented by a thorough analysis of the operational factors of time, space, forces, and information, potentially leading to additional operational and/or capability requirements. Finally, the core of the mission analysis is the SOCC operational framework development. Based on a COG analysis, the operational framework will visualize the SOCC approach to the problem. Planners will identify the HNSF’s COG, which will have to be facilitated for effectiveness or protected against opponents in case of an insurgency. This will lead to HN critical capability requirements (i.e. the ability to conduct independent combat operations or to generate and sustain forces) and respective requirements (e.g. well-trained leadership, mobility, freedom of action) and vulnerabilities (e.g. public support, recruitment, logistic system). SOCC planners will derive the necessary conclusion for an overarching MA approach to build required capabilities and capacities, as well as to mitigate the potential threat to identified weaknesses of the HNSF. (This analysis is also necessary for own forces to provide targeted and sustainable MA to a selected HNSF.)

5/ For SOF MA, the outcome will be an identification of and the development of:

   a/ SOF MA target audience.

   b/ LoOs (including interdependencies between SOCC combat operations and SOCC MA, or independently) with decisive conditions the SOCC wants to achieve by creating specific effects with identified tasks to execute (with MA only or with a mix of SOF combat operations and MA) in an graduated and sequenced approach.

   c/ Decision points for COM SOCC where command decisions are necessary so that an opportunity can be exploited or a setback neutralized, thus requiring plans for, or execution of, branches and sequels.

6/ At the end of the mission analysis, the output should answer the questions as depicted in Figure 7-16. It is the result of a joint
effort of the SOCC, subordinate SOTGs, and contributions of the SOPLE and SOF in the deployed OLRT.

Figure 7-16. Special Operations Component Command Mission Analysis

7/ Once COM SOCC is briefed on the outcome of the mission analysis, the SOCC will release its own planning guidance to subordinates (if already identified or available), as well as commence COA development as directed by the COM.

(b) Component-level Phase 3b: Special Operations Component Command Course of Action Development

1/ As the mission analysis has identified the problem and the required mission and tasks for SOF to be executed, the COA development will describe different approaches on how to address the problem. Driven by the JHQ operational planning directive, CPG with its approved mission statement, and the operational design, planners will develop several different approaches to the problem. This process is supported by information provided by the SOCC representation within the OLRT, potentially providing information of relevance for MA like SA, HN details like stakeholders, points of contacts, structures, basing, contracting, etc.

2/ Additionally, it requires the inclusion of local, regional, national, and international actors into COA development. Also important is the contribution of the subordinate SOTGs, as these forces will execute the SOCC MA plan within their capabilities and capacities. The key questions for consideration are:
a/ What is the purpose and sequence of the main special operations activities necessary to create the desired conditions? Considerations should cover the potential mix of combat operations and a graduated MA approach and the related necessary force flow and build-up of SOF and HNSF capabilities.

b/ What are the desired effects from the main special operations activities? This will cover both HN and adversaries in areas of perception, confidence, and building sustainable capabilities and will be most likely achieved by an MA effort.

c/ What systems or single elements of the systems should be influenced by special operations? Pending priorities and approach this may be the MA target audience (selected HNSF, HN institutions with relevance for SOF MA), the elements posing the threat to the HN, or both.

d/ What are the primary SOF components and capabilities required to carry out the main actions for the creation of the desired effects? This will identify the number of SOTGs, their specific tasks, type and size of critical enablers, essential liaison with respective authority and responsibility, and the necessary civil-military collaboration (see Chapter 8). Specific relevance is linked to the creation of sustainable HN forces and structures, requiring a SOF liaison and advisory network within the HN, as the SOF MA target audience is dependent on and nested in the conventional HN environment.

e/ What complementary military and non-military activities are required to increase the likelihood of SOF MA success and decrease risk of failure? The SOCC needs strong JHQ support because the operational level is in the position to engage key stakeholders within the HN that are beyond the SOCC level of reach. Additionally, the JHQ has to set the stage for the SOCC by assigning the mission-essential resources. As the SOCC is limited in this area, it is heavily dependent on conventional assistance. During mission analysis, SOF planners will identify a variety of critical enablers for the SOCC and/or subordinate SOTGs in areas of aviation, logistics, medical, or the challenging provision of adequate liaison in quality and quantity in important areas from HN and strategic levels down to operational and tactical institutions, organizations, and units. (For more details, see Chapters 10, 11, and 13.) Finally, not being the only actor in the JOA, the SOCC has to identify non-military actors of relevance, which may complement and assist SOF MA. Here initial planning may call for the creation of a joint interagency task force to be further developed through CONOPS and OPLAN development.
3/ The application and integration of HN facts based on functional expertise and experience is the major hub for the development of a unique SOF MA COA. Specifically of value is the use of a green cell in the COA development process (including wargaming), as this will realistically address a required timeline for effective MA, as well as identify additional requirements (like SOF Info Ops, effects of SOF MA operations including lethal/non-lethal targeting, further SOF tasks, SOF MA perception management) for SOF MA success.

4/ Considering these different questions will lead to different COAs covering topics as shown in Figure 7-17.

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**Figure 7-17. Special Operations Component Command Course of Action Development**

5/ The COA to be developed will answer the questions on how the SOCC, with its subordinate SOTGs, will address the problem. Along different phases, the SOCC will plan for building capacities and capabilities and will address:

a/ The end state to be achieved with SOF operations.

b/ The best-suited SOCC task organization (to include liaison to all relevant actors).

c/ Specific tasks to the SOCC and SOTGs by phase.

d/ Required enablers (like conventional experts for logistics or air advisory).
e/ Identified risks to SOCC

f/ CCIRs with specific emphasis for PIRs and friendly forces information requirements.

g/ A timeline in relation to conditions to be achieved (e.g. when is a specific capability level expected of HNSF/graduated approach (train, mentor, advise)).

h/ Need for coordination, synchronization, or deconfliction with higher, lateral, or subordinate HQs and the non-military environment in the HN.

6/ The major challenge for MA COA development is planning for a realistic timeline, as the SOCC and subordinate SOTGs are vulnerable to the internal security situation and its development, HN willingness to collaborate, and the scale of SOF TCNs’ contributions. Additionally, the HN (e.g. population, public perception, culture, and related specifics linked to HN military effectiveness and performance) has to be incorporated into the COA.

7/ The timeline will be more predictable during the execution of the MA.

(7) Component-level Phase 4: Special Operations Component Command Operation Plan Development

(a) Component-level Phase 4a: Special Operations Component Command Concept of Operations Development

1/ The SOCC CONOPS is developed through close collaboration among the SOCC, lateral components, and higher HQs for coordination and deconfliction to achieve synergy of effort. The document is founded on the selected COA and influenced by the draft Annex K, which will be produced by the JHQ SOFAD with assistance from the SOPLE. Since Annex K specifically provides the SOCC with its mission, SOCC planners have to provide the necessary details to the SOFAD and the SOPLE to ensure that the SOCC mission is feasible and will have the necessary support by the JHQ. Of specific importance is the inclusion of realistic timelines and expectations within Annex K and a clear allocation of responsibilities. These responsibilities affect additional annexes of the JHQ OPLAN, and the respective components’ SOFAD and SOPLE will have to fight for a clear allocation of responsibilities in favour of SOF, as it is primarily a matter of priorities for the assignment of resources and enablers in conjunction with a tailored C2 structure (including supported/supporting relationships) for best use for SOF MA.
2/ Major items in the CONOPS, specifically of interest for subordinate SOTGs, are:

a/ **SOCC Mission.**

b/ **COM SOCC Intent.** For MA, COM SOCC will address his desired approach by describing in broad terms his plan and emphasizing specific points of importance like main effort or sequencing and balancing of forces and resources for MA and other operations.

c/ **Operational Design.** The visualization of the SOF MA approach is the outcome of a thorough analysis of an extensive number of factors all of relevance for SOF MA. The factor analysis provides planners the opportunity and the requirement to apply operational art to develop a SOF-unique way to conduct MA. Linked to the operational design is the respective list of tasks and resources required to achieve desired SOF effects and to build conditions to make it come true.
Figure 7-19. Special Operations Forces Military Assistance Operational Design

d/ **SOCC Objectives.** Objectives are defined in the operational design of the SOCC and are expressed along LoOs to achieve the desired SOCC end state. As MA aims for sustainable conditions within the HN target audience, the respective objective will be linked with the build-up of capable and legitimate forces with adequate capabilities and capacities. Additionally, pending the situation, there may be the requirement for SOF combat operations, either unilaterally or by a partnered approach with the HNSF.

e/ **SOCC Forces and Resources.** It reflects the necessary SOTGs, enablers, and capabilities the SOCC needs to have to plan and execute MA. Details will be described in the SOCC combined joint statement of requirements (CJSOR), which will be submitted with the CONOPS to the JHQ.

f/ **Cooperation with Other Actors.** This will assign authorities and responsibilities for the SOCC and SOTGs by enabling these elements to engage HN and other military and non-military actors for collaboration and coordination to make SOF MA effective. The SOCC needs to liaise with HN authorities, as the SOF MA target audience is nested within and dependent on HN structures, both military and civilian. This requirement may lead to the request for additional support (e.g. from the JHQ, conventional enablers, or experts, as some areas do not require SOF-specific skills). For further details, see Chapter 13.
g/ **Mission and Tasks to Subordinate Forces.** The CONOPS assigns specific MA tasks and other responsibilities. It can define specific MA activities with certain HN units and may include supporting tasks.

h/ **Coordination Instructions.** Aside from integration activities with various actors, these instructions will provide necessary information on ROE and FP guidance, which may facilitate or hamper the effectiveness of SOF MA.

i/ **Service Support.** This part addresses logistical and administrative arrangements and specifies responsibilities and authorities for the SOCC and subordinate SOTGs, as well as provides G&D for interaction with the JHQ and the HN. Specific emphasis is on logistics, movement, engineering, and medical. As it also covers the SOCC and SOTG sustainment for SOF MA, it normally does not address the logistical support and sustainment for the HN target audience in detail. This subject will be handled more intensively in the specific SOCC and SOTG MA planning, and requires flexibility due to the permanent development and progress of the HN MA target audience.

j/ **Command and Signal.** This includes a well-defined SOCC task organization with an appropriate C2 structure. Planners will specifically think about command responsibilities inside the SOCC (like C2 for SOF air), supporting-supported relationships to maintain flexibility and to meet local, regional, or national requirements (including the collaboration with higher HQs or other components), liaison and interaction responsibilities for the SOCC and SOTGs deployed within the JOA, and reporting and assessment responsibilities.

3/ Command relationships, including the respective liaison structure, are critical to effectiveness. Especially liaison with higher, lateral, and other actors (including HN) is critical for facilitating operations and sustainment. SOF MA liaison requires additional liaison structures, as they serve SOCC operations and the build-up of durable and sustainable HN structures and forces.

4/ Finally, this SOCC CONOPS in conjunction with the SOCC CJSOR will be sent to the JHQ for final harmonization, primarily conducted by the SOFAD and the SOPLE, and for approval by COM JHQ.

5/ Parallel to this, the SOCC CONOPS provides the framework for the subordinate SOTGs‘ planning.
Component-level Phase 4b: Special Operations Component Command Operation Plan Development

1/ Once the SOCC CONOPS is approved by the JHQ, the SOCC staff will transform the CONOPS into the OPLAN. While specific emphasis is on SOF deployment, employment, and sustainment, the plan will be developed with additional information about national caveats, intentions (if not already known), and restrictions. Additionally, it will receive a final adjustment and refinement based on close coordination and synchronization with lateral components and other actors as required.

![Figure 7-20. Special Operations Component Command Operation Plan Development](image)

2/ SOCC OPLAN development is complemented by the force generation process, JCO, and legal framework development conducted by the JHQ and supported and monitored by the SOFAD and the SOPLE on behalf of the SOCC.

Component-level Phase 5: Execution

(a) The primary role of the SOCC in the execution of the campaign is the:

1/ Orchestration of the integration of SOF with conventional forces and non-military capabilities at the local, regional, national, and international levels.

2/ Collaboration, coordination, and integration of SOF into HN structures.

3/ Facilitation of SOF MA conducted by the subordinate SOTGs.

4/ Monitoring and assessing of all SOF operations and actions.
(b) These activities specifically include:

1/ Management of resources for SOF and in support of the HNSF.

2/ Lateral and horizontal synchronization and harmonization of SOF MA effects.

3/ Battlefield management with lateral and higher actors.

4/ Lethal and non-lethal targeting and its integration into Info Ops.

5/ Info Ops support to the JHQ Info Ops campaign.

6/ High-level key leader engagement.

7/ Permanent HN force and capability assessment and progress reporting.

8/ Future operations planning.

9/ Management of ISR and information collection in support of the SOTGs.

10/ Networking to international, national, and HN stakeholders as appropriate in the JOA.

(c) During execution, operations and campaign assessment are permanent processes at the operational level, supported by the SOCC. Even though the assessment of SOF MA is a challenging and complex task, it may lead to further planning and/or adjustment of MA. Therefore, the SOCC will use adjustments of existing plans, branches and sequels, and future JCOs and FRAGOs to ensure SOF MA will be focused and on target. Additional requirements concerning effective SOF MA will have to be handled by NSHQ, as it is the primary entity to engage SOF TCNs.

d. Tactical Level: Special Operations Task Group

(1) SOTG planning is closely linked to the planning process of the SOCC. When the SOCC is developing its plan in support of the JHQ campaign plan, it is heavily dependent on the contribution of the subordinate SOTGs. For this purpose SOTG staff will monitor the process and provide timely input and advice as required. This will ensure that any SOF MA plan developed by the SOCC (and nested into the JHQ campaign and MA planning) will fulfil the feasibility criteria.
(2) The planning effort of the SOTG is twofold. Planners support the SOCC planning process throughout the phases with expertise and advice, and parallel to that, the SOTG is developing its own understanding of the situation, CONOPS, and OPLAN. The related SOTG planning for its own OPLAN will be covered in Chapter 8, where the planning process for SOF land, maritime and air MA (and the role and responsibilities of the SOCC) will be described in detail. As the SOTG is a national unit, it is up to the nation what kind of planning process (SOTG decision-making process, COPD-related, etc.) will be applied. It is just essential that the SOTG provides the necessary, quality input and product on time.

(3) SOTG planners will consider various factors and parameter during the process to ensure both high-end contributions to SOCC as well as to produce a sound and complementing SOTG OPLAN in support the SOCC OPLAN. The respective planning considerations are similar to the ones that are considered on operational and strategic level. They primarily differ in the level of detail and the balancing of main effort and priorities. Additionally, the SOTG planning will be influenced by results from the OLRT deployed into theatre as well as any PDSS conducted prior any deployment. Finally, the TCN has a key role as national interests, caveats, and potentially existing bilateral or other agreements may also impact SOTG planning.

(4) The major challenge for SOCC and the subordinate SOTGs is the thorough collaboration to complement the SOF MA approach and to ensure unity of effort. While the SOCC will provide the overall framework for SOF MA, it is the SOTG level that will shape, plan and execute in detail the SOF MA.
(5) Whatever planning process is applied by the SOTG, planners will try to establish and develop a thorough understanding and assessment of the situation with incorporation of available strategic and operational documents that finally
leads to a recommendation to the COM SOTG. Within this assessment, planners may identify a possible requirement or an opportunity for SOF MA. Influenced by national interests and caveats, COM SOTG will be tasked or will decide to commence detailed planning for potential SOTG missions. While trying to establish and maintain SA, the SOTG will be supported by various agencies and entities. Additionally, it will monitor and advise, as appropriate, and will receive any additional information via national channels or NSHQ (if authorized).

(6) During the SOCC appreciation of the situation, the SOTG is to provide thorough advice on a feasible and tailored tactical SOTG contribution based on different approaches on how to engage the crisis at the strategic level. This includes an initial estimate of required SOF, capabilities, and other requirements already identified for the different options.

(7) The main phase of the SOTG planning process is the estimate process. Planners will identify the problem to be solved and develop a way to address it. The primary task for the SOTG is the thorough mission analysis based on available documents, information, and SA. During this analysis, planners will:

(a) Assess the environment (permissive/non-permissive, land/maritime/air) with conclusions for deployment and employment of the SOTG.

(b) Identify ways and means to the end (objectives and end state) to develop an operational framework.

(c) Develop an initial estimate of capability requirements (SOTG composition, enabler, force multiplier, medical, logistics).

(d) Address requirements to the SOCC (information, capabilities).

(e) Be aware of the potential need for liaison (SOCC, conventional battlespace owner, HN, IOs/NGOs).

(f) Provide COM SOTG with various COAs for selection.

(8) Once COM SOTG has selected a COA, planners will develop an SOTG CONOPS. It is critical that this CONOPS is coordinated and nested in the SOCC CONOPS. The following comprise a potential MA plan as part of an SOTG CONOPS and later OPLAN:

(a) A training plan

(b) A concept for partnered operations (if appropriate or required)

(c) An assessment of required resources

(d) A measurement concept to assess progress

(9) This MA plan has to be intensively coordinated with the overall SOCC MA concept together with full-scale cooperation and coordination with the HN.
Summary. Planning for SOF MA is conducted on all levels within the SOF community. Since SOF are an integral part of overall strategic and operational planning and because they focus on the achievement of effects of operational and strategic relevance, SOF representation and integration in the planning process is critical for SOF MA success. Effectiveness requires SOF planners to be familiar with the conventional strategic and operational planning processes, as well as how to apply and integrate their own SOCC planning process into it.

Important Note. SOF MA requires a much deeper understanding and effort of planning as complex and influencing factors, like actors involved, human terrain in the JOA or HN, desired effects, and the related timeline, provide a challenging planning environment.
CHAPTER 8 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

8-1. General

a. This chapter will outline and describe the most common of MA themes that are found between air, land, and maritime SOF elements. Immediately following this chapter are several annexes, each have been developed to outline and describe some of the more unique aspects of MA operations in the air, land, and maritime environments.

b. SOF MA is employed to achieve strategic (political or military) or operational objectives. The purpose is generally to achieve long-term goals such as capability development to assure regional stability. To achieve these objectives, air, land, or maritime NATO SOF may be used as part of a combined/joint effort with multiple NATO SOF elements or as a stand-alone SOF operator, team, or unit. In all circumstances, a thorough understanding of the mission, commander’s intent, and constraints is vital. This will enable those involved in air, land, or maritime MA operations to adjust activities to meet the circumstances encountered. SOF MA, regardless of the environment is conducted in support of friendly or Allied forces in peace, crisis, and conflict. Typical SOF MA missions include, but are not limited to:

(1) Non-NATO nationals attending a SOF course at the NATO Special Operations School (NSOS).

(2) A single air, land, or maritime SOF SME providing advice to an HN on their specific SOF capability issues.

(3) A team of SOF SMEs or SOFADs providing education and/or training.

(4) SOF SMEs or SOFADs providing air/land/maritime-based training on indigenous equipment.

(5) A whole, or part, SOTU/SOTG supporting another NATO SOF capability’s MA mission.

(6) A whole, or part, SOTU/SOTG (including craft) to provide air/land/maritime-based training.

(7) A SOCC with supporting SOTU/SOTG to provide support to HN operations.

c. Complex Operating Environment. SOF MA can be conducted under NATO or national C2 arrangements and can be delivered to a friendly or allied nation anywhere in the world. Although both SOF and conventional forces can conduct MA operations, SOF are best suited to conduct MA operations when there is increased risk, either physical or political. SOF MA is delivered by experienced maritime SOF operators. These personnel are generally more experienced than their conventional counterparts and have an innate maturity, which lends itself to dealing with the complexities related to an MA operation. Complexities in an MA operation include:

(1) Cultural Sensitivities. MA can be conducted anywhere in the world and personnel deployed on operations need to be aware of the cultural background of the AOO. SOF air/land/maritime operators are likely to have experience operating with different cultures and, therefore, have an improved understanding of what may cause offence or be seen as inappropriate within an HN society.
Notwithstanding, it remains vital that all personnel deploying to an HN on an MA operation are provided with information about the culture of the HN.

(2) **Political Sensitivities.** Due to the strategic nature of SOF operations, it is important to understand the political environment of the potential AOO. MA operations can occur in areas where the overt presence of foreign military personnel can potentially have a negative impact, on either the internal political situation or the HN’s relationships with its neighbours. As a result there may be a requirement for MA operations to be low visibility or even covert. This factor has a major impact on the type of operation SOF can conduct—a large deployment of ships or aircraft will be difficult to achieve without attracting local/media attention. Understanding the political sensitivities of the AOO, especially during the planning of MA operations, is vital to ensure the strategic success of the operation.

(3) **Security.** SOF personnel are used in situations where the physical risk is medium to high. The physical risk can be from criminal activity (including potential for kidnap) or from insurgents/terrorists. A sound understanding of the HN security situation is of prime importance when deploying personnel overseas. The security situation will drive the FP measures that will need to be taken by the TCN. In all cases, even where the security situation is permissive, deployed personnel should take personal protection measures, such as identifying an emergency rendezvous point and procedures, in case of an incident.

(4) **Uncertainty.** It is not uncommon for language barriers to cause an HN to have a different interpretation or understanding from the TCN providing MA. This usually manifests itself when the MA personnel arrive in the AOO and commence tasks. As a result, the HN may ask for additional, or even different, support. These initial misunderstandings can cause confusion and a degree of uncertainty that requires careful negotiation with the HN by the deployed SOF commander; any changes in the tasks, which fall outside the mission/intent/constraints, need to be cleared by NATO/TCN before they can be put in place.

(5) **Communications.** Large MA operations will often deploy with a full suite of secure communications that enable connectivity with NATO/TCN. However, smaller MA operations rarely deploy with such an array of communications and regularly have to rely on basic telephone and Internet communications. Communications via insecure means will pose a risk to the security of the operation, and thought needs to go into mitigating communications security issues at the planning and execution phases of the operation.

(6) **Target Audience.** The recipients and focus of an MA operation within the HN can be at any or even multiple levels: political, strategic, operational, or tactical. Furthermore, the recipients are often not themselves SOF. These factors require that the SOF operators must be able to understand the make-up of the target audience and adjust their delivery method accordingly.

d. **Comprehensive Approach.** The strategic purpose of SOF MA will often mean that the MA activity will form part of a wider comprehensive approach. A comprehensive approach involves enduring relationships with relevant national (more than one government department), conventional forces, NGOs, regional and/or IOs, and can also involve law enforcement agencies. It is crucial that activities are synchronized so as to
ensure they are complimentary. This will require coordination between departments and, where possible, NGOs, both in pre-mission planning and when deployed.

e. **Shaping the Planning Environment.** Planning for a SOF MA operation is heavily influenced by a variety of factors and actors that need to be incorporated or at least considered right from the initial planning. Therefore, it is critical for the SOCC (when used) to have SA of strategic and operational conditions, limitations, and obligations (resources required), as well as to conduct a detailed CPOE with a specific focus for MA requirements. SOF MA operations will almost always require the SOCC and SOTG to do an HN air/land/maritime power capability analysis to get an effective assessment of the HN’s current capability. Once this framework is clear and understood on the SOCC and SOTG level, planners will be enabled to plan for an effective maritime SOF MA.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8-1. Planning for Special Operations Forces Military Assistance**

f. **Planning.** Planning for a NATO SOF MA task will commence on orders from higher command (NATO or national). To develop a plan, planners will need to fully understand the mission, the operating environment, and the exit strategy.

(1) **Mission.** Analysis of the mission, commander’s intent, and constraints will enable planners to identify the requirements of the task and the end state, and understand C2 arrangements.

(2) **Environment.** Planners will need to use available open-source and intelligence information about the operating environment to develop an understanding of the people operating within the HN, their capabilities and limitations, the culture of the HN, and the physical, political, and military environments of the HN. A reconnaissance visit may be required, especially if the TCN is deploying air, land, or maritime assets, to establish links with HN liaison personnel and to identify the available resources and potential shortfalls. One
output of this element will be an improved understanding of the risk associated with the mission.

(3) **Personnel**

(a) Success of SOF MA is heavily related to the quality of the SOF member and his relationship to the HN counterpart. It is a critical mix of social, functional, and methodological competence, the baseline for the selection of the SOTG MA personnel. The SOF member conducting MA specifically in the land environment has to meet a number of criteria for effectiveness and, ultimately, mission success (see Figure 8-2).

(b) The well-selected SOTG MA personnel has to be a soldier, diplomat, leader, trainer, advisor/mentor, and comrade. The social aspect is specifically critical for SOF MA personnel.

### Selection and Training

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**Figure 8-2. Military Assistance Personnel Selection Criteria**

(4) **Exit Strategy.** Each MA mission needs to include an exit strategy, normally the point at which the mission is complete, objectives are achieved, and forces can be recovered. The exit strategy must also consider under which circumstances forces should be recovered if the situation changes.

g. **Preparation.** Once the mission and environment are understood, deploying personnel should conduct any requisite pre-deployment training and preparation:

(1) **Mission/Task-related Training.** The type of mission may require personnel to conduct additional training before deploying; training could include completing a course to become a competent instructor or additional flying or
watercraft training on a particular technique that is going to be taught/demonstrated to the HN.

(2) **Cultural Training.** All personnel deploying should have a sound understanding of the culture of the environment to which they are deploying.

(3) **Force Protection to Include Rules of Engagement.** SOF operators will already have a high level of FP (personal weapons use and TTP) training, but the environment may dictate the requirement for additional training (e.g. defensive driving). In addition, all personnel should have and demonstrate a sound understanding of the ROE for their operation.

(4) **Medical Preparation.** Medical preparation will be required and should be directed by the TCN.

h. **Execution**

(1) **Deployment.** Personnel may deploy to the theatre via civilian or military means but, in both cases, in-theatre reception procedures will need to be agreed with the HN during the planning phase.

(2) **Sustain.** The duration of the MA activity will drive the degree of sustainment required. Small short-term deployments may require no sustainment, but larger or longer deployments will require a detailed sustainment plan. This is of particular importance when TCN assets are deployed. Situation reports (SITREPs), for NATO/national HQs, should be compiled on a regular basis to meet national/NATO requirements.

i. **Post-mission Activity Report.** A post-mission activity report should be compiled to identify lessons that can be used for future MA missions.

8-2. **Special Operations Forces Mobile Training Team**

a. NATO nations are able to deploy mobile training teams (MTTs), or SOPTs, to another nation to provide capability-specific SOF education, training, or advice. The make-up of the team is dependent on the training required. In this scenario, it is unlikely that assets will be deployed, and it is more common for the SOPTs to provide classroom-based education and training on the HN’s equipment rather than bring their own.

b. Initial contact is often conducted through the defence staffs at the embassy or consulate within the nation seeking training. Alternatively, if there is already a standing training team in the nation, contact may be made through them. The defence staffs will ascertain if the requirement meets their own national guidelines, then liaise with national/NATO SOF staffs to commence planning. SOF planners will, in the first instance, liaise with the embassy defence staffs to identify the scope of the requirement. The defence staffs/standing training team will also provide information on the area that the SOPTs would deploy to so they can understand the environment and are able to identify any additional personal pre-mission training requirements.

c. Once initial scoping of the task is complete, the defence staff will identify a liaison point of contact (POC) within the nation seeking the training, so that the SOPTs can conduct detailed planning. This detailed planning will include confirmation that facilities
are suitable at the location where the training will be delivered (e.g. sufficient space, computers, and projectors for any presentations). On these small-scale deployments, it is common for the SOPTs to use civilian accommodation and transport; the POC and defence staffs will be able to offer advice on both.

**Best Practice.** It is highly recommended that the team lead and lead planner for the MA mission travel to the location with a small survey team to get a better feel for the mission environment. This is often referred to as a PDSS using an OLRT. This team will identify all mission support requirements and any necessary additional team training required prior to deployment.

d. Because of the small size of the deploying team, the most common means of travel to the receiving nation is via civilian means. The team should arrive several days prior to the beginning of the mission. The team should be met by the POC once landing in country. The team should arrange to visit the facilities to confirm all support requirements are met before the mission commences. Sometimes training facilities are on an HN’s military base; vehicle access permits and any last minute base-access issues should be addressed and reconciled with the POC or HN at this time. This visit also provides an opportunity to adjust the training programme, if required.

e. The MTTs/SOPTs should send SITREPs back to the TCN/NATO SOF HQ and the defence staffs during the deployed period as per national SOPs. The SOPTs should ensure that those receiving the training provide feedback; this will assist in adjusting the training, especially if similar training programmes are to be delivered in the future.

8-3. **Training Exercises.** NATO SOTUs operate in multiple environments (e.g. desert, jungle, maritime, air). To become competent, SOTUs must conduct training in these environments. Exercises will require SOTUs to deploy either alone or in support of another capability’s task unit. Friendly nations that have the required types of operating environments may allow SOTUs to conduct training in their nation. In return, it is common for the friendly nation to request SOTU support, allowing crew from the friendly nation to witness and take part in the training, either as passengers on SOTU assets or in conjunction with their own assets. Many nations do not have dedicated SOF, and it is far more common that an HN will ask for their troops to be involved in the exercise. This will likely see an SOTU providing basic air/land/maritime familiarization and having HN troops operate with SOTU assets. When an SOTU provides any training to the HN, the activity becomes MA. The planning and conduct of this type of MA is the same as any overseas training exercise with one exception; the degree and type of training that the SOTU will provide to the HN must be agreed on beforehand. It is vital that the deployed COM SOTU balances both the SOTU training and the requirement to provide MA.

a. **Reconnaissance/Liaison.** As with any overseas training exercise involving deployment of assets, there will be a requirement for a reconnaissance visit well ahead of the event that must identify all J1–J9 issues. It is important to check the operating base and refuelling facilities to ensure that they meet minimum standards; it may be necessary to augment these facilities. The major difference, when the exercise also involves MA, is the need to establish robust liaison between the HN and SOTU to ensure MA objectives are achieved.
b. **Sustainment.** When deploying assets, consideration should be given to how spare parts will be received; national customs procedures can often be complex and take time.

8-4. **Long-term Training Team/Mission.** The majority of SOF MA operations that involve the deployment of long-term training teams/missions are ground based and involve a limited number of personnel from an SOTU. However, it is possible for the team to include special operations air task unit (SOATU) or special operations maritime unit (SOMTU) personnel. The activities involved in these types of MA operations will be dependent on the situation in the HN.

a. **Permissive Environment.** When the situation within the HN is permissive (low physical threat), the activities will be focused on educating, training, and advising HN SOF personnel. The deployed team may request support from SOPTs to provide air/land/maritime advice to the HN or even the deployment of assets with an SOTU to conduct a training exercise.

b. **Non-permissive Environment.** Long-term training teams/missions can be established in HNs where the situation is non-permissive (e.g. in a nation experiencing an insurrection). MA operations in this type of environment can range from education, training, and advice to participation in HN operations against enemies of the state. In these types of environments, training teams can become the target of insurgents or anti-state actors; training team security and FP are extremely important in this type of environment.

(1) **Military Assistance Activities.** The MA activities that training teams are authorized to conduct in these environments must be clearly articulated and understood by the teams and deployed SOF personnel.

(2) **Rules of Engagement.** Training teams and SOF may need to act in self-defence or take part in support of HN operations; in both cases, the ROE must be clear.

(3) **Liaison.** The level of liaison required with the HN will increase in a non-permissive environment, and consideration should be given to the establishment of a SOLE or operational HQ.

8-5. **Long-term Large-scale Deployment.** NATO SOF MA operations can include the provision of material assistance to the active employment of indigenous forces in the conduct of major operations. This may include the deployment of a SOCC with an SOTG. The scale of the operation may also require the establishment of a special operations air command in air missions. Due to the scale of the activity, NATO, and/or the deploying nation, will need to conduct planning and preparation in the same way as detailed in AJP-3.5(A)(1). A vital element of this type of operation is the opinion and desires of the HN. The HN may restrict the types of operations and activities that SOF can conduct; they may insist on tighter ROE than that cleared by NATO/TCN. Therefore, liaison with the HN is key.

8-6. **Summary.** MA operations in the air, land, and maritime environments all share a number of common denominators. They also differ in their own unique ways via the equipment and resources used to support each MA effort. Regardless of the environment, MA is employed to achieve strategic (political or military) or operational objectives. To achieve these objectives, air, land, or maritime NATO SOF require a thorough understanding of the mission, commander’s intent, and constraints.
1. General

a. In the land environment, there are various aspects that are significantly different from other environments. It allows more actors (e.g. provincial reconstruction teams, international police forces) and organizations (e.g. IOs, NGOs, GOs) to operate and, therefore, requires SOTGs and HNSF to cooperate, deconflict, and potentially liaise when required. The terrain for operations is complex and may vary among mountainous, flat, or desert terrain. As a result, operational art and the conduct of operations becomes challenging when considering the different means and assets for mobility, as well as specific considerations and requirements for logistics and communications. These types of terrain offer enemies multiple ways for engagement and leads to increased requirements for intelligence and more complex use of force enablers or force multipliers such as ISR or joint fires. Additionally, potential threats can be expected to be larger than a threat in the maritime arena. While in the maritime arena, HNSF normally have to deal with smaller elements threatening maritime or coastal facilities or vessels; in the land domain (especially in a COIN scenario), it can be expected that opponents will have more capacity and capabilities to pursue their goals (based on favourable terrain and supportive networks allowing flexibility, safe havens, external support, etc.). This requires HNSF to be sufficiently capable in capacity and capabilities to mitigate this threat. Therefore, the requirement for building HNSF is more complex in terms of generating, training, and employing the force, including enablers and force multipliers. All these factors frame the legal and Info Ops requirements to enable and make land SOF MA effective, and this leads to the increased importance of HN human terrain, and related cultural specifics, reflection/integration. All these factors have an impact on the specific aspects, functions, and TTP that HNSF have to be trained in during land SOF MA.

b. Nevertheless, all environments are interconnected. Air MA is a critical enabler and multiplier for a persistent and effective land MA effort. It is the tool providing mobility, flexibility, speed, and surprise, thus making the ground-based HNSF effective. Maritime capabilities are also a potential force multiplier to employ land-based capabilities, but they also help an HN protect its borders and critical coastal or maritime infrastructure. A joint approach supports synergy and facilitates effectiveness.

2. Framework for Land Special Operations Forces Military Assistance

a. The baseline for land SOF MA is the outcome of the all-level planning process defined by:

(1) NAC/SHAPE/JHQ planning and respective products.
(2) HN requests and shortfalls (based on CPOE, OLRT deployment, or PDSS).
(3) Situation in the potential AOO.
(4) Supporting efforts by the international community including IOs, GOs, and NGOs.
b. Within the JHQ OPLAN and the relevant annexes (e.g. Special Operations or Partnering), the SOCC will receive its mission. SOCC mission analysis, supported by subordinate SOTGs, will further identify specific tasks and actions to execute the mission. The outcome will be twofold:

(1) **Special Operations Component Command**

(a) The SOCC is the interface between the JHQ and the SOTGs. While the SOTGs are designated to execute the groundwork of MA, the SOCC’s primary responsibility is to provide the framework and preconditions to enable SOF MA. For this purpose, SOCC planners will:

1/ Identify the operating environment for the SOTGs (land, maritime, air).

2/ Plan for the appropriate SOCC liaison network (e.g. ministries, HN key decision-makers and stakeholders, relevant non-military actors and organizations with impact for SOF, the JHQ, and lateral components).

3/ Assign liaison responsibilities to subordinate forces.

4/ Ensure the necessary logistic backup (infrastructure, equipment, supply, and support not within national responsibilities) to enable SOTG MA.

(b) A major factor for land SOF MA is the identification of the environment in which SOF has to operate. There is a major difference in relation to the MA approach between a permissive and a non-permissive environment. Specifically, in a non-permissive environment, SOF may be forced to conduct combat operations, either unilaterally or in a partnered approach, to set the conditions to start and maintain MA for HNSF. This leads to specific capability requirements, such as air assets and ISR, and will influence basing and infrastructure. This impacts various MA planning considerations.

(c) Figure 8A-1 depicts the development of the SOF framework for land SOF MA. Supported by HN, higher HQs, and subordinate SOTGs, and utilizing the opportunities provided by the use of OLRT and PDSS, the SOCC will define and provide the overall framework and ensure the availability of the required preconditions that will allow the SOTGs to plan ground-based MA and to conduct MA in the execution phase.
(d) This planning is driven by the obligation to develop sustainable conditions for HN organizations and HNSF in relation to structures, processes, procedures, and TTP. One major challenge for the SOCC is the creation of a functional horizontal and vertical MA system that is able to generate and sustain effective and independent HNSF nested in an optimized and effective security sector of the HN (since the HN is responsible for MA). This will only be possible through close cooperation with the JHQ, as some required HN assistance and support is related to engagement and decision levels beyond that of the SOCC.

(e) Furthermore, the extent of SOF MA is relative to the overall security situation in the JOA. The SOCC may be forced to initially conduct combat operations (if in a COIN environment) to set the conditions to establish and expand SOF MA. If HNSF have the capability to conduct operations, this may lead to a partnered operations approach, which is also a form of MA.

(f) Additionally, based on the identification of relevant non-military actors in the potential AOO, the SOCC should plan for their comprehensive integration as they may directly or indirectly facilitate or support SOF MA.

(g) During the planning, and more importantly, the execution phases, the SOCC’s primary function is to assist the SOTGs in their MA effort through:

1/ Permanent monitoring of MA activities and potential progress (based on predefined criteria and CMs).

2/ Provision of assessments and reports to the JHQ.
3/ Support with enablers and capabilities not organic to the SOTGs (e.g. ISR, air assets).

4/ Establishment of regional or national SOF MA infrastructure (e.g. training centres, academies for officers and/or NCOs)

5/ Provision of appropriate education to high-level HN leadership for effective and sustainable HNSF.

6/ SOTG assistance in the effort to cooperate with, integrate, and/or support non-military actors and agencies that are operating in their AOO.

(2) **Special Operations Task Groups.** It is the SOTG that has to execute the *groundwork* of MA. Therefore, the SOTG will initiate its own planning for MA while supporting the SOCC in the planning process with expertise and advice to ensure feasible SOF MA. During SOTG planning (such as the SOF decision-making process or any other national planning system applied to the problem), the detailed concept to conduct land SOF MA will be created, as well as the identification and definition of requirements. Some of these requirements may be provided by the SOF TCN, while others may have to be addressed to the SOCC, to higher NATO organizations, or other NATO/partner nations (at the strategic level of the force generation process or in direct consultations with nations or HN).

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**Figure 8A-2. Special Operations Task Group Land Special Operations Forces Military Assistance Considerations**

3. **Employment Considerations**

   a. Aside from the effect on pre-deployment training and force preparation, it is primarily permissive or non-permissive environments, together with HN requirements and
expectations for MA, that shape the type and extent of SOCC and SOTG employment. In a permissive environment, there may be a smaller footprint of conventional NATO forces and SOF. A permissive environment also allows training to be the main effort instead of balancing combat operations and training. These environmental distinctions impact the required SOF capabilities, enablers, and force multipliers for land SOF MA. Efficiency of any land SOF MA is heavily dependent on the provision of non-organic capabilities, complementing the already available SOF. There are several enablers and force multipliers that are essential for mission success because they provide capabilities the SOTG does not have and fill a critical capability gap or multiply already existing SOF capabilities and effects. They either form, together with the SOTG, a land SOF MA task force, or are potentially provided by the SOCC or conventional NATO (JHQ or lateral components).

![Figure 8A-3. Enablers and Force Multipliers](image)

b. These enablers and force multipliers allow the SOTG to focus on the main effort, the provision of MA to the HNSF, by:

(1) Facilitating communication between trainer and trained force.

(2) Gaining and maintaining SA.

(3) Enabling reconnaissance and operations.

(4) Influencing public perception and acceptance.

(5) Cooperating with IOs/NGOs.

(6) Assisting in perimeter security/FP and direct support during operations (e.g. cordon security, quick reaction force (QRF)).
(7) Providing medical support to the SOTG, HNSF, and to the population.

(8) Providing mobility and close air support (CAS).

(9) Providing and maintaining mission-essential infrastructure (e.g. base camps, ranges).

(10) Supporting with joint fires, as required.

c. These elements provide the SOCC and SOTG with an opportunity to conduct and expand the MA effort, as these specialists may be assigned to conduct specialist training with selected personnel from the HNSF.

d. An important consideration is related to the positioning of the MA SOTG. Generally, it should be co-located with the partnered HNSF to facilitate relationship building and to establish strong rapport for effective MA and mission success. This optimizes available time for MA and supports SA and intelligence collection. Framework for the basing is built around the security situation and requirements, available infrastructure, and medical aspects of FP for the SOTG.

4. **Special Operations Task Group Composition**

a. The land SOF MA SOTG is tailored to the mission, situation, and resulting requirements. The SOTG should be able to plan and execute training and partnered operations. The balance between both defines the structure. The MA element has to be reinforced with intelligence, logistic, and communications capabilities (the size may vary if these supporting elements also have an MA task) to facilitate operations, support FP, and establish and maintain sustainable conditions. The general land SOF MA SOTG will most likely consist of:

   (1) C2 element (leadership and operations centre)

   (2) MA element (SOF operators)

   (3) Specialists (key enablers)

   (4) Communications

   (5) Intelligence

   (6) Logistics

   (7) Medical

b. This will ensure the execution of MA to the HNSF. Nevertheless, the situation, mission, and the potential duration may also require the assignment and integration of enablers as shown in Figure 8A-3.

c. During a regular land SOF MA mission, the size of the SOTG will decrease with the increase of the capacity and capability of the HN unit. This is linked to the shift from *training to advising to mentoring*, thus minimizing the requirements for SOF operators and specialists. This part is related to the planning of measurement criteria for SOF MA
success prior to mission start and requires permanent monitoring, assessment, and adjustment.

d. SOF MA is normally a land-based operation and, therefore, requires mobility. This mobility can be provided by vehicles (protected or unprotected, organic or HN-provided) and/or air assets. These air assets may come from SOF TCNs, or they may be a part of air SOF MA. The type of vehicle used is based on the security situation (requirement for protected vehicles) and/or the benefit of using HNSF vehicles, since their use will potentially simplify mobility training for HNSF. During planning, repair and maintenance considerations of the mobility assets are a critical and important element. Repair and maintenance facilitate SOTG sustainment and, if provided by HN-based assets, self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, planners have to consider the potential requirements for maintenance and the logistic flow of both personnel and materiel.

5. Partnered Operations

a. There are various ways of conducting partnered operations in a land MA environment. They may differ in the extent of the SOF contribution and who will have the lead. According to the phase and progress of the MA effort and the situation in the operating environment, the mission may start with SOF in the lead and continue with a steady shift to HNSF leadership as they develop and improve. This will have an impact on the type of MA (train, advise, mentor and the balance of the three) and the respective resources the SOCC and the SOTG have to commit.

b. As an example, there might be the need for coalition joint fires in support of the HNSF. Due to language issues or capability gaps of the HNSF, SOF may additionally assist with the required liaison and communications package.

c. Nevertheless, during mission planning and execution, the SOTG will potentially operate along the basic principles as described in the NSHQ SOTG Manual, dated Dec 09. For this reason, this does not replace the requirement to have an understanding of SOTG planning and mission execution principles.

d. When planning partnered operations, there a number of factors, that have to be incorporated into the SOTG planning process. One of the key factors is the legal aspect, either based on NATO-HN agreements (SOFA, ROE), existing laws (LOAC), or along national caveats and restrictions. All may restrict or influence the forces conducting MA in areas such as:

1. Use of force
2. Intelligence sharing
3. Balance of OPSEC, FP, and synchronization
4. Targeting
5. Handling of opponents or hostile actors
6. Provision of medical support to HNSF (including medical evacuation (MEDEVAC))
e. Additionally, partnered operations are affected by HNSF specifics like different TTP, capability levels, literacy deficiencies, language capabilities, or the national mentality affecting the HN military performance. This requires an enormous amount of flexibility and patience within the SOCC and SOTG, and implies:

1. A tailored-to-the-target adjustment of planning procedures
2. A potential expansion of time-related mission planning
3. Extended pre-mission training/rehearsal

f. Furthermore, the requirement for deconfliction and coordination will increase, which has an impact on the establishment of liaison and battlespace management during the conduct of partnered operations. The liaison exchange may range from single SOF operators to embedded SOPTs, according to the capability level of the HNSF, the type of operation, or limitations. Regardless, liaison exchange with HNSF during partnered operations does not replace the requirement for good staff work and coordination. SOF planners should communicate directly with their HNSF counterpart. This ensures minimization of misunderstanding and facilitates the effort to improve HNSF personal standards and capabilities.

g. Partnered operations are the high end of the land SOF MA mission. Aside from the effect large-scale SOF employment achieves, it also provides a special opportunity to promote the effectiveness and capabilities of the HNSF, thus facilitating public perception and acceptance. For this reason, an important element of planning partnered operations is the integration of key enablers like Info Ops and PsyOps, as well as a coordinated (by the SOCC with the JHQ and other relevant actors) media campaign.

h. Finally, partnered operations (as well as in the area of embedded SOPTs) have an inherent risk with potential for mission failure. Specific risk areas include:

1. FP, sleeper threat, and possible mitigation measures.
2. Information security.
3. Operational behaviour in uncertain circumstances and the effects on SOF operations.
4. Cultural specifics with potential for conflict under operational conditions.

i. Nevertheless, partnered operations (and embedded SOPTs) are the opportunities to develop HNSF capable of independent operations.

6. Summary. The most likely type of environment for a SOF MA mission is land. While some aspects are identical to the maritime and air domains, there are multiple features unique to the land domain that require a different and land-focused approach. This has an impact on relevant time, space, and force factors for the SOF tasked to conduct MA, as well as the receiving HNSF. Nevertheless, when developing and pursuing the train-advice-mentor-partner LoO, it will help train HNSF to be independent, effective, and self-sustainable, which will offer SOF the justification to exit.
ANNEX 8B – MARITIME SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

1. **General.** The development of maritime SOF MA operations has to take into consideration the environment that maritime SOF operate in. The maritime environment can and should be considered one of the harshest environments on earth for SOF to operate in. Unlike the land environment, operations in the maritime environment must be heavily supported by unique SOF and conventional assets. Maritime SOF MA operations are used to maximize the effects/impact of the HN’s (usually limited) maritime power within its own areas of jurisdiction and in defending itself against a foreign enemy, insurgency, and illegal or illicit activities that threatened the HN or endangered its allies and partners. Maritime SOF MA missions can also be used to integrate the HN’s maritime power into a coalition, maritime campaign, or specific maritime operation. Maritime SOF MA operations require extensive and detailed planning to set the stage for successful execution. Usually, maritime SOF MA operations are expensive and may require high-price assets like aircraft (helicopters/fixed-wing (FW) aircraft), ships, submarines, surface watercraft, subsurface delivery vehicles (SDVs), and diving equipment, usually closed circuit breathing apparatus (CCBA). Additionally, these operations generally consume more time than land operations and are heavily dependent on adequate resourcing, such as funding, logistics, security, assets, instructor-qualified subsurface capabilities (e.g. CCBA), maritime crews (surface and/or subsurface ships or watercraft), and/or pre-mission training requirements over an extended period of time (4 months or more). When deployed, the SOCC in conjunction with the supporting special operations maritime task group (SOMTG) and special operations maritime task units (SOMTUs) must be involved with all phases of planning and execution to provide command guidance, risk management, and oversight to ensure mission success. This requires a thorough understanding of the strategic (possibly political), operational (regional and HN), and tactical environments the SOCC, SOMTGs, or SOMTUs will be operating in and the impacts of their actions. It also requires a realistic expectation on the time required to achieve the desired effects of the maritime SOF MA mission. Maritime SOF MA can be longer in duration than other SOF MA missions due to the aircraft, surface watercraft, or subsurface watercraft assets and training required to complete a mission. While there are mutual requirements and preconditions common for maritime, land, and air MA, there are specific challenges unique to the maritime SOF MA operation.

2. **Specificities of the Maritime Environment.** When SOF are planning to conduct maritime MA operations, they have to consider the different physical areas, for planning and execution within the maritime operational environment, as a multidimensional battlespace (above, on, and below the sea) that also includes shorelines and littoral areas. Generally, this battlespace (open/deep – blue water, costal – green water, riverine – brown water and wet obstacle) is a combination of land and water that forces have to negotiate. Additionally, the maritime environment is subject to international legal specificities regulated namely by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The maritime operating environment is comprised of the high seas, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), territorial seas, and the more confined and often shallower waters of littoral regions, estuaries, and

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14 The term high seas means “all parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State”. – UNCLOS, 1982, Article 86.
15 The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea where the coastal state has “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living”. – UNCLOS 1982, Article 56.
16 “The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea”. – UNCLOS 1982, Article 2.
rivers. Thus this is a vast, highly complex, and immensely diverse area bordered by the land territory. The sea covers approximately 70% of the earth’s surface, nearly 80% of the world’s population lives within 100 miles of it (and this figure increases each year), and there are 224 major river basins in the world. These waterways connect regions and nations globally through an independent network of economic, financial, social, and political relationships since 90% of the world’s commerce is linked via the sea by a net of numerous ports and infrastructure such as pipelines and oil and natural gas platforms. Additionally, 75% of trade passes through canals and international straits, and most of the world’s telecommunications are part of a vast, subjacent transoceanic telecommunications cable network. Conversely, the world’s oceans, seas, and littorals have increasingly become an environment for criminal activities. These activities include illegal immigration, human trafficking, weapons smuggling, narcotics trafficking, piracy, maritime terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and configure national, regional, and global threats. Security within the maritime environment is an ongoing mission to keep international and national laws enforced, to preserve the right of navigation, and to keep citizens, vessels, infrastructure, and resources safe. Maritime security operations counter the threats and mitigate the risks of illegal or threatening activities to help safeguard interests, security, and stability. Security within the maritime environment and the consequent maritime security operations can contribute to building partner capacity, exchanging information, cooperative security, and interoperability. Therefore, these operations create opportunities for cooperation with allies and partners; opportunities that can be multiplied by the employment of maritime SOF operations, particularly maritime SOF MA, that has political and strategic impacts at the national, regional, and/or global levels.17

![Figure 8B-1. Maritime Environment](image)

3. **Maritime Special Operations Forces Military Assistance Operations Characterization.** MA is a broad spectrum of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations.18 The range of MA includes, but is not limited to, capability building of friendly security forces; engagement with local, regional, or national leadership or organizations; and civic actions supporting and influencing the local population. SOF conduct MA within their field of expertise, such as maritime SOF.

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18 AJP-3.5(A)(1).
1st Study Draft

a. Special maritime operations under the MA task are those specifically tailored to reinforce an HN’s defence strategy through the development of indigenous maritime power. MA tasks for NATO special maritime warfare forces include assessing, training, advising, and assisting indigenous maritime forces in the employment and sustainment of their maritime capabilities.

b. The primary reason many developing nations are unable to effectively deal with irregular coastal threats to their sovereignty is that although nearly all the nations at risk have surface-based security forces most of them don’t possess capable maritime forces. The lack of capable maritime power means the HNs facing irregular/asymmetric or criminal maritime threats concede the initiative and mobility advantage to the insurgents or criminals. Properly tailored maritime capabilities have been shown to help threatened nations regain the initiative and set the tempo for further counter-irregular forces and COIN or counter-criminal operations by providing mobility, intelligence, and fire support for indigenous security forces.

c. Maritime SOF personnel performing the MA task can be employed primarily as trainers and advisors and secondarily as mentors. Special operations maritime advisors conducting MA use an indirect approach to achieve NATO’s strategic objectives in a given region. The result of these unique maritime special operations is that indigenous forces develop and sustain the maritime power capabilities they will use to defend their own countries. These capabilities, normally dependent on a number of key platforms and specialized equipment that allow for infiltration on or below the surface, when linked to air mobility can produce one of the most powerful combinations of SOF capabilities.

d. The special operations maritime advisory skills needed for successful MA include language training; regional and cultural familiarization; ability to conduct and/or manoeuvre subsurface swimming; combat swimming ship attack using CCBA with manpack explosive devices employing delayed fuse systems; underwater demolition of offshore facilities; helicopter personnel cast and recovery; SDV launch and recovery; submarine dry dock shelter; combat rubber raiding craft (CRRC); over-the-horizon (OTH) navigation; maintain and employ foreign craft in combat situations; and personal FP skills.

e. MA teams will ensure that indigenous naval/maritime forces are appropriately integrated to the maritime C2 system either through direct communications with the special operations command and control element or through the SOCC’s C2 processes and systems.

4. **Common Factors for Maritime Special Operations Forces Military Assistance**

a. MA can involve the support, advice, education, training, or support of HN forces with any of the missions used by maritime special forces, such as insertion/extraction by sea, discreet beach reconnaissance (hydrographic survey) in advance of an amphibious operation, discreet assault route preparation in advance of an amphibious operation, other activities performed in support of an amphibious operation, costal reconnaissance,
ISR, recovery or protection of ships and maritime installations, maritime interdiction operations (MIOs),\textsuperscript{19} maritime counterterrorism, and personnel recovery (PR).

b. When conducting an assessment of the HN’s current capability, certain factors need to be considered to capture the realistic maritime SOF capabilities of the HN forces, such as swimmer capabilities, SDVs, or surface watercraft to conduct special operations in maritime, littoral, and riverine operational environments. The HN maritime SOF capability forces may have the following operating specializations:

(1) Subsurface swimmer operations—should have the following minimum capabilities:

(a) Conduct combat swimmer ship attack using CCBA with manpack explosive devices employing a delayed fuse system.
(b) Conduct shipboard/offshore platform assault.
(c) Conduct static-line water parachute insertion.
(d) CRRC OTH navigation.
(e) Conduct helicopter personnel cast and recovery.
(f) Conduct rendezvous at sea.
(g) Conduct nearshore hydrographic reconnaissance (combat).
(h) Conduct beach feasibility reconnaissance.
(i) Conduct nearshore/foreshore obstacle clearance.
(j) Conduct nearshore submerged hydrographic reconnaissance.

(2) Subsurface swimmer operations—should have the following desired capabilities:

(a) Conduct swimmer surface launch and recovery.
(b) Conduct helicopter tethered CRRC insertion.
(c) Conduct CRRC helocast insertion.
(d) Conduct CRRC parachute insertion.
(e) Conduct riverine infiltration/exfiltration.
(f) Conduct submarine operations (lock-in/lock-out).
(g) Conduct surface boat hydrographic survey.

\textsuperscript{19} During MIOs, SOF conduct opposed boarding operations on uncooperative maritime vessels or platforms that are developing actions against international shipping procedures; employ visit, board, search, and seizure (VBSS) and/or heliborne visit, board, search, and seizure; and/or perform underwater operations.
(h) Conduct riverine hydrographic reconnaissance.

(3) SDV operations—should have the following minimum capabilities:

(a) Conduct underwater demolition of an offshore facility.
(b) Conduct interdiction against a port facility.
(c) Conduct personnel and/or equipment recovery.
(d) Conduct personnel and/or equipment delivery.
(e) Conduct limpet assembly modular ship attack.
(f) Conduct submarine/dry dock shelter/SDV launch and recovery.
(g) Conduct combat swimmer ship attack using CCBA.
(h) Conduct harbour penetration.
(i) Conduct pinger/receiver rendezvous.
(j) Conduct contour navigation.
(k) Conduct submarine/dry dock shelter/SDV launch, rendezvous, and recovery.
(l) Conduct underwater telephone operations.
(m) Conduct SDV communication radio operation.
(n) Conduct nearshore hydrographic reconnaissance (combat).
(o) Conduct beach feasibility reconnaissance.
(p) Conduct nearshore submerged hydrographic reconnaissance.

(4) SDV operations—should have the following desired capabilities:

(a) Conduct dry dock shelter mass swimmer launch and recovery.
(b) Conduct dry dock shelter emergency procedures.
(c) Conduct disabled SDV recovery.
(d) Conduct at-sea rescue.
(e) Conduct resupply delivery.
(f) Conduct dry dock shelter mobility.
(g) Conduct submarine attack at pierside.
(h) Conduct a grid search.
(5) Surface watercraft operations—should have the following minimum capabilities:

(a) Conduct VBSS.
(b) Conduct combat craft direct fire support.
(c) Conduct combat first aid/MEDEVAC.
(d) Conduct combat search and rescue.
(e) Conduct live fire small arms skills proficiency.
(f) React to fire on craft.
(g) Abandon/scuttle craft.
(h) Conduct special boat unit/air-coordinated operation.
(i) Manoeuvre in formation.
(j) Conduct man-overboard actions.
(k) Conduct low-visibility piloting.
(l) Conduct mooring.
(m) Conduct towing.
(n) Conduct damage control on board.
(o) Conduct coastal surveillance/intelligence collection.
(p) Conduct team insertion/extraction.
(q) Conduct combat team embarkation/disembarkation.

(6) Surface watercraft operations—should have the following desired capabilities:

(a) Conduct special boat unit support SDV sled tow.
(b) Conduct operational deception.
(c) Conduct surface contacts radar and visual identification.
(d) Conduct alongside debarkation/embarkation of troops/equipment from ship underway.
(e) Support non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO).
(f) Conduct surface boat hydrographic survey.
“Footboy Operations”

MARITIME OPERATIONS (PLOWMAN)

“MACSOG’s maritime operations have generated a lot of criticism since they first became public knowledge. The operations have been accused of being a waste of effort, being poorly conceived, and being run willy-nilly by directives from a bureaucracy in Washington that did not know what to do with them. There is some truth to these accusations. When MACSOG took over the operation from the CIA, Maritime Operations’ mission was to serve as a lever to deter North Vietnamese support for the NLF insurgency. With the initiation of Rolling Thunder, however, the program became redundant. At this point, MAROPS evolved into an interdiction, intelligence collection, and psychological operations campaign.

“Although the North Vietnamese went to great lengths to protect their coastline by the employment of much-needed personnel, artillery batteries, and radar installations, it is unknown whether these actions were done as a response to MAROPS, Rolling Thunder, Sea Dragon, or all of the above. The reduction of coastal traffic, interdiction of supplies, and virtual elimination of the North Vietnamese fishing fleet below the 19th parallel were testimony to the effect that this small force had on Hanoi’s capabilities and also reflected poor coordination between MACSOG’s branches. Since detainees taken by the SSPL for indoctrination were seized by the same PTFs that were destroying coastal traffic, the projects worked at cross-purposes. The connection between the two operations must also have been rather obvious to the North Vietnamese authorities. At the same time, the U.S. Navy’s interdiction effort was having a detrimental effect on the ability of the PTFs to capture detainees. Regardless, during the year 328 prisoners were taken for psychological indoctrination at Paradise Island and 102 North Vietnamese craft were destroyed and 3 damaged. South Vietnamese CSS casualties were 1 man killed, 3 wounded, and 1 missing in action.”

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ANNEX 8C – AIR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MILITARY ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

1. General

a. MA is the broadest of the three NATO SOF tasks. It is the only task that may occur across the whole of the NATO spectrum of conflict, and therefore, it can include an extremely wide variety of activities that can be conducted at any time (e.g. peace, crisis, conflict). For air SOF, these tasks can range from something as simple as the deployment of a single airman to provide subject matter expertise to a friendly nation, to the full deployment of an SOATG to support a friendly nation during a major conflict. Air SOF MA operations are used to maximize the effects/impact of the HN’s (usually limited) air power within its own borders and in defending itself against a foreign enemy or insurgency. Air SOF MA missions can also be used to integrate the HN’s air power into a coalition, air campaign, or specific air operation. Air SOF MA operations require extensive and detailed planning to set the stage for successful execution. Usually air SOF MA operations are more expensive (helicopters/FW aircraft may be required) and time-consuming than land or maritime MA operations and are heavily dependent on adequate resourcing, such as funding, logistics, security, aircraft, instructor-qualified aircrews, and pre-mission training requirements over an extended period of time (6 months or more). While deployed, the SOCC, in conjunction with the supporting SOATG and SOATUs, must be involved with all phases of planning and execution to provide command guidance, risk management, and oversight to ensure mission success. This requires a thorough understanding of the strategic (possibly political), operational (regional and HN), and tactical environments the SOCC, SOATGs, or SOATUs will be operating in and the impact of their actions. It also requires a realistic expectation on the time required to achieve the desired effects of the air SOF MA mission. Air SOF MA can be longer in duration than other SOF MA missions due to the air assets and training required to complete a mission. While there are mutual requirements and preconditions common for air, land, and maritime MA, there are specific challenges unique to the air SOF MA operation.

b. The Special Air Warfare Manual (SAWM), dated Mar 12, defines MA as follows, “MA is a broad spectrum of measures and activities that support and influence critical friendly assets through training, advising, mentoring, or the conduct of combined operations.

(1) “Special air warfare operations under the MA task are those specifically tailored to reinforce an HN’s defence strategy through the development of indigenous air power. MA tasks for NATO special air warfare forces include assessing, training, advising, and assisting indigenous air/aviation forces in the employment and sustainment of their air/aviation capabilities. The difference between air/aviation MA conducted by special air warfare forces from those conducted by conventional forces is the environment where the MA is provided. Just as with land and maritime MA, air/aviation MA by SOF is characterized by a higher level of political or physical risk than would be acceptable by conventional air/aviation forces.

(2) “The primary reason many developing nations are unable to effectively deal with irregular threats to their sovereignty is that nearly all the nations at risk have surface-based security forces. Developing nations rarely possess the air power needed to help their ground-based security forces find, fix, and finish terrorists or insurgent groups. The lack of capable air power means the HNs facing
irregular/asymmetric threats concede the initiative and mobility advantage to the insurgents. Properly tailored air/aviation capabilities have been shown to help threatened nations regain the initiative and set the tempo for further counter-irregular forces and counter-insurgent operations by providing mobility, intelligence, and fire support for indigenous security forces.

(3) “Unlike the air/aviation activities and aircrew skills required for SR and DA, special operations airmen performing the MA task are employed primarily as trainers and advisors. Special operations air advisors (SOAAAs) conducting MA utilize an indirect approach to achieve NATO’s strategic objectives in a given region. The result of these unique special air operations (SAO) is that indigenous air/aviation forces develop and sustain the air power capabilities they will use to defend their own countries. The special operations air advisory skills needed for successful MA include language training; regional and cultural familiarization; ability to fly, maintain, and employ foreign aircraft in combat situations; and personal force protection skills.

(4) “SOAA teams will ensure indigenous air/aviation forces are appropriately integrated to the air C2 system either through direct communications with the SOLE in the combined air operations centre (CAOC) or through the SOCC’s C2 processes and systems.”

c. The sheer scope of MA operations means that it is not possible to detail every type of air activity within this chapter; there are far too many to make that feasible. However, it is important that SOF airmen understand the planning and execution factors that are common to all types of air SOF MA activities, and this chapter will identify factors common to all air SOF MA. An understanding of these factors will enable air SOF elements to plan and execute a myriad of MA activities with confidence. Furthermore, and to provide context, this section will also outline four common SOF MA activities involving air.

| Important Note. | Air SOF MA is any air-related SOF activity that influences or builds the capabilities of another nation through support, advice, education, training, or combined operations. |

2. Common Factors for Special Operations Forces Air Military Assistance Missions. MA can involve the conduct of, or training of HN forces in the use of, any of the missions utilized by special air warfare forces; specialized air transport activities by FW, rotary-wing (RW), or tilt-rotor aircraft, CAS, close-combat attack (CCA), air-to-air refuelling, forward arming and refuelling point operations, air land integration (ALI), ISR, and PR.

a. Special Operations Forces Air Military Assistance versus Conventional Air Military Assistance. NATO air SOF is in relatively short supply compared to conventional air, and therefore, it is important to be certain that an MA task requires air SOF capabilities rather than conventional. SOF airmen traditionally have broad experience in comparison to conventional airmen, bring inherent flexibility, and are able to adjust the training/advice that they deliver to meet the changes in circumstance on the ground/in the air. There are two major factors that should be considered when deciding to use air SOF—HN requirement and risk.
1st Study Draft

(1) **Requirement.** One of the main purposes of an MA operation is to assist the HN in capacity building. An HN requesting or being offered MA may or may not have its own SOF units (land, air, and maritime). When an MA task involving air is designed to work with an HN’s SOF units, it may be more appropriate to assign air SOF to the task.

(2) **Risk.** Special air operations are employed where the degree of physical and political risk is too high for conventional forces and in environments where support from friendly forces is limited.\(^{21}\) Air SOF may be employed to conduct an MA operation, in support of HN conventional forces, where the physical risk is deemed too high for conventional air, where increased discretion is required, or where there is limited support from home or another NATO nation. MA missions should be subject to a normal operational risk assessment as detailed in Chapter 6 of the *SOATU Manual*, dated Sep 13.

![Important Note](image)

**Important Note.** Careful consideration is needed when making the decision to use air SOF to ensure that scarce resources are not being used when the task could be undertaken by conventional air.

![Important Note](image)

**Important Note.** Air SOF is more appropriate if physical risk is high, discretion is required, or the mission involves HN SOF.

b. **Special Operations Air Advisory Task Unit.**\(^{22}\) This is a functional SOATU composed of specially trained airmen dedicated to providing MA to indigenous air/aviation forces supporting NATO operations. These designated special operations airmen are focused on training, advising, and assisting HN air/aviation units in tactical- and operational-level employment and sustainment functions. An air advisory SOATU is trained and equipped to facilitate the availability, reliability, safety, and interoperability of indigenous air/aviation forces; logistics and maintenance elements; and air/aviation combat service support elements with NATO forces. This specialized SOATU addresses an HN's employment of air/aviation forces through mission planning, ALI, force generation, and employment of air/aviation forces across the spectrum of conflict. SOAA training is centred on foreign languages, cultural and theatre/regional orientation, competency in foreign aircraft, FP and survival skills, and advanced planning and integration in a non-NATO environment.

3. **Creating a Sustainable Joint Operations Capability.**

One mission area for air MA within developing countries is building the link between air and land forces to create a sustainable joint operations capability. Often, there is a lack of understanding and cooperation between the HN's air and land forces. Sometimes this disconnect is by design, as each component’s leadership tries to *stovepipe* their capability to maximize their influence within a particular nation, especially when

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\(^{21}\) Special air operations differ from conventional air operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, methods of employment, and independence from friendly support. – AJP-3.5(A)(1)

\(^{22}\) SAWM
competing for limited budgetary resources. In other cases, it may be a result of history within the country, where the air forces fall under the control of the land forces commander because the land forces were already established when the new air force capability was developed. This can lead to the an ineffective use of the air forces since the land force commander may only view them as a mode of transportation instead of exploiting all of their air force capability. Regardless of the reason behind the lack of cooperation between an HN’s military forces, it has been proven that joint operations are an effective way to employ a country’s full military capability against an enemy. This is especially true when one component lacks the military capability of the other component, such as the land component’s lack of air mobility or CAS. A land component may have some indigenous air capability, but the majority of this capability is typically owned within the air component of a country.

**Air SOF MA Vignette.** Georgia MA mission (tactical airlift/joint operations) conducted by an MTT wanted to send a large contingent of conventional military trainers into the country and draw unwanted attention to the programme. The political environment was too sensitive. Therefore, Special Operations Command – Europe was tasked to assist with the execution of the Georgia Train and Equip Programme (GTEP). As part of this mission, a small MTT team of SOAAs was tasked with training the Georgian aviation forces in helicopter daylight tactical air mobility missions. This training was planned to coincide with the light infantry training being conducted by an SOTU from the U.S. SOF.

This small MTT consisted of six SOAAs: two pilots, two flight engineers, one maintenance person, and a mission commander. This small team would deploy for 6 months and teach daylight tactical flying in UH-1H helicopters to include mountainous operations, formation, and air mobility. They would also advise on the maintenance of the helicopters. (Note: As part of GTEP, the Georgians received refurbished UH-1H helicopters donated from the U.S. and Turkey. The basic flight training in these aircraft was conducted by conventional army instructors. The SOAAs built upon these basic flight skills and taught advanced daylight tactical operations. The SOAAs would target the most qualified pilots in the squadron using a train-the-trainer approach. By training the most qualified pilots first (instructor pilots, if available), they started to build a pyramid of trained aircrew that would allow the squadron to continue to build their capability after the SOAAs had redeployed. This training approach is the most economical and least time-consuming. The SOAAs had to evaluate the capabilities of each pilot before they received the training. This evaluation was done in collaboration with the U.S. Army pilots (conventional force) who had conducted the basic qualification training of the squadron’s pilots. It was also important to train pilots who would actually pass the training onto the rest of the squadron. The SOAAs did not give training to the squadron leadership if their primary job was not flying. For example, there was no point in training a squadron commander in a tactical skill if he rarely flies the aircraft or is not actively involved in daily flight operations.
Important Note. This can sometimes be a culturally sensitive issue since usually the leadership or senior members of a squadron want the best training available for themselves before the younger members of the squadron are trained in a new capability. It is up to the air advisors to be the brokers of good faith in these situations and explain to the senior leadership the benefits of training the aircrew that do the majority of the flying first. This does not prevent the SOAAs from giving the squadron leadership or senior aircrew an orientation training ride or some exposure to the training, such as air mission planning, to make them feel part of the programme.

The SOAAs also taught flight planning, tactical air mission planning, and ALI (joint planning/operations) with the infantry forces being trained by the SOTU. The MTT of SOAAs deployed to the location and lived in a small complex along with the SOTU trainers. Upon completion of the air training mission, the SOAAs had trained four aircrews. Once the initial capability was established by the SOF, both the ground and air continuation training was turned over to conventional forces.

Vignette Summary. This is an excellent example of what SOF aviators can do to support the MA mission. It has all of the pieces mentioned earlier in this chapter. As a part of pre-mission training, the SOAAs had to be qualified in the UH-1H helicopter and had to conduct mountainous refresher training prior to deployment. It also highlighted the fact that specific, pre-mission coordination and detailed planning were critical to success and that SOF sometimes require conventional support to complete its mission. The SOAAs had to coordinate with conventional army pilots and the SOTU to develop a training plan to meet the mission objectives, and conventional forces were required to do the basic flight training. Air MA missions are almost always expensive and require sufficient and consistent funding to be successful. Georgians were given UH-1H model helicopters with supporting spare parts and flight/maintenance training prior to the SOAAs deploying for the mission. Aircraft fuel was rationed to support only essential flight training, and the aviation advisors maximized training opportunities with good planning and execution. Another important aspect to consider is operational risk management. Specifically, this mission was a high-risk mission from political and military points of view. When examining this vignette from a political perspective, a large conventional U.S. force training in Georgia could have raised tensions between Georgia and Russia. Therefore, a small force with limited military visibility was the better political option. This is an excellent example of SOF playing as tactical actors on a strategic stage. It should be noted that there will always be military risks associated with using small military teams when training foreign troops and airmen while isolated from any major NATO military support. This is a typical scenario for SOF trainers because of the high demand on the limited resources of SOF. Once the initial capability was established and conventional troops were ready to take over the training, the mission was transitioned to conventional forces.

4. Summary. Air SOF MA missions can increase an HN’s air power capability. That capability can be a new capability, such as training on new aircraft, or it can be training the HN to use their current capability in a more effective manner, such as introducing new TTP.
Regardless, air SOF MA missions always require detailed planning, sufficient funding, and often contain some political and military risks.
CHAPTER 9 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS MEDICAL ENGAGEMENT AND PARTNERING

9-1. General

a. Medical civil action programmes (MEDCAPs) and other versions of medical MA have been used for decades and, in recent conflicts, to support SOF commanders’ MA objectives, particularly as they relate to COIN operations and foreign internal defence. These objectives include engaging disengaged local populations, maintaining and improving local relationships to build goodwill and cooperation, and building HN medical capability. SOF assets, because of their high readiness state, have also been used to support humanitarian assistance missions by providing health care to the HN population and participating in rescue operations, for example, in post-earthquake humanitarian operations in both Haiti (2010) and Japan (2012).

b. Allied Command Operations (ACO) Directive 83-2, *Allied Command Operations Guidance for Military Medical Services Involvement with Humanitarian Assistance and Support to Governance, Reconstruction and Development*, dated 29 Mar 10, establishes critical NATO guidelines for making collaborative command, medical, and legal decisions in the use of medical assets in MA. ACO Directive 83-2 lists seven guiding principles. These are do no harm, be clinically appropriate, be culturally sensitive, be coherent and coordinated with higher HQs’ directives and programmes, be sustainable, and, where possible, facilitate HN primacy.

c. These guiding principles apply to SOF medical assets acting in a medical capacity during MA missions. The distinction of medical capacity is important because often SOF medics are designated combatants with advanced medical capability. Thus, they are not necessarily bound by the same medical ethics as those governing medical personnel and units identified under the Geneva Convention.

d. ACO Directive 83-2 delineates areas where NATO medical elements may be employed in MA. They are reconstruction and development, humanitarian assistance, medical civil action projects, medical engagement and planned medical outreach, support to the security forces’ medical services, and infrastructure and equipment support. Refining the concepts from ACO Directive 83-2, SOF medical MA is divided into two broad categories: SOF medical engagements (MEs) and SOF medical partnerships (MPs). Frequently, these areas will overlap (see Figure 9-1).

![Figure 9-1. Medical Military Assistance, Medical Engagement, and Medical Partnership](image)

e. Elements that improve chances for ME and MP mission success include pre-mission training, comprehensive planning, pre-planned culturally appropriate training
toolkits, and employing metrics for measures of performance (MOPs) and MOEs that measure desired impact. The analysis of LLs, combined with performance measuring metrics, allows continued improvement in the science of medical MA missions.

f. Some poor outcomes generated by improperly planned and coordinated SOF ME and MP missions include:

1. Diminishing local medical assets health care credibility with HN population.
2. Undermining local medical assets’ economic stability.
3. Creating unfulfilled local expectations for continuing care and support.
4. Wasteful or redundant efforts in nearby localities (e.g. multiple clinics in close proximity, unsupportable by local resources).
5. Improper use of medications and supplies provided to local populations (e.g. resale of medications).
6. SOF inadvertently breaking higher HQs’ agreements (e.g. visiting and searching clinics).
7. Providing opportunities for enemy engagement or Info Ops (e.g. “They are trying to poison us with their vaccinations”).
8. Failure to capitalize on available higher HQs outreach opportunities and culturally appropriate training materials.
9. Counterproductive outcomes due to cultural ignorance.

g. Unwanted ME and MP outcomes frequently occur as unintended consequences because of quickly planned and executed operations for short-term tactical gains. For example, SOF medics providing sick calls to HN soldiers or civilians may be easy and have short-term benefits, but backfire when the SOF medic must refuse care to those who have come to expect it. A better way is to establish HN mechanisms for this support. Likewise, a desire to show a units MOP, such as number of patients treated or amounts of medical material donated at a MEDCAP, may reflect positive unit activity, but the effects of these events can actually undermine strategic objectives such as enabling self-sustainability of the local health care system. Finally, some operations blatantly test medical ethical boundaries, such as requiring biometric screening or operational intelligence, as quid pro quo for receiving health care benefits. For this reason, SOF should avoid using medical assets in ME and MP without careful planning.

h. A SOF commander can use SOF medical assets effectively to support MA objectives. Keys to success include establishing sustainable, ethical solutions aligned with command objectives that require careful mission planning, devoted command emphasis over time, and MOPs and MOEs.

9-2. Special Operations Forces Medical Engagements

a. SOF MEs encompass a spectrum of medical operations directed at the tactical, operational, or strategic levels of an HN population to improve populace health, improve medical care, and build HN medical capacity in support of command objectives (Figure 9-2).
Figure 9-2. The Medical Engagement Model

b. SOF MEs include MEDCAPs defined in ACO Directive 83-2 as a non-kinetic tool where medical assets use “deliberate, direct interventions intended to deliver medical care to HN civilians” to win hearts and achieve military political ends. Other SOF MEs include dental civil action programmes, engineering civil action programmes, MEDCAPs, medical seminars (MEDSEMs), and veterinarian civil action programmes.

c. Historically, the MEDCAP is the most common form of SOF ME and classically entails single- or multiple-day direct treatment events using SOF internal assets, or medical assets coordinated by SOF, conducted solely to meet a local commander’s immediate tactical purposes. They are typically not well coordinated with HN assets or integrated into a larger medical development plan. Because of this, they may result in some short-term tactical gains but have limited long-term mission effectiveness. In some cases, SOF MEDCAPs actually harm mission objectives at the operational and strategic levels. ACO Directive 83-2 specifically recommends against these operations and endorses the concept of ME and planned medical outreach that conform to the seven guiding principles above. Specific planning, tactics, and procedures that enhance the effectiveness of SOF ME will be discussed later in this chapter.

d. HN primacy is a key element of all SOF ME. SOF MEs should place HN elements in the forefront and SOF in the background, supporting HN objectives as a primary goal. By including HN elements in the planning and execution of MEs, the commander enhances the chances of conducting ethical, culturally appropriate interventions that are sustainable by HN assets when SOF have departed. At the same time, SOF ME should be nested with the commander’s operational objectives. SOF ME mission analysis:

(1) Planning Considerations

(a) Conducting a complete mission analysis with a proper intelligence preparation of the battlefield from a medical perspective is a critical step in planning SOF ME. SOF ME must be carefully planned in advance and supported by the PDSS. This is one reason why it is critical to include a medical leader in the SOF PDSS team.
(b) SOF may conduct short-notice crisis intervention combat, peacekeeping, and NEOs. Unless a unit develops on-the-shelf contingency plans for ME for short-notice crisis intervention missions, it is unrealistic to expect a SOF element to conduct significant ME in rapid deployment crisis intervention.

(c) SOF elements expected to respond to natural disasters and similar missions should develop contingency plans for this type of ME, particularly when deploying SOF surgical assets in support of disaster relief. If ME contingency plans are not in place for short-notice deployment, SOF medical leaders should focus on the unit’s medical needs and appropriately advise commanders of the limitations and constraints to using medical assets as an MA tool.

(d) SOF acting alone in an AOO frequently have limited medical assets. The SOF medical leader, as the commander’s special staff officer and the medical advisor (MEDAD), must carefully consider and propose realistic and ethical SOF ME options with limited SOF assets that support the commander’s objectives and are coordinated with the other elements of the commander’s staff. Given the commander’s guidance, the SOF medical leader may consider coordinating for additional non-SOF resources, if required, to support the commander’s objectives. Some key considerations for SOF-only MEs are:

1/ SOF commander’s desired scope of ME operations to include emergency health care to local civilians and augmenting and improving HN medical assets.

2/ Mission parameters, such as deployment length, level of OPSEC, number of medical personnel authorized for deployment, pallet space and logistical support chain for ME mission, national and HN legal limitations and constraints, and medical rules of eligibility (MROE).

3/ SOF medical preparedness to conduct MA.

(e) SOF medical leaders should consider three primary areas when conducting medical pre-deployment and mission analysis in support of ME missions. These are friendly forces, HN assets, and NGOs. Friendly forces can be further subdivided into one’s own national SOF assets and assets belonging to general-purpose forces (GPFs) working with SOF.

(2) Friendly Forces Areas of Consideration

(a) SOF internal assets:

1/ NATO SOF defines the NATO special operations combat medic (NSOCM) as the medical provider responsible for providing direct medical support to an SOTU. Under this definition, NSOCMs may be physicians, nurses, or medic operators, based upon national preference. The ability for an NSOCM to support MA will vary by nation, based on the skills, qualifications, education, and authority
given to the NSOCM. SOF medical leaders must factor these considerations into the pre-mission planning process when scoping the ability to meet the commander’s desired MA objectives.

2/ SOF may have access to organic dental, veterinary, surgical, civil affairs, linguistic, and other capabilities. These resources should be considered in the ME planning process, paying particular attention to these assets’ logistical support requirements. Rarely are these assets at the same deployment readiness level as the SOTU, so it is critical these elements are integrated early into operational timelines.

3/ SOF medical planners must consider the logistical support requirements for any proposed ME. ME typically requires additional supplies and equipment. One example is culturally appropriate curriculum and training materials. There may be financial or legal limitations on how these items are procured, and that must be considered as well. To be most successful, these details cannot be created quickly or ad hoc. Prudent SOF elements procure and plan these engagements carefully in the pre-mission planning process.

(b) GPFs:

1/ SOF medical leaders should consider friendly GPF capabilities that can be leveraged to optimize the commander’s objectives during mission analysis. SOF medical elements have limited personnel, time, and equipment, while GPFs’ Role 1, 2, and 3 facilities may have significantly underutilized assets. The ideal SOF ME is coordinated with GPF medical assets that are aligned with SOF mission objectives. To accomplish this, SOF medical leaders must understand the GPF medical mission and priorities, and create relationships with GPF medical leaders that foster support. Some important information to gather about GPFs potentially available for MA use are:

a/ MROE. What are the GPFs’ limitations in providing training and health care to the local population?

b/ GPF ME Programme. What current ME programmes are the GPFs currently conducting (e.g. partnering with HN medical elements, conducting health facility assessments, coordinating care with HN facilities)? SOF should seek to integrate and facilitate these programmes rather than creating their own, leveraging GPF assets toward the SOF mission.

c/ GPF Medical and Operational Assets. What assets does the GPF have available to put toward ME missions (e.g. funding, medical supplies/equipment for donation, training resources, culturally appropriate training materials, access to vehicles, access to security forces, access to key HN leadership)?
Host Nation Areas of Consideration

(a) SOF medical leaders should consider HN capabilities as part of mission analysis. Frequently, HNs have self-development plans with internal resources or resources provided through humanitarian assistance programmes from GOs and NGOs (e.g. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)). Some nations may use HN military capabilities to augment civilian medical capabilities. Ideally SOF MEs maximize HN plans and align them with SOF mission objectives. To accomplish this, SOF medical leaders must understand the HN development priorities and create relationships with HN leaders that foster support. Equally important, SOF ME should not hamper, inhibit, or compete with HN development plans as this could be detrimental to the SOF mission. Key HN information to be considered during mission analysis includes:

1/ HN development priorities such as improving health care access, increasing health care provider capability, improving medical logistics, and reducing infant mortality.

2/ Medical and non-medical leaders that influence the delivery of HN medical programmes at the local, district, and higher levels.

3/ HN programmes that are currently underway (e.g. clinic-building process, local medical training programmes, immunization programmes, clean water programmes).

4/ HN resources that could be leveraged to support SOF ME (e.g. military and civilian medical elements, NGOs). SOF should seek to integrate and facilitate these programmes versus creating their own or leveraging HN assets toward the SOF mission.

(b) NGOs are highly variable and frequently have significant resources that could be leveraged to optimize SOF objectives. However, NGOs may be wary to work with military organizations if they feel such cooperation might compromise impartiality, humanitarian objectives, or their independence. Likewise, SOF assets may be wary to work with NGOs for OPSEC reasons. Some considerations regarding NGO/SOF partnership during mission analysis include:

1/ What is the historical attitude of the NGO toward military cooperation?

2/ What type of operations are military units conducting (e.g. combat operations, peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement operations)? NGOs will likely be more amenable to cooperation in non-combat operations (Figure 9-3).
3/ What benefit can SOF achieve by coordinating efforts with NGO efforts? NGOs may be able to provide sustainment after SOF leave. NGOs may also be a great resource for culturally specific training materials or health trends to which SOF ME can be directed.

e. SOF ME mission execution:

(1) Successful SOF ME starts with careful planning and integration of all elements of the SOF command toward the commander’s objectives. MEs are complex tactical operations that entail a requirement for C2, communications, troop movements, security, and logistical support. It is short sighted to think that an effective ME can be conducted with just an NSOCM with an aid bag and some additional medications and resources to pass out to a local population. In fact, these types of operations should be avoided.

(2) Early in the execution timeline, the NSOCM or SOF MEDAD should conduct KLEs with HN and other stakeholders to determine feasible engagements that can be supported by, through, and with HN assets. Proper planning and preparation will allow the SOF medical leader to offer recommendations to the HN leadership that are actionable within the SOF unit’s timeline. HN primacy is advantageous as it de-emphasizes SOF involvement and increases HN buy-in and cultural relevancy.

(3) The importance of including the entire SOF planning staff in the planning and execution of MEs cannot be understated. A common mistake made during SOF MEs is failing to socialize the SOF ME plan with other staff sections.

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Because SOF ME is a tactical operation, intelligence, operations, and logistical staff officers will all have a significant impact on operational success. SOF medical planners must avoid the SOF ME becoming just a sideline medical operation by properly staffing the plan through command channels.

(4) Determining and gathering MOPs and MOEs are an important component of ME execution. Without knowing in advance how a SOF ME’s impact will be measured, it is impossible to determine if the event had the commander’s desired effect. In an ME, an MOP might be the number of HN health care providers trained in a particular medical skill such as early tourniquet application for uncontrolled bleeding. An MOE could be a reduction in people who died from wounds in a select population because of an increase in the use of tourniquets for uncontrolled bleeding. By having a collection plan for these metrics prior to deployment, the SOF medical leader can ensure that interventions are having the desired effect for both the HN and the commander and provide the necessary statistics that justify resource expenditures.

(5) Because HN sustainability is a primary goal of SOF MEs, the provision of medical education, as opposed to direct medical care to a population, may be a better choice for SOF MEs. One SOF ME model successfully conducted in Africa and Asia is the MEDSEM. In a MEDSEM, the SOF element conducts KLE to coordinate local authorities for an ME. Then, using HN-guided objectives, the SOF element trains and mentors HN assets to conduct planned medical outreach. Properly conducted, this enhances HN provider capability, builds confidence in HN providers, and leaves a connection that is logistically sustainable by the HN once the SOF unit departs.

Figure 9-4. Medical Seminar Model

f. Conclusion

(1) SOF MEs are complex tactical operations that require careful planning, pre-deployment preparation, and execution if they are to be ethical and effective. SOF commanders must allocate appropriate resources and planning in coordination with SOF medical advice to optimize these operations.

(2) Short-term, poorly planned MEs using under-resourced SOF medical assets without proper nesting with HN and commander’s objectives is suboptimal and can potentially damage overall mission objectives. If a short-term engagement is required, SOF commanders should avoid the use of medical assets to meet this requirement.
Nations should seek training in conducting SOF ME and be aware of NATO-specific guidance and doctrine governing the use of medical assets for operational purposes. SOF medical leaders should be trained in operational planning concepts to facilitate integration of SOF ME into other staff operations.

9-3. Special Operations Forces Medical Partnership

a. The most common MA mission most SOF will execute is military partnership for the purposes of improving partner defence forces. Typically, these missions entail training HNSF in military tactics and procedures, including medical procedures. SOF MP is defined as the use of SOF medical assets at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels to conduct medical training, mentoring, and advising of partnered forces to improve operational medical capacity and promote self-sustainability in support of a SOF commander’s MA objectives.

b. Like SOF MEs, proper pre-deployment planning and training is critical for successful SOF MP. It is unrealistic for SOF commanders to expect significant, sustainable improvement in security force capability without proper resourcing for these activities. Important general planning can be divided into several broad categories: general planning factors, friendly forces resources, and HN resources. SOF MP mission analysis:

1. General Planning Factors

   a. There are four overarching categories for general planning factors. They include commander’s objectives, mission parameters, MROE, and partnership resources.

   b. A SOF medical leader’s first critical planning factor for SOF military MP is the SOF commander’s objectives. The commander’s desired end state should be the guiding factor for all activities. This should be tempered by legal and ethical constraints and HN capabilities and objectives to
ensure that the unit’s mission is accomplished in the best possible way. SOF medical leaders must communicate issues and risks, and foster realistic expectations with the SOF staff and commander during the mission analysis process.

(c) Basic mission parameters are the framework upon which SOF medical leaders build MPs. Mission location and length will be a driver in what SOF medical assets can accomplish in developing partner capacity. Available weight and pallet space may determine SOF medical options. Likewise, the limitations on number of personnel deployed and the overarching purpose of the mission may have impacts on the medical plan. Early SOF medical leader engagement with operational planners ensures that medical assets are prudently incorporated into the mission parameters.

(d) A key mission parameter will be how much time the SOF unit will have with the partner nation forces. Clearly a 2-week, 24/7 medical partnering mission will be different than a 6-month partnering mission with weekly engagement. SOF medical leaders should consider the short-term and long-term partnering plan. These goals should be measured in terms of MOPs and MOEs.

(e) It is wise for SOF medical leaders and SOF staffs to create these training plans in advance and save them for future use as they can often be reused in missions with different HN partners.

(f) MROE will be another significant planning factor in MPs. The commander’s expectation for SOF to provide direct medical support to partnered forces will influence medical logistic planning factors with implied follow-on tasks for the J4 and other staff officers. The national rules for the use of national medications and funding for HN medical supplies may constrain or enable the SOF medical leader’s ability to support commander objectives.

(g) SOF medical partnering is likely to be more successful if SOF medical leaders are part of the pre-mission planning process. Determining a medical training plan and choosing culturally suitable curriculum for the partner force should be done prior to deployment.

(h) Training resources may be developed internally or purchased off-the-shelf. For example, “Where There Is No Doctor” is an excellent training resource developed to teach third world personnel critical medical skills, can be cheaply procured in many languages, and is designed for both literate and illiterate populations. Other sources for training information are the ICRC or the HN educational system already in place.

(2) Friendly Forces Areas of Consideration

(a) SOF internal assets:

1/ The NSOCM, or medically trained individual responsible for health care of an SOTU, may be a physician, nurse, or medic operator, based upon national preference. This will have an impact
on the medical complexity of MPs. For example, an NSOCM who is
a specially trained operator is not likely to be able to successfully
partner with an HN’s surgical team in developing damage control
surgery skills. An analysis of SOF internal assets matched to HN
assets and the desired partnership end state must be conducted
during pre-mission planning. A SOF unit may find a requirement to
train the non-medical SOTU operators as trainers, under the direction
of the SOF medical leader or NSOCM, to maximize the SOF unit’s
ability to partner and train an HN force in medical skills.

2/ Some nations’ SOF have access to dental, veterinary,
surgical, civil affairs, linguistic, and other capabilities to augment
missions. These resources might be leveraged to improve training
and special skills partnerships. These specialized capabilities
frequently create unique logistical support requirements and are
rarely at the same deployment readiness level as the SOTU, so it is
critical that these elements be considered early in the planning
process to allow integration into the operational leader’s training and
deployment timeline.

(b) GPFs: SOF medical leaders should consider friendly GPF
capabilities that can be leveraged to optimize the commander’s objectives.
In a large conventional training mission, GPFs may already have training
programmes and assets that can be aligned with SOF mission objectives.
For example, in recent NATO operations in Afghanistan, the conventional
partnering structure entailed centralized medic training for Afghan National
Army elements that was underutilized. SOF was able to facilitate partner
participation in already scheduled HN training in unfilled slots. In this way,
the SOF element leveraged an existing programme to further the long-term
goal of building HN self-sustainment. Using HN-designed curriculum and
processes leaves a sustainable HN training resource and pipeline. If
curriculum must be prepared by the SOF unit, make sure it is culturally
sensitive and educationally appropriate for the partnered force.

Jeapes, Major General Tony. SAS: Secret War.

“‘Doug’s opened a clinic just inside the door there for men and boys. That’s open every
morning from eight to twelve. Then, in the afternoon, he goes visiting the really sick who can’t
get here, and sees the women in the evening. There’s no point in visiting them earlier because
if they can even move they will be sent out to work, so they don’t get back till evening. The
men won’t let the women come to the clinic at all. What we need is a female medic here really.
That’s an idea, boss, how about WRAC, one per four-man patrol?’ There was a chorus of
approval.

“‘Seriously, they only used to let Doug near them when they were at death’s door, but it’s got
much better over the last couple of months. They call him now when the women are really ill,
but they still won’t always let him touch them. Tell the boss about your brilliant diagnosis last
week, Doug.’ The other three sat grinning from ear to ear as Steadman looked down at his
cup, smiling the weary smile of someone who has had his leg pulled for a long time.
“Well, it was like this.’ He had a calm strong voice with just a suggestion of West Country.

“This old bloke came to me one night in a high old dudgeon. Said his wife was sick. So I went to see her. She was lying in this little room, all dark except for one candle burning in the corner. She was quite an old woman, I could see that from her face and hands, but I couldn’t see her shape or anything, just a bundle of clothes, lying there. He said she had stomach-ache. Her temperature and pulse were OK, so it was not appendicitis. I thought she was probably constipated; there’s a lot of that here they don’t drink enough. Anyway I gave her some vitamins and iron tablets—all the women need them because the men take all the good food and gave her a dose of senna pod for constipation. I thought I would go back and see her in the morning, by daylight, like.’ It was obvious from the looks of delight from the others that he was coming to the crunch line.

“What happened?’

“Well, nothing really. The old boy turned up with a goat next morning as a present for the birth of a fine son.”

(3) **Host Nation Areas of Consideration**

(a) HN capabilities vary widely. During the PDSS and preparation, it is important to understand the level of medical knowledge, training, and logistical support that the partner force currently has. This will establish a starting point for medical partnership. For example, planning to teach a partner force sick call medicine, when they have no medicine and no means to procure medications will not likely lead to desired HN gains and will not be sustainable after the SOTU leaves. Alternatively, a well-developed HN partner force with ample access to medical logistics and a solid knowledge base of tactical combat casualty care might benefit from sick call medicine training.

(b) NATO SOF has established a systematic approach to considering SOF medical systems that can be applied to evaluating an HN medical capability (see Figure 9-6).

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Figure 9-6. Special Operations Forces Medical System Model

1/ **Leadership.** What is the leadership structure of the HN medical system? Is there a senior medical leader? How is medical direction accomplished? What are the legal structures governing HN partner force medical care? How do commanders interact with the medical system?

2/ **Personnel.** How is the HN partner force manned? Are there surgeons, physicians, nurses, medics, and/or first responders?

3/ **Planning.** How does the HN partner force conduct medical planning? What capabilities can it draw from?

4/ **Communications.** What communication capabilities does the medical system use to manage medical issues? What protocols exist (e.g. 9-line evacuation request)?

5/ **Training.** What training systems exist in the HN? How is the partner force trained and to what level and capability?

6/ **Treatment.** What treatment capabilities exist at the point of wounding and higher levels of care? What sick call and preventive medicine programmes are in place? What medical treatment facilities exist?

7/ **Evacuation.** How does the medical system evacuate patients? How do they treat patients during evacuation?
8/ **Supply.** How do medical providers get medical supplies and medications? Is there a cold chain capability?

(c) It is important to consider the HN’s development priorities when creating the MP plan. MP plans should be balanced between what the HN needs and desires and the SOF unit’s capability to provide quality training and mentoring. For example, teaching a partner forces MEDEVAC techniques on airborne platforms when the unit will be reliant on ground evacuation is likely to be a fruitless endeavour.

(d) HN equipment and logistical supply may be a significant consideration for MP plans. It is not uncommon in recent operations that a SOF unit’s MP plan entails teaching partner counterparts how to use equipment like a combat application tourniquet. However, if the HN force is unlikely to be able to reliably procure and maintain combat application tourniquet access, a wiser plan might be to determine what tourniquet the partner force has access to and how to use and improve that piece of equipment. This enables the HN to create sustainable solutions that may not be to the home nation’s standards but is an improvement on current practices.

(4) **Special Operations Forces Medical Partnership Execution.** A key to a successful SOF MP is having a feasible, accurately informed plan that is coordinated and resourced in accordance with the commander’s overall partnership plan. Properly conducted pre-mission planning reduces mission friction. Experience shows, however, that even the most careful planning will require adjustment on the ground. Some key guidelines can be followed that enable successful MP execution.

(a) Pre-mission planning should include a complete on-the-ground assessment of the HN’s medical capabilities and resourcing at the SOTU level and above during initial entry operations. Verifying PDSS information on HN capabilities will establish if the pre-mission MP plan is feasible and acceptable.

(b) SOF medical leaders should identify key partner and HN leadership that can influence HN training and resources, particularly the HN’s partner unit commander and influential local medical providers. Creating a positive relationship and developing the medical network early will improve partnering execution. The SOF medical leader should learn the HN medical logistics process, using the HN system to support training whenever possible.

(c) As medical partnering proceeds, it is important to not only teach the desired skills to the partner force, but also build HN training capability that will continue the training mission after the SOTU leaves. Developing HN medical trainers helps ensure that the SOTU teaches in a culturally appropriate manner and leaves a self-sustaining capability.
Training, Mentoring, and Advising

(a) SOF MPs at the tactical level typically start with training and graduate to mentoring and advising the partner forces. Training entails directly passing skills from the SOTU to trainees. In a mentoring relationship, the SOTU coaches the partner force through specific skills or operations. When advising, the SOTU will provide targeted advice to improve performance. At operational and strategic levels, SOF MP tends to be more focused toward mentoring and advising.

(b) When training, mentoring, or advising, it is important to carefully consider the partner force’s literacy, interpreter capacity, time availability, cultural perspectives, ethics, and motivations. Without proper preparation, it is easy to make culturally sensitive mistakes that lead to significant negative mission impact. How the partner force best learns, whether that is visually, kinetically, or by speaking and hearing, should be established early in the partnering process.

Red Flag. A common error in MP is to assume incompetence when a partner cannot meet SOTU expectations, when in fact there may be significant reasons for not performing to desired levels. Always treat the partner force with respect.

Improve Operational Medical Capacity

(a) Operational medical capacity is the ability for a partner to care for their patients and personnel. MP should be focused on achievable goals that improve this capability.

(b) All medical personnel and elements operate at different levels influenced by their culture, resources, limitations, and constraints. MP should be focused toward achieving measurable performance objectives that have true operational impact monitored through MOEs.

(c) Many SOTUs will tend to want to teach partner forces tactical combat casualty care skills. Partner force learning objectives should be scoped by partner force initial capabilities. Evidence-based medicine shows that more lives are saved with bleeding control than any other initial battlefield intervention.

Best Practice. While it may be reasonable to train other complex tactical combat casualty care skills with a more advanced partner, training should focus on easily trained and measured skills that make a difference like placing tourniquets early and properly.

When working with a less medically developed partner, basic preventive medicine and hygiene training is a low cost programme that requires few resources and has direct operational impacts.
(7) Self-sustainment

(a) Successful MP should end in partner self-sustainability. At the start of an MP, there may be significant difference between the partnering SOTU and the partnered force. In this case, the SOTU will have a greater training role that will move toward mentoring and advising as the partner force improves. The desired end state is for the partner force to be able to maintain and build on skills transferred to it by the partnered SOTU.

![Figure 9-7. Spectrum of Special Operations Forces Medical Partnerships]

(b) Self-sustainment within a partner force is greatly influenced by motivation and resources in both the partnering force and the partnered force. It may not be possible to bring a partner force to the same level of skill and ability as the partnering SOTU because of these factors. Proper pre-mission planning informed by checks of performance during the partnering process are critical to ensuring skills are sustained.

9-4. **Summary.** Employing SOF medical assets to achieve a commander’s MA objectives is attractive because it is inherently non-confrontational and can promote a positive goodwill message. At the same time, using these assets can be a slippery ethical slope. How medical assets are used must be carefully weighed for short- and long-term benefits to the mission and potential negative consequences that may not always be obvious or intuitive. A decision to use medicine as an engagement and partnering tool must be carefully evaluated by SOF commanders and their legal advisors and MEDADs.
1st Study Draft

CHAPTER 10 – SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

“Whenever I took a decision, or adopted an alternative, it was after studying every relevant factor … geography, tribal structure, religion, social customs, language, appetites, standards—all were at my fingertips ….”

-T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia), Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph

10-1. General

a. Once the partnering environment has been defined and described and the forces to be partnered with have been chosen and evaluated during the PDSS, the SOF unit responsible must then decide how best to mentor, train, or advise the HNSF. This includes developing and executing a pre-deployment training plan that best simulates the JOA and prepares SOF for their upcoming MA task. While all MA environments will differ, training plans should draw from generic and significant LLs from past NATO SOF experiences conducting MA with units and staff organizations.

b. Effective pre-deployment training is imperative for mission success. Nations providing forces for deployment must ensure adequate preparation of individuals and units that compose the force for employment by the commander in the execution of the MA mission.

c. Pre-deployment training involves numerous stakeholders including nations, individual HQ in and outside of the NCS and the NFS, NATO education and training centres to include the NSOS, and other NATO institutions. To meet theatre operational requirements, a common and synergistic approach to training must be in place, including

Figure 10-1. Military Assistance Pre-deployment Training Puzzle
a clear understanding of the delineation of roles and responsibilities for training and preparing the MA force.

**Important Note.** Conducting MA requires adaptive units led by well-informed, culturally astute leaders and soldiers.

d. While each NATO mission will be different, if it includes MA or SFA, SHAPE will task one of the JFC HQs to plan and execute all NATO-led pre-deployment training for key leaders and staffs. It will also select personnel for JTF HQ, military advisor teams, police advisor teams, and operations coordination centre advisor teams.

e. In accordance with NATO policy, TCNs are to provide properly trained and equipped forces for NATO operations. It is essential to operational success that nominated personnel meet the requirements of the job description and mission, including experience, background, qualifications, and language proficiency when working in a NATO operational environment. It is enough of an obstacle when NATO forces cannot talk to the HNSF; it is unacceptable when NATO personnel cannot talk among themselves. The nature of MA is so reliant upon personality that the decisive point of an MA or SFA mission may well be the selection, training, and education of personnel in preparation for that mission. Personnel should, therefore, attend all required national and NATO-led pre-deployment training prior to mission deployment.

f. In MA, the relationship between the advisor and the HNSF is vital. Rigorous vetting and selection of advisor personnel by the TCN is critical to ensuring that those personnel directly engaged in the MA or SFA process not only have the required knowledge, skills, and abilities, but also the right temperament and attitude required to work closely with HNSF personnel, often for extended periods without respite.

10-2. **Theatre-specific Training Requirements.** Each MA or SFA mission will have common theatre-specific training requirements regardless of the area or region of deployment. The most significant of these that nations and NATO should train for are:

a. **Insider Threat Training.** Conducting MA/SFA with HNSF will include insider threats. Units partnered with HNSF and individual advisors/mentors located in various HNSF HQs or operations coordination centres must remain vigilant at all times. Vigilance is achieved by learning, understanding, and recognizing the indicators associated with potential insider threats. Pre-deployment training must make every effort to include examples of insider threat events. Insider threat training is closely tied to cultural training and civilian casualty (CIVCAS) training. NATO SOF pre-deployment training must include insider threat training.

b. **Cultural Training.** As discussed in Chapter 4 on human terrain, understanding the culture of the HN in which SOF are deployed is vital to successful MA/SFA.
Taking the Time to Learn About and Understand the HNSF Culture

“October 1971. The operation to seize a firm base on the jebel was mounted in October of the same year. The Khareef had been spent in building up the firqats to operational strength and preparing them for the coming offensive, and the inevitable slowing-down in the pace of operations had allowed ample time for commanders to consult, plans to be drawn up and stores to be stockpiled. It was a heavy monsoon and not until September did it begin to break. If this operation was to succeed, as it must, the troops would be heavily dependent on air support, both for supply and for fighter-ground attack, so there could be no question of mounting it before air support could be guaranteed. The next problem, however, was religious. The month of Ramadan was due to begin on 20th October, when good Muslims should refrain from eating or drinking between sun-up and sun-down, but to postpone the offensive until the end of November would mean an unacceptable delay. The senior Qadi, the religious leader in Dhofar, was consulted on the problem, and it was agreed that he should broadcast the absolution permitted by Islam to warriors involved in a holy war. The Sultan, who is both the religious and secular head of state, would also publish a letter authorising the firqat and all his forces to disregard the fast.”


Language Training. Basic language training should be built into pre-deployment training. While translators will be employed, it is the advisor/mentor and his willingness to try and use basic components of the local language as soon as he arrives on ground that will help establish trust and rapport between the advisor/mentor and the HNSF. Language training between SOF and the partnered HNSF should be part of the daily/weekly routine when in theatre.

Red Flag. Nations must ensure that those people selected for the role of advisor, mentor, or trainer have the requisite English language skills so that they may fully integrate into the established JTF training mission structure. Sending an individual on a mission with a large English language dictionary in tow will undermine not only their ability to advise, mentor, and train, but more importantly, the MA or SFA mission itself.

Civilian Casualty Prevention and Mitigation Training. As long as guns, grenades, bombs, rockets, and missiles are part of the equation, then so too will CIVCAS. Unfortunately, CIVCAS is the one issue that can lose the support of the HN local nationals and HNSF and make success in the mission untenable. Pre-deployment training should take time to focus on the issue of CIVCAS and explain how a tactical situation resulting in the accidental killing of civilians can have negative strategic and political effects on NATO and the mission. Pre-deployment training should ensure that all NATO personnel and units understand the importance for full transparency and the need to quickly investigate and make amends for any CIVCAS allegations.
e. **Escalatory Use of Force Training.** Tied to CIVCAS training, escalatory use of force training should be part of any advisor/mentor/trainer’s pre-deployment training. This includes understanding the established ROE, the LOAC, and the RoL in the HN.

f. **Improvised Explosive Device and Counter-improvised Explosive Device Training.** MA and SFA will most likely take place in a COIN environment where the majority of threats are asymmetric in nature. Insurgents will use every homemade explosive technique possible to hamper MA activities and HNSF training and operations. Pre-deployment training should include basic IED/counter-IED training. This training should focus on the types of IEDs typically used in the theatre, indicators that will help identify them, and self-extraction procedures.

g. **Anti-corruption and Building Integrity Training.** Military forces typically do not include this type of subject in their pre-deployment training, but it could be beneficial as most MA missions will take place in corrupt environments. The SOF MA operator should be trained to recognize the indicators of corruption and facilitate training with the HNSF leaders to pass on an ethos of building integrity to ensure the HN local nationals see the HNSF as a force of good and not one of corruption. Police forces in one’s home nation should be invited to the pre-deployment training to facilitate anti-corruption training.

h. **Commander’s Guiding Documents and Tactical Directives.** Once a NATO mission is underway, the JTF HQ will develop documents that provide the G&D on how to employ and not to employ tactical assets in theatre. While rotation 1 may not have this benefit, all follow-on rotations’ pre-deployment training should include time to read and become familiar with all operation orders (OPORDs), SOPs, and tactical directives that must be followed when in theatre.

i. **Additional Training Requirements:**

   (1) **Physical and Mental Fitness.** Often with a healthy body comes a healthy mind. The role of an advisor/mentor is a particularly challenging job. It requires long hours where the mind is in full gear. Training for the role of advisor/mentor should try to replicate this environment. Once in theatre, advisors/mentors must find the time to maintain their physical fitness.

   (2) **Health and Medical Support with Focus on Tactical Combat Casualty Care.** Advisors/mentors can easily find themselves isolated and in remote locations where there are no coalition troops to provide immediate medical support. It will be up to the advisor/mentor to provide that medical support to themselves, their fellow SOF operators, and their partnered HNSF. Tactical combat casualty care skills should be taught during pre-deployment training and maintained throughout the deployment period.

   (3) **Anti-terrorism/Force Protection.** NATO soldier should be ever vigilant while conducting MA or SFA. Pre-deployment training should include realistic
training that replicates a situation where indicators are present that imply an attack by insurgents or terrorists. The aim of this training is not to counter the terrorist act or threat, but rather to recognize and avoid it, and bring in the specialists to deal with it directly.

(4) **Interagency Training.** As Chapter 3 identified, joint interagency operations are a must for all MA and SFA missions. Pre-deployment training at the national level, and if possible the NATO level, should include an opportunity to work in an interagency environment. Invite local police, health care, humanitarian aid, and any other emergency organizations to the training. Until one has worked in an interagency environment, it is difficult to truly understand the complexities and skills required to be a successful interagency player.

(5) **Negotiation Skills Training.** Being an advisor/mentor/trainer is about give and take. Unfortunately, most military forces don’t spend much time training in this area because it takes a highly trained and qualified person with the right temperament to become a negotiator. A *my way or the highway* mentality is not going to work. An understanding of the human terrain in the AOO will facilitate this requirement. Those with real negotiation skills should be invited to come teach and take part in pre-deployment training.

(6) **Information Operations Training.** MA and SFA will only work and be successful with HN nationals’ support. Everything that an advisor/mentor/trainer says or does sends a message. Ensuring that the message sent is the one received requires an understanding of Info Ops. Many believe Info Ops to be nothing more than radios in a box, dropping leaflets, and writing news stories. The fact is that every advisor/mentor/trainer is an Info Ops delivery system. Pre-deployment training should create training situations where this fact becomes self-evident and ensures that the advisor/mentor/trainer is forced to say or do something that will have either a positive or negative informational effect on the target HN audience.

| Important Note. | In MA or SFA, every NATO soldier is an information tool. Understanding the 1st order effects of your words and actions, and the potential for subsequent 2nd and 3rd order residual effects, is a must for every advisor, mentor, or trainer. |

10-3. **Training Concept**

a. The successful accomplishment of any NATO mission and the establishment of effective pre-deployment training will be the assigned JFC’s highest priorities. Personnel who receive NATO-led pre-deployment training adapt and perform much quicker than those who have not. Theatre-specific pre-deployment training established by the JTF will be built to ensure the preparation of key staffs and leaders, as well as TCN personnel for service in the new theatre of operations. The objectives for pre-deployment training are:

1. Promote continuity and common standards.
2. Establish mission awareness in individuals.
(3) Ensure functional area competence.

(4) Facilitate staff integration and coordination.

b. Pre-deployment training for a NATO mission is typically conducted in three phases.

(1) **Phase 1 – National Training.** Training required during this initial phase includes completion of all nationally mandated pre-deployment training requirements. Personnel deploying for a NATO operation are required to meet the ACO force standards as delineated in the ACO Force Requirements Volumes II, *Land Forces*, dated Dec 13, and VII, *Combat Readiness Evaluation of Land HQs and Units*, dated Feb 14. Personnel must also meet the requirements as stated in the individual job descriptions of the position that they will be filling. Personnel must be prepared to meet the specific challenges unique to specific theatres.

(2) **Phase 2 – NATO Training.** This training aims at preparing the personnel for their mission by providing one-source knowledge, increasing SA, and ensuring standardization. NATO-led JTF training events and courses will be advertised through calling letters by the JFC tasked for the NATO mission. NATO training will include functional system training and functional area training. The aim of functional system and functional area training is to ensure that those personnel selected to be part of an HQ understand the specific OPLANS, OPORDS, SOPs, FRAGOs, tactical directives, and IT systems related to their desk functions.

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**Best Practice.** During the ISAF mission, the NSOS built and provided a 2-week long pre-deployment training programme that included time to read key ISAF, IJC, and NATO Special Operations Component Command – Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) documents such as related OPORDs, SOPs, and directives. The readings were reinforced with discussions and practical exercises that brought context to the documents. This proved invaluable for those deploying into the NSOCC-A and ISAF SOF HQ.

(3) **Phase 3 – In-theatre Training.** Upon arrival in theatre, personnel should complete an induction course. Commanders at all levels arrange and coordinate in-theatre training (ITT) for their respective commands and units. COM JTF has the authority to direct subordinate commands to plan and conduct ITT to his specification. ITT helps to ensure that joint staff efficiency and operational ability remains high throughout the rotation period.
10-4. **Scenario-based Pre-deployment Training**

a. The world that people live and work in is complex. The behaviours and skills required to solve a simple problem are always multidimensional. And yet training is often developed and executed in a linear nature where a military trainer interacts with the audience in one direction with a frightening array of slides, the content of which is the same as the words spoken. Adults learn little when subjected to this kind of training.

b. During pre-deployment training, repetition is often used to drill into the minds of learners those things that are not to be forgotten. Instead wargames should be used to make the training as life-like as possible and to train people to make judgement calls and decisions when many pieces of information are arriving at once.

c. In scenario-based training, there are no linear paths. The scenario-based situations are complex. Trainees often fail, but learn by reflection and become better at the judgements they make the next time, even though the environment and scenarios presented are different.

**Best Practice.** Scenario-based training is much more reflective of how learning occurs in real life. Mistake after mistake is made, but each individual finds patterns of action and reaction. As a result, better decisions are made as more experience is gained. With that wisdom, one can anticipate reactions to stimuli and act with that in mind.

d. Those nations that create a realistic MA training environment in their home countries prior to deployments have had more success than those who have not. Conventional forces can and should be used to represent potential HNSF to be partnered with SOF. Efforts should be made by national SOF HQs to include as many GOs and NGOs, as well as paramilitary or police forces so that their deploying SOF members have the opportunity to interact and work alongside the multitude of potential organizations that may be deployed in the JOA. By doing so, SOF will understand the complex dynamics involved in planning for and executing MA missions. If the opportunity exists, HN
nationals that live in the respective NATO SOF home nation should be sought out from within their respective militaries or civilian communities and hired to help support some of the MA planning and training.

e. Scenario-based training should be:

1) **Purposeful.** Each student has a history and a future desire that affects their readiness and ability to learn. They see a reason for learning the lesson.

2) **Result of Experience.** All learning is by experience but varies in richness and depth for different people. Students can learn things by rote, but they have meaning when applied to real-world situations.

3) **Multifaceted.** Students will learn more thoroughly when they have the opportunity to engage with more perceptions (such as feelings and emotions), thought processes, and understandings.

4) **Active Process.** It cannot be assumed that the student soaked up the information just because they were in the classroom at the time of the lesson. Learning is assured through interaction.
the NSHQ J7 staff. A hasty pre-deployment training design and development process should be initiated, and a pre-deployment training agenda should be developed based on timelines given by COM NSHQ and Deputy Chief of Staff Training and Readiness. The length of training will be dependent on the information available and the timelines for deployment of rotation 1. As the mission progresses and NATO SOF have been engaged in operations, the pre-deployment training can be adjusted or modified to meet the operational and threat environment.

b. Pre-deployment training design and development (see Annex E) demands creativity that helps challenge attendees to their fullest extent. It must include ample time for discussions, provoking thought, and sharing past experiences for similar missions. A challenging scenario should be developed that allows topics to flow sequentially and builds to a final test or exercise the ties all the pieces of the training together.

10-6. Lessons Identified/Lessons Learned. Building and maintaining a LI/LL repository will be vital to the success of any NATO SOF MA or SFA mission. NATO SOF conducting MA and SFA should make every effort to establish a mechanism to capture LI/LL and make them available to the rest of NATO SOF. Follow-on pre-deployment training supported by NATO SOF should pass on LI/LL to the next group deploying into theatre.

10-7. Summary. Pre-deployment training is a national, NATO, and JTF responsibility, but above all else, it is an individual responsibility. Many of the pre-deployment training requirements are things individual SOF members can be working on each and every day in order to be ready for the next mission at hand. MA and SFA require the SOF soldier who is a self-learner and doesn’t have to be told to start preparing for the next mission. Taking an interest in watching international news and understanding that some of the headline stories have the potential to be the next MA or SFA mission is the first step to pre-deployment training.
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11-1. **General.** The long-term effort to build, maintain, and sustain an HNSF unit capability and capacity is characteristic of SOF MA. The end state should be an independent HNSF capable of being effectively employed and sustained well after NATO SOF have completed the MA mission and returned home. This entails considerations for sustainment with regards to HN politics, organizations, financing, processes, and resources. As already described in previous chapters, sustainment is one of the critical and defining factors that guides the planning and execution of MA. Therefore, it affects all levels from strategic down to tactical.

**Important Note.** SOF as a stand-alone force will not be able to create such sustainable conditions in the long-term independently. They will have to coordinate and integrate with conventional structures from NATO, as well as HN organizations and structures ..

11-2. **Framework for Building Sustainable Forces and Conditions**

a. Sustainment must be factored into planning and execution. Planning must ensure that NATO is able to generate and sustain SOF throughout the MA campaign. This has to cover personnel, financing and equipment, and requires activities from the SOF TCNs, as well as a permanent assessment, revision, and adjustment conducted by the operational and strategic levels. It is a continuous process based on progress, delays, set-backs, and the constant changes in the situation and environment. Secondly, there is the requirement to build sustainable HNSF that are well integrated into the overall HN military structure. This implies SOF coordination and activities within its specific expertise but also in areas where SOF has to rely on conventional expertise.

Figure 11-1. Sustainment Planning Considerations
b. During the campaign planning, the SOCC will develop its MA plan in close coordination with the subordinate SOTGs/SOATGs, as well as with the JHQ. As stated in Chapter 7, the extent and balance of different SOF missions (MA, SR, and DA) is dependent on the specific conditions of the operational environment (permissive/non-permissive, COIN scenario, SOF mission, and tasks assigned by higher HQs). It will most likely affect:

(1) Structure of the SOCC and SOTGs/SOATGs and the related balance between combat and MA elements within the units.

(2) Type and quantity of critical enablers, both organic and supporting conventional.

(3) Requirements for basing and FP.

(4) Type and extent of liaison.

(5) Risks and respective ways and means for mitigation.

(6) Phasing and sequence of SOF activities.

(7) SOF MA approach (balancing training, advising, mentoring).

(8) Timeline and desired effects and progress toward a defined objective and end state.

c. This chapter will focus primarily on the creation of sustainable conditions both for the selected HNSF and the related HN structures required to sustain the force. These elementary conditions are similar to NATO SOF sustainment requirements; they just differ in the moulding due to specific parameters such as cultural specifics or desired capability levels and skills SOF MA plans to achieve. Nevertheless, for understanding, there is a quick review on essential sustainable conditions SOF have to establish and maintain to conduct MA effectively.

11-3. Sustainable Conditions for Special Operations Forces

a. The foundation for a sustainable SOCC and SOTGs/SOATGs conducting MA is laid during the planning for MA as part of the campaign plan. As described in previous chapters, the factor *sustainment* is initially covered in the pre-deployment phase. Deployment and logistics are principally national responsibilities. Therefore, SOTGs/SOATGs will plan for both in close coordination with national organizations and authorities, while the SOCC and NSHQ will support this coordination on the operational and strategic levels.

b. The SOCC, as part of its OPLAN, plans for appropriate deployment and logistical integration into the JHQ logistic structure. This includes the required liaison network and the ways and means to get access to the logistic system of the JHQ most likely via the joint logistics support group (JLSG) and a respective consideration in the day-to-day logistical decision-making process. The majority of SOF MA tactical-level training with HNSF will differ from the conventional SFA mission, but the required resources (e.g. equipment, infrastructure) are mostly going to be the same.
c. Subordinate SOTGs/SOATGs, which have the primary responsibility for MA, will set the stage for sustainment by establishing the necessary conditions in the following areas:

(1) **Personnel.** When the SOTG/SOATG is planning for MA, it will identify quality and quantity of the required SOF personnel to conduct MA, especially over an extended period of time. This includes:

(a) Type and number of specialists
(b) LOs
(c) Rotation planning
(d) Administrative requirements
(e) Required skills of the selected personnel
(f) Pre-deployment training

(2) **Equipment**

(a) Equipment is an important factor for SOF executing MA. The provision of adequate equipment will ensure:

1/ Capability to shoot, move, communicate, and medicate
2/ Conduct FP and mitigate insider threats
3/ Training effectiveness for the partnered HNSF

(b) Consideration must be given to a balanced equipment list. While it is beneficial to use HNSF equipment when conducting MA, there will be the requirement to use organic equipment to perform internal functions and to ensure compatibility and cooperation with other friendly NATO conventional forces. This includes a permanent assessment of whether there is a need to adjust the equipment due to changes in the overall situation or the level of capability and performance of the trained HNSF. SOTGs/SOATGs also have to plan for repair and maintenance of equipment. This may be ensured via national channels, the JHQ, or by existing HN structures (including local economy if appropriate). The overall aim should be a simple and flat structure to ensure timeliness and flexibility in provision and maintenance of mission-essential equipment. Optionally and depending on the type of environment (permissive/non-permissive), SOTGs/SOATGs can procure similar equipment to that of the HNSF. By doing so, the SOTGs/SOATGs may streamline and simplify the logistic chain, support the local economy, and potentially minimize the required number of organic logistic personnel.

(3) **Infrastructure.** Infrastructure is key for conducting MA, ensuring FP, and establishing sustainable conditions for the SOCC and SOTGs/SOATGs. Requirements are identified during planning and further developed by close coordination with the HN, using SOF representatives in a deployed OLRT, as well
as the results of the PDSS. Options for SOTGs may be co-locating bases with
conventional NATO force elements, on HNSF bases, or the SOCC and
SOTGs/SOATGs will decide to establish their own bases. Whatever option is
chosen, planners have to aware of the respective impact on time, required
resources, and the execution of the mission, especially if MA execution is
preceded by build-up of infrastructure.

(4) Logistical Support. Doctrinally logistics for SOF is a national
responsibility. While the SOCC will ensure the provision of the overall logistical
framework and integration into the conventional system via the JLSG, including
the compliance to given medical standards, it is the SOTG/SOATG that will plan in
detail:

(a) Maintenance of its equipment, which can be done within or by the HN
(technical advisors, contractors) or via national resources.

(b) Engineering including other services (e.g. trash, sewage, electricity).

(c) Transportation of cargo or personnel.

(d) Supply, including subsistence; personal equipment; petroleum, oil,
and lubricants; ammunition.

d. When planning for these different topics, the respective SOTGs may identify the
type of support that may be outsourced to regional or local contractors.

11-4. Sustainment and Complexity

a. In the initial phase of the planning process, the SOCC and subordinate
SOTGs/SOATGs will conduct their CPOE. During this process, they will hopefully gain
an understanding of the crisis situation together with the identification of the involved
actors and factors that are influencing the situation. Linked to that are various activities
and efforts in different areas and on different levels. The military is just one tool that is
trying to influence by complementing actions and activities. In some situations, non-
military actors will have the lead and the military will act in a supporting role, mostly by
providing forces to create the security conditions required for others to operate safely and
effectively.
b. SOF, as part of the joint force and a comprehensive approach, have to understand this complex environment, the interdependencies between the different areas, and the inherent challenges and opportunities for SOF MA. This will lead to respective planning and ensure the addressing of specific requirements, either provided by higher HQs, the SOCC, and/or the SOF TCNs. Planning encompasses:

(1) Liaison personnel with appropriate ranks, skills, and expertise.

(2) Effective coordination mechanism and forum, integrating all affected entities and levels and with clearly defined responsibilities.

(3) Integration of non-military approaches and efforts to include opportunities for SOF to exploit.

c. Even when these requirements are covered in the planning for sustainment, there will be a permanent process of assessment and adjustment (e.g. time or forces) to integrate progress and developments with impact on the situation. This may lead to a change in the of SOF MA ways and means to achieve objectives and defined end state.

11-5. **Sustainment Parameters**

a. The implementation of lasting sustainable conditions for HNSF is dependent on various factors, specifically covered in planning and executing MA for a designated SOF MA target audience, as well as in the establishment of durable, effective, and sustainable HNSF structures. This includes appropriate structures and procedures within HN ministries and related organizations, where the SOF MA target audience is either personally nested in or their requirements are appropriately covered and supported.

![Figure 11-3. Sustainment Parameter](image-url)
b. One of the major parameters affecting the establishment of sustainable forces and structures is the human terrain. Cultural specifics, as described in Chapter 4, are a critical influencer and a potential reason for success or mission failure. Historically grown behaviour or mentalities may set the tone for the level of performance or basic capacity of the HNSF. These specifics have to be addressed when SOF are:

(1) Training soldiers, leaders, and specialists (reflecting possible literacy, ethnics, physical standards, etc.).

(2) Establishing or supporting new structures (ethnics, stakeholders, historically grown process and procedures).

Red Flag. SOF MA will fail if it tries to implement TTP or values not standard to or compliant with the cultural specifics of the HN. SOF personnel responsible for planning and executing SOF MA have to understand these limitations and plan for them accordingly into their timeline and concepts. NATO SOF leadership has to ensure that higher HQs are aware of this so that NATO or national political leadership do not develop expectations that SOF at the tactical levels cannot fulfil.

c. A thorough analysis of the HN system and sub-systems, with their relationships, interdependencies, and understanding, is essential for successful SOF MA. Here the focus is on decision-makers and stakeholders with their agendas and interests. This is often linked to the human terrain of the HN since different ethnics and social structures are driving these interests and agendas. SOF will not change these specifics, but needs to understand, incorporate, and exploit to establish the sustainable forces and conditions. At the local level, this will be the SOTG’s/SOATG’s task, but on regional or national levels, it is a task for the SOCC. It will require patience, diplomacy, and building strong rapport with the HNSF counterparts.

d. The best planning and execution of NATO SOF MA is futile if SOF fails to establish and maintain confidence and trust, both within the nations providing SOF, as well as the HN. This encompasses confidence within the SOF MA target audience, HN decision-makers and stakeholders, and the population. It will be the foundation for durable and reliable conditions and support to the HNSF, and it will facilitate sustainment. Therefore, planning for MA, especially when conducting SFA, has to integrate ways and means to assess the progress and reliability of the selected HNSF. Planners have to integrate SOF MA and SFA efforts and results into the overall Info Ops plan, and vice versa to be consistent; always balancing it with the need for OPSEC and FP.

11-6. Special Operations Forces Target Audience: Host Nation Security Forces

a. As already stated, SOF MA will focus on the development of selected HNSF. It is a challenging and complex task and will only be successful with the support of, and in coordination with, higher HQs (SOCC, CCs, JHQ) and other stakeholders (comprehensive approach), as appropriate.

b. When SOF plan for MA, they will simultaneously cover sustainment, as this is an integral part of the overall SOF MA plan. It affects all levels of command and principal
functional staff areas, as there are various interdependencies. Therefore, SOF MA has to incorporate the implementation and integration of appropriate processes and procedures, based on HN requirements and specifics.

c. The foundation for capable and sustainable HNSF is the availability of adequate personnel in quality and quantity. This is influenced by the HN human terrain and the respective interdependencies between the different HN stakeholders, organizations, and/or ministries. Therefore, SOF have to generate qualified HN personnel in administrative areas that are able to permanently cover selection, recruitment, payment, morale, welfare, promotion, and development to ensure generation and re-generation of soldiers, leadership, and specialists. This doesn't necessarily imply that these administrative personnel are selected from the HNSF, being the MA target audience, but these positions do require careful selection and training. It is critical that this audience is sufficiently literate, understands the system, and is able to integrate into it.

d. SOF also have to put emphasis on the careful selection and build-up of qualified HNSF leadership, both for officers and NCOs. SOF have to integrate the need for specialists in all functional areas and their respective selection and training. Linked to that is an effective generation system for personnel replacement, an adequate promotion system, and a tailored-to-the-requirement training and development system. It has to cover training and education and be a part of a training system with approaches to:

(1) Basic and advanced training  
(2) Individual and collective training  
(3) Specialty or cross-functional training  
(4) Centralized or decentralized training  
(5) Train the trainer preparation to establish sustainable conditions
e. Related to that is administrational and structural thinking like the decision to create SOF-specific training areas or academies or the integration into already existing conventional institutions.

f. The SOF priority is the development and employment of credible and operational HNSF. Based on the available HNSF units and personnel, SOF have to develop a plan to ensure this, such as the train, assist, advise approach. Even if the approach is a time-consuming effort, it will ensure a timeline is created for the steady decrease of SOF resources to conduct MA, as well as the steady increase of HNSF capacity and capability. There is a critical interdependency between leadership selection and training, as this affects the establishment of HNSF planning and operations capabilities. Effective selection and training supports the desired end state and the achievement of SOF exit criteria and overall strategy.

g. The developed HNSF will require equipment for training, and sustaining operational effectiveness. SOF MA planners should be aware that the provision of equipment and effective equipment training is heavily linked to national specifics (e.g. literacy standards or national interests). Equipment should be generated (but potentially may not be funded at the beginning of the MA mission by the HN) via HN sources. This will simplify the effort to train the HNSF on handling, maintaining, or repairing equipment to maintain operational readiness. Though this affects SOF pre-deployment training (training SOFADs in HNSF equipment), it will simplify SOF MA effort because the HNSF are likely familiar with it.
Important Note. Planners have to be aware that providing the necessary equipment is just one side of the coin to ensure sustainable conditions. Even more important is generating logistic HN personnel that are able to understand and apply logistic processes and procedures (adjusted to available skills and cultural specifics) within the unit and the HN chain of command, including higher HNSF HQs and/or higher HN civilian ministries. Normally, this will also be a task for SOTG logistic personnel, and as a result, this position will be double-headed. As such, SOTG/SOATG personnel will train the HNSF logistic personnel in their respective functions and responsibilities.

h. Ultimately, all SOF MA efforts are based on the careful selection of SOF personnel within the SOCC and the subordinate SOTGs/SOATGs. In some areas, MA efforts can be supported by conventional SMEs, where SOF skills and mindset are not mandatory for mission success. Additionally, it may sometimes be enough to influence and support other actors within the environment to achieve synergy for SOF. But it remains the primary responsibility of the SOCC and SOTGs/SOATGs to conduct the daily MA with the HNSF.

11-7. Supporting Host Nation Structures

a. Capacity- and capability-building encompass the concurrent reform of HN governmental institutions. Capacity- and capability-building includes all actors, their roles, responsibilities, and actions, so that both can be managed and operated effectively, legitimately, and accountably, thus contributing to a functioning security framework. This requires a coordinated and integrated approach, affecting not just SOF but also higher conventional HQs and other actors (see Figure 11-2) in the operational environment. Like in any nation, security forces are nested in an overall administrative and organizational architecture like the MOD. It provides the framework, enabling all functional staff areas to execute their tasks properly and effectively. There are additional interdependencies with other institutions as well, such as the ministry of finance, the ministry of justice, or the MOI, as all have tasks and responsibilities affecting the operational effectiveness and sustainment of the HNSF that SOF MA is dealing with. In Figure 11-5, some of the interdependencies are shown.
Figure 11-5. Organizational Interdependencies

(1) Ministry of Interior. The MOI normally is responsible for the internal security within the HN. It will execute authority over intelligence services and national police forces for law enforcement. It is the responsibility of the MOI to provide internal security throughout the HN. This potentially includes the external security for MA facilities (e.g. bases, training facilities) for SOF and HNSF. Depending on the environment in which HNSF are supposed to operate (external security or COIN scenario), SOF and its target audience have to coordinate and collaborate with the MOI. Of specific importance is the need to establish permanent cooperation and coordination in the intelligence arena, as it will facilitate operational effectiveness (build-up of HNSF intelligence capacity and facilitation of operations planning capability), as well as support FP for HNSF and SOF. Additionally, the MOI will potentially manage the regional and local administration. SOF, when building credible and sustainable HNSF, have to establish an adequate coordination and integration of SOF and HNSF into this architecture. This includes mechanisms for information exchange, mutual support, and durable relationships because, in various areas, it is the civil administration that will strongly influence the degree of sustainment.

(2) Ministry of Justice. An important factor for credibility of SOF MA and the HNSF is the employment within a legal framework. This credibility potentially affects any support from NATO, SOF TCNs, and the HN population, and may be a permanent challenge for SOF, since often HN values and principles differ significantly from NATO TCN standards. Therefore, it is a key task for SOF to ensure the best possible compliance with the HN legal framework, and it has to be reflected in the MA plan, as well as in the planning and execution of operations. The major responsibility in dealing with a ministry of justice is nested within the JHQ or non-military actors. SOF just have to ensure that their concerns are properly addressed and looked after.
(3) **Ministry of Finance.** It is a common understanding that the budget is the defining parameter for quantity and quality of the security force. It defines the size of HNSF, the amount of money available for payment of the single officer and soldier (directly influencing motivation and the willingness of any potential recruit to join), the size and quality of the necessary infrastructure, and the type and quantity of the necessary equipment for operational effectiveness. Even though SOF may be tasked to provide donations or payment at the beginning, it is essential that in the mid-term the HN is performing this task to ensure sustainment.

b. All three ministries are civil institutions under a respective civil leadership. When exercising civil leadership responsibilities, it has a direct impact on any SOF MA effort, as well as future effectiveness of HNSF. Derived from that, SOF have to plan for:

1. A tailored SOF liaison structure to implement and coordinate SOF-specific and MA requirements.

2. An appropriate selection and qualification of HN specialists (including conventional specialists) that are able to understand and interact with the relevant civilian counterparts.

3. Intensive education of decision-makers and other relevant stakeholders that have influence and an impact on the provision of persistent support to HNSF.

c. These tasks have to be covered by different levels (SOCC and SOTGs/SOATGs), as well as by higher conventional HQs (JHQ) in relation to the respective HN target audience. Often it is related to the human terrain, as ranks, positions, and heritage sometimes make the difference. Additionally, SOF have to consider activities of non-military actors (IOs, GOs, NGOs) as they may operate in indirect support of SOF MA or may pose a serious challenge to achieve progress and success. This implies the establishment of a coordination and deconfliction mechanism to achieve potential synergy.

11-8. **Summary.** It is a complex task for SOF to create sustainable forces and conditions to achieve operational objectives and to contribute to the desired strategic effect. While creating effective HNSF is within the *comfort zone* of NATO SOF, it is a major challenge to establish sustainable structures within HNSF, as they are nested within the conventional HN environment. SOF have to be aware that aside from the various planning considerations they have to integrate, there are a number of other actors and entities that have the lead for the establishment of necessary conditions or the ownership of required resources. Therefore, any SOF MA planning (SOCC, SOTGs/SOATGs) has to incorporate these facts, which will lead to a SOF structure (size, composition) best suited to ensure direct MA or any additional liaison.
# COUNTER INSIDER THREAT FUNCTIONS TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Proactive Functions</th>
<th>Reactive Functions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare</td>
<td>Detect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic</td>
<td>- Set countermeasure requirements</td>
<td>- Investigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Set FP and arming policies</td>
<td>- Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct STRATCOM</td>
<td>- Conduct reactive STRATCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct STRATCOM</td>
<td>- Investigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Warn and report</td>
<td>- Manage consequences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Manage consequences</td>
<td>- Conduct STRATCOM</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Exploit lessons</td>
<td>- Exploit lessons</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct Info Ops</td>
<td>- Disseminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational</td>
<td>- Apply FP and arming policies</td>
<td>- Investigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Set SOPs</td>
<td>- Conduct vetting and screening of CT personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Engage at senior HNSF level</td>
<td>- Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Learn lessons</td>
<td>- Warn and report</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Investigate</td>
<td>- Manage consequences</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct Info Ops</td>
<td>- Conduct Info Ops</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Warn and report</td>
<td>- Exploit lessons</td>
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<td>- Manage consequences</td>
<td>- Disseminate</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disseminate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical</td>
<td>Pre-deployment Training</td>
<td>- Recognize adverse behaviour that is frequent, excessive, out of the norm, repetitive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Practise TTP</td>
<td>- React to the presence of the abnormal or absence of normal</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Cultural training</td>
<td>- Report</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Conduct close quarter marksmanship training</td>
<td>- Warn</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Threat awareness training</td>
<td>- Investigate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployed</td>
<td>- Assess threat and risk</td>
<td>- Concentrate force rapidly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Detailed planning</td>
<td>- Coordinate with other units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Learn lessons</td>
<td>- Reinforce morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Adopt FP and arming policies</td>
<td>- Resume mission</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Look the part</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Guardian angles</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Build rapport</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Enforce access procedures</td>
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<td>- Challenge</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Communicate</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Concentrate force rapidly</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Gain and maintain control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Contain and neutralize threat</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Conduct joint response with HNSF</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Investigate</td>
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25 ISAF SFA Guide 2.0.
PRE- AND POST-OPERATION HOST NATION SECURITY FORCES UNIT ASSESSMENT TABLES

The following annex provides a basic assessment table that can be used as a template by special operations advisory teams to capture and assess pre- and post-operations observations and CMs for HNSF. The operational and tactical environment will vary for each NATO MA/SFA mission and will dictate if additional pre- and post-operations assessment criteria is required. The SOCC HQ will provide further G&D for pre- and post-operations assessment.
## Pre-operation (Planned) HNSF – Special Forces Unit Assessment Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-operation (Planned) Category</th>
<th>Partnered, Enabled, Advised, Unilateral</th>
<th>Security Classification as Required</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Scale 1 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest) or N/A (Not Applicable)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Intel</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>HNSF intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN JPTL vetted</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit RFI to HNSF intelligence organization</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planning/Preparation</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct mission planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>without SOFADs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request and coordinate HNSF QRF</td>
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<tr>
<td>Request for HNSF enablers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Battlespace deconfliction with</td>
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<tr>
<td>adjacent HNSF</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Execution</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Unilateral HNSF tactical C2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plan for safe integration of</td>
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<tr>
<td>combat/supporting arms</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNSF organic mobility</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rehearsed ground SOM</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-operation Procedures</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Planned/briefed SSE/TEO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planned/briefed in accordance</td>
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<tr>
<td>with HN ROE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Briefed detainee handling</td>
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<tr>
<td>in accordance with HN LOAC/ROE</td>
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<tr>
<td>Understand post-mission</td>
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<tr>
<td>requirements to HNSF higher HQ</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incorporated previous lessons</td>
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<tr>
<td>learned in mission planning</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total: Train, Assist, Advise Score</strong></td>
<td>Note: Add additional comments if for the numbers are subjective.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Partnering Information</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of HNSF SFU personnel on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOTG personnel on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOF enablers (MWD, EOD, JTAC, etc.) on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOF enablers (QRF, RW, ISR, FW, etc.) off target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers off target (ISR, CAS, CCA, AW, MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, LEP, etc.)</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner ratio</td>
<td>SPU pax on target/(SPU + JTF SOF pax) on target x 100 = %</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOF Train, Assist, Advise Officer in Command/Officer of Primary Responsibility Comments**

The SOF train, assist, advise team leader should provide additional comments as required.

---

26 EOD stands for explosive ordnance disposal; JPTL stands for joint prioritized target list; SSE stands for sensitive site exploration; TEO stands for technical exploitation operation; JTAC stands for joint terminal attack controller; CASEVAC stands for casualty evacuation; LEP stands for locally employed personnel; MWD stands for military working dog.
## Pre-operation (Planned) HNSF – Special Police Unit Assessment Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-operation (Planned) Category</th>
<th>Partnered, Enabled, Advised, Unilateral</th>
<th>Security Classification as Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase</strong></td>
<td>Scale 1 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest) or N/A (Not Applicable)</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNSF intelligence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warrant</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN prosecutor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit RFI to HNSF intelligence organization</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planning/Preparation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct mission planning without SOFADs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request and coordinate HNSF QRF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Request for HNSF enablers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battlespace deconfliction with adjacent HNSF</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Execution</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unilateral HNSF tactical C2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan for safe integration of combat/supporting arms</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNSF organic mobility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehearsed ground SOM</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pre-operation Procedures</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned/briefed SSE/TEO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned/briefed evidence handling in accordance with HN law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Briefed detainee handling in accordance with HN law</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understand post-mission reporting requirements to HNSF higher HQ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incorporated previous lessons learned in mission planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Train, Assist, Advise Score</strong></td>
<td>Note: Add additional comments if the numbers are subjective.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned Partnering Information</strong></td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of HNSF SPU personnel on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOTG personnel on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOF enablers (MWD, EOD, JTAC, etc.) on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers on target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOF enablers (QRF, RW, ISR, FW, etc.) off target</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers off target (ISR, CAS, CCA, AWT, MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, LEP, etc.)</td>
<td>Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Ratio</td>
<td>SPU pax on target/(SPU + JTF SOF pax) on target x 100 = %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOF Train, Assist, Advise Officer in Command/Officer of Primary Responsibility Comments**
The SOF train, assist, advise team leader should provide additional comments as required.
## POST-OPERATION (ACTUAL) HNSF – SPECIAL FORCES UNIT ASSESSMENT TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-operation (Planned) Category</th>
<th>Partnered, Enabled, Advised, Unilateral</th>
<th>Security Classification as Required</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase</strong></td>
<td>Scale 1 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest) or N/A (Not Applicable)</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intelligence
- HNSF intelligence
- HN JPTL vetted
- Submit RFI to HNSF intelligence organization

### Planning/Preparation
- Conduct mission planning without SOFADs
- Request and coordinate HNSF QRF
- Request for HNSF enablers
- Battlespace deconfliction with adjacent HNSF

### Execution
- Unilateral HNSF tactical C2
- Plan for safe integration of combat/supporting arms
- HNSF organic mobility
- Rehearsed ground SOM

### Pre-operation Procedures
- Planned/briefed SSE/TEO
- Planned/briefed in accordance with HN ROE
- Briefed detainee handling in accordance with HN LOAC/ROE
- Understand post-mission reporting requirements to HNSF higher HQ
- Incorporated previous lessons learned in mission planning

### Train, Assist, Advise Score

| Total: | Note: Add additional comments if the numbers are subjective. |

### Planned Partnering Information

| Number of HNSF SFU personnel on target | Pax: |
| Number of JTF SOTG personnel on target | Pax: |
| Number of JTF SOF enablers (MWD, EOD, JTAC, etc.) on target | Pax: |
| Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers on target | Pax: |
| Number of JTF SOF enablers (QRF, RW, ISR, FW, etc.) off target | Pax: |
| Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers off target (ISR, CAS, CCA, AWT, MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, LEP, etc.) | Pax: |

### Partner Ratio

SPU pax on target/(SPU + JTF SOF pax) on target x 100 = %

### SOF Train, Assist, Advise Officer in Command/Officer of Primary Responsibility Comments

The SOF train, assist, advise team leader should provide additional comments as required.
## POST-OPERATION (ACTUAL) HNSF – SPECIAL POLICE UNIT ASSESSMENT TABLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-operation (Planned) Category</th>
<th>Partnered, Enabled, Advised, Unilateral</th>
<th>Security Classification as Required</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase</td>
<td>Scale 1 (Lowest) to 5 (Highest) or N/A (Not Applicable)</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Intelligence
- HNSF intelligence
- Warrant
- HN prosecutor
- Submit RFI to HNSF intelligence organization

### Planning/Preparation
- Conduct mission planning without SOFAODs
- Request and coordinate HNSF QRF
- Request for HNSF enablers
- Battlespace deconfliction with adjacent HNSF

### Execution
- Unilateral HNSF tactical C2
- Plan for safe integration of combat/supporting arms
- HNSF organic mobility
- Rehearsed ground SOM

### Pre-operation Procedures
- Planned/briefed SSE/TEO
- Planned/briefed evidence handling in accordance with HN law
- Briefed detainee handling in accordance with HN law
- Understand post-mission reporting requirements to HNSF higher HQ
- Incorporated previous lessons learned in mission planning

### Train, Assist, Advise Score

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planned Partnering Information</th>
<th>Note: Add additional comments if the numbers are subjective.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of HNSF SPU personnel on target Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOTG personnel on target Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOF enablers (MWD, EOD, JTAC, etc.) on target Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers on target Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF SOF enablers (QRF, RW, ISR, FW, etc.) off target Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of JTF (air, maritime, land) enablers off target (ISR, CAS, CCA, AWT, MEDEVAC, CASEVAC, LEP, etc.) Pax:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partner Ratio SPU pax on target/(SPU + JTF SOF pax) on target x 100 = %</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SOF Train, Assist, Advise Officer in Command/Officer of Primary Responsibility Comments
The SOF train, assist, advise team leader should provide additional comments as required.
PARTNERING FORCE RATIO CALCULATIONS

PFR is the percentage calculation of HNSF SPU members that are physically on the ground within a defined target area. The target area should be defined as personnel that are *boots on ground* from the outer cordon to the target. This can include enablers that are positioned within the outer cordon perimeter that will be called forward to support with MWDs, EOD, etc. HNSF SPU, JTF SOF elements, and JTF elements that are not physically on the ground within the outer cordon perimeter should not be counted in the calculation of the partner ratio. Figure C-1 pictorially depicts a partner ratio calculation.

![Figure C-1. Calculating Partner Force Rations When Conducting Operations](image)

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27 AWT stands for air weapons team.
# HUMAN TERRAIN: CULTURAL AID MATRIX

1. **Cultural Aid Matrix.** The cultural matrix is an example of a tool that can be used to analyse the environment before conducting MA. Each matrix needs to be tailored to the area of interest and should have heavy input from those with a deep understanding of the cultural terrain in question. The matrix below was developed with Afghanistan in mind, but can be adapted from HN to HN. This tool can help organize information that is available and also highlight gaps in information that may be worth gaining when building one’s analysis of the cultural human terrain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRIVERS</th>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>(EXAMPLE)</th>
<th>ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Biography</td>
<td>ETHNICITY</td>
<td>Pushtun, Tajik, Hazara, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRIBE/FAMILY</td>
<td>Wazir, Afridi, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>EDUCATION/ LITERACY</td>
<td>To what level and how does this influence their decision-making?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RELIGIOUS/ POLITICAL AFFILIATION</td>
<td>What sect/party do they belong to?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERSONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY</td>
<td>Open to outside influence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASPIRATIONS</td>
<td>Social/political/economic desires?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal Code</td>
<td>SEEN AS HONOURABLE</td>
<td>Is this individual seen as honourable?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE IN AREA</td>
<td>What areas of justice/injustice influences this individual?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Family-level Pressures</td>
<td>HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIONS/ CONFLICTS</td>
<td>Tension or alliances with neighbouring village/tribe, village justice?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FAMILY VILLAGE’S ECONOMIC STABILITY</td>
<td>Is the individual’s family village economically secure?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FAMILY VILLAGE’S ECONOMIC/ POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS</td>
<td>What are the social/political/economic desires of this village?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Village-level Pressures</td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH GIROA</td>
<td>Is GIRoA seen as honourable and supporting village’s growth, development, and justice?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH SHADOW GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>If the village is in an undergoverned space, who is the local power broker? How do they influence the village?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL NGOs</td>
<td>Are there NGOs in the area? Are they seen to be doing good work?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRIVERS</td>
<td>CATEGORIES</td>
<td>CRITERIA</td>
<td>(EXAMPLE)</td>
<td>ASSESSMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Drivers</td>
<td>External Pressure</td>
<td>NATO/ISAF</td>
<td>How does the individual and their family perceive NATO/ISAF?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OTHER COUNTRIES</td>
<td>What other countries exert their influence in the area the individual is from?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL NGOs</td>
<td>Are there international NGOs in their village, or positive/negative perceptions of their influence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES</td>
<td>Do international companies operate within the area? Positive/negative influence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DIASPORA INFLUENCE</td>
<td>Do any family members live abroad? Do they have positive/negative influence?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MEDIA AND INFO OPS INFLUENCES (Either local or international)</td>
<td>If known, what type of media sources is this individual influenced by?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Drivers</td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>WATER</td>
<td>Is there water scarcity, and how does this affect decision-making?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BLACK MARKET</td>
<td>Does a black market operate nearby, and does it employ or influence the area?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>Does the drug trade operate in the area, and does it employ or influence the area?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MINERALS/MINING</td>
<td>Are there groups operating or looking to operate in mines nearby? Positive/negative?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Water Conflict Scenario.** This is a fictional scenario based around a water conflict. The threat group, HONTAS, is fictional as are the individuals represented. Utilizing the cultural matrix, determine how Bilal Rakhmon and Kamran Noorzai would interact if they were to meet at a shura. The information gathered on this matrix covers the broad categories of PMESII, and categories can be modified when using this tool for other scenarios.

3. **Conflict/Issues.** Within the Darwesham District, there has been ongoing conflict over the local water source between the inhabitants of the dry lands and the fertile lands (see Figure B-1). Even prior to these water-based conflicts, they have historically had great tensions due to economic disparity and ethnic divide. ISAF SOF is supporting the Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan by identifying potential locations for village stability.
operations (VSOs). This is in line with a *three tribe* SOF effort in helping shape the environment via kinetic and non-kinetic efforts. SOTG 99 has found a village near the Darwesham Dam that would benefit from the Afghan local police VSO programme.

- **Figure B-1. Darwesham District**

4. **Background**

   a. Six months ago, a large dam-building programme was started, funded by IOs (World Bank, USAID). This dam is to be built at a strategic location where enough energy would be produced to provide electricity for the valley. Once completed and operational, there will be enough electricity to sustain a fully functional factory to process canned fruit a possibility.

   b. However, the location of the proposed dam has also been the battleground for many historical conflicts over controlling the direction of the river flow between the Noorzai of the dry land and the Tajiks of the fertile land. The contract to build and employ staff for the dam project was awarded to the politically connected Tajik family, the Rakhmons. This has caused great concern for the Noorzai who are unwilling to see the dam project completed. A roving HONTAS judge went to the dry lands once the contract was awarded to the Tajiks. He offered to gain HONTAS support to destroy the dam in order to not allow this *unjust* construction to occur.

   c. Building of the dam has had to stop due to the number of attacks that have happened at the site. It is believed that these have been HONTAS-led attacks. This is of concern as the area to the east of the dry lands is where the shadow governor, Commander Mullah Akhtar (Obj MOSQUITO), has been increasingly active. He has built support for his cause through an Info Ops campaign building on local fears of the dry-land inhabitants that the GIROA dam programme will divert water away from them, making their enemy neighbours wealthier. This campaign has relied on radio broadcasts and a strong word-of-mouth programme led by influential storytellers since storytelling is the main method of sharing information in the area.
5. **Tribal Tensions**
   
a. There has been a long history of tension between rival clans fighting over both resources and land, with the predominant struggle being over water supply. The Noorzai believe that their currently dry land is blessed and would be even more fertile than the Tajik-controlled fertile land if they had a steady flow of water.

b. There are natural tensions due to ethnic and tribal differences between these areas. However, they have recently been aggravated by the increased international presence in support of the dam and water project. This has been perceived, particularly by the dry land Noorzai, as GIRoA’s effort to favour the fertile land Tajiks. As a result, the dry land Noorzai have engaged with HONTAS, allowing them to conduct attacks within the area to disrupt dam-building efforts and target other symbols of GIRoA’s presence. Noorzai believe that they will forward their own interests by sheltering and assisting the fighters. Commander Ahktar has offered to reward loyalty by attacking dam-building sites and helping gain local control over more fertile neighbouring lands.

c. The Tajik Rakhmon family have been awarded a contract to assist in the building of the dam. Although this is seen by the Noorzai as another example of GIRoA favouritism of the Tajiks, Bilal Rakhamon (son of the Tajik malik) has stated in his contract that he will employ labour from communities in both the Tajik-controlled fertile land, as well as the Noorzai-controlled dry land.

d. Recent events:
   
   (1) December 2011: Shura to promote peace and stability in Garmsir. Maliks from both the Tajik-controlled fertile land and Noorzai-controlled dry land attended this event. Both communities stopped their feuds for 2 months following this shura. However, once the contract to build the dam was announced and that the Tajiks would be running the project, fighting resumed March 2012.

   (2) After the rogue U.S. soldier incident (referred to locally as their 3/11), HONTAS held an anti-GIROA/U.S. rally in the area, backed up with negative rhetoric, which reinforced local support from the Noorzai. The dam project is partially funded by USAID, and there were calls to seek revenge by acting against all programmes linked with the U.S.

   (3) Every year, there is a storytelling competition in the Noorzai-controlled dry area. Kamran Noorzai won this competition in May 2012. He conducted a one-man play and was able to represent the conflict between the Tajiks and Noorzai, including speaking in Pushto for the Tajik roles and Dari for the Noorzai for humorous effect.

6. **Tribes/Families of Influence**
   
a. **Dry Lands**

   (1) The Noorzai tribe occupy the dry belt of land to the east of the dam that is being constructed. The Noorzai are among the most widespread and influential Pushtun tribes in Afghanistan with one of the largest populations of all the Pushtun tribes. The Noorzai speak Pushto. Some speak or understand Dari (a form of Persian) as well.
A portion of the Noorzai tribesmen are sedentary and practise an agriculture-based lifestyle. However, many other Noorzai clans have been traditionally nomadic (Kuchi) throughout history, especially during the time of the Durrani Empire and more recently during the HONTAS era.

Members of the Noorzai clan have been known to be excellent at growing and maintaining orange orchards and growing sweet pomegranates. They move to other parts of the country where they work off landowners’ lands but aspire one day to have fertile land to grow these fruits. Many have moved abroad (e.g. Turkey) to work on fruit orchards.

The Noorzai tribes have traditionally had bloody conflicts with the neighbouring Tajiks in the more fertile areas. These conflicts have been based on a combination of economic strain over more fertile lands, and also due to tensions for being of different ethnicities and not speaking the same language.

The education rate in the Noorzai-controlled dry land is very low, in part due to the lower economic output of the area, as compared to their neighbours in the Tajik-controlled fertile areas.

Fertile Lands

The Tajiks constitute the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. They primarily live in the Panjsher Valley north of Kabul and in the northern and north-eastern provinces of Parwan, Takhar, Badakhshan, Baghlan, and Samangan. Few Tajik people extend into the central mountains. Most Tajiks speak Dari. Some have a basic understanding of Pushto.

The Tajik community is not divided into tribes. They prefer to identify themselves with the valley or region they live in. For earning a livelihood, Tajiks do sedentary mountain farming and sheep/goat herding. Tajiks grow a variety of fine fruits and nuts.

Unusually, there is a pocket of Tajiks in the AOI in the fertile lands. This was due to the land being extremely good for growing high-quality fruit, so a group of Tajiks moved to this land centuries ago.

Aware of their vulnerability for being in an area that is primarily Pushtun, the Tajik Rakhmon family have invested heavily in building strong political connections with Kabul, regardless of who may be in power. Particularly over the past 10 years, the Rakhmons have helped assist counter-HONTAS programmes in the area, as well as consolidated support from other Tajik strongholds near Kabul. As a result, they have received a lot of favourable support from Kabul.

Due to their mistrust of Pushtuns, the Tajiks of the fertile land have made great efforts to keep the Pushtuns to the east in the dry land areas down. They have fought hard over water resources for several decades, as whoever controls the water can ensure a good crop to sell the following season.

Since the Noorzaei of the dry areas do not all speak Dari, and the Tajiks of the fertile areas do not all speak Pushto, it has been challenging to find potential partnerships to broker and end the tense conflict.
APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
NSHQ MA HANDBOOK
DATED

Bilal Rakhmon

POSITION: Next tribal chief (eldest son of malik)

AOO/AOI: Darweshan

ETHNICITY/TRIBE/SUB-TRIBE: Tajik

PHYSICAL APPEARANCE: Approx 35 years old, 6'1" height

SIGNIFICANCE/BACKGROUND:
Son of the Tajik malik with family ties to Kabul. He was educated in Kabul but is dedicated to maintaining his family’s influence and business interests within Darweshan and beyond. He is keen to assist in the establishment and maintenance of stability within the region. He recognizes the importance of security and stability both for his family and business interests.

RECENT ACTIVITY:
Took part in the Peace and Stability Shura held last year and has begun taking more of an active role within local politics. He found the shura to be dominated by elders who are out of touch and whose power is in decline. He feels the main change-makers exist within his own peer group.

Kamran Noorzai

POSITION: Story Teller/Fixer

AOO/AOI: Darweshan

ETHNICITY/TRIBE/SUB-TRIBE: Pashtun, Noorzai

PHYSICAL APPEARANCE: Approx 32 years old, 6'3" height

SIGNIFICANCE/BACKGROUND:
He did have an education locally, paid for by an uncle living in the U.S. Being literate he often reads local and national news sources to the villagers. Due to this, he is respected as a key source of information. Locals will often confide in him regarding local matters. As there are few jobs locally and due to his local influence, he has been paid by HONTAS to share this information. Having seen classmates go on to further education and jobs, he has aspirations for himself and his community to succeed in a stable environment. At the moment, at least, he sees HONTAS as the only way to achieve this.

RECENT ACTIVITY:
His position as a source of local information and his convening power was utilized by Rasul in the organization of the anti-GIRoA and ISAF rally following 3/11.
### 7. Bilal Rakhmon Matrix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRIVERS</th>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>(EXAMPLE)</th>
<th>ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal Drivers</td>
<td>Biography</td>
<td>ETHNICITY</td>
<td>Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, etc.</td>
<td>Tajik (and speaks Dari)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>TRIBE/FAMILY</td>
<td>Waziri, Afridi, etc.</td>
<td>Tajik (This branch moved south due to economy.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td>EDUCATION/ LITERACY</td>
<td>To what level and how does this influence their decision-making?</td>
<td>Well educated. Attended business school in Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>RELIGIOUS/ POLITICAL AFFILIATION</td>
<td>What sect/party do they belong to?</td>
<td>Presumed to be Muslim.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERSONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY</td>
<td>Open to outside influence?</td>
<td>Heavy family connections with Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ASPIRATIONS</td>
<td>Social/political/ economic desires?</td>
<td>Seeks security and financial stability for his region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tribal Code</td>
<td>SEEN AS HONOURABLE</td>
<td>Is this individual seen as honourable?</td>
<td>Not stated. He is next in line to be Malik of his tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE IN AREA</td>
<td>What areas of justice/injustice influence this individual?</td>
<td>Moved to this area despite being a minority group, very cautious about potential threats to tribe’s safety, and very strong links to Kabul to ensure this safety.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family-level Pressures</td>
<td>Family Village’s Economic Stability</td>
<td>HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIONS/ CONFLICTS</td>
<td>Tension or alliances with neighbouring village/tribe, village justice?</td>
<td>Tensions with the Noorzai tribe with whom his tribe have fought many battles, particularly over water.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FAMILY VILLAGE’S ECONOMIC STABILITY</td>
<td>Is the individual’s family village economically secure?</td>
<td>He has secured a very lucrative private sector contract to build the dam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FAMILY VILLAGE’S ECONOMIC/ POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS</td>
<td>What are the social/political/ economic desires of this village?</td>
<td>There is a strong desire to be financially strong and create stability in the region.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal Drivers</td>
<td>Relationship with GiRoA</td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH GIROA</td>
<td>Is GiRoA seen as honourable and supporting village’s growth, development, and justice?</td>
<td>Bilal’s tribe has actively supported GiRoA’s efforts in the past to disrupt HONTAS’ influence in the area by supporting counter-HONTAS activities. Bilal has also attended a Peace and Stability Shura hosted the previous year. Unknown what role he played or how well he was received.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village-level Pressures</td>
<td>Relationship with Shadow Governance</td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH SHADOW GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>If the village is in an undergoverned space, who is the local power broker? How do they influence the village?</td>
<td>Unclear who all the power brokers are. But Bilal is in line to be the next malik of the area. Bilal returned to fertile lands after gaining an education in Kabul to serve his tribe.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Relationship with Local NGOs</td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL NGOs</td>
<td>Are there NGOs in the area? Are they seen to be doing good work?</td>
<td>The World Bank and USAID are building a dam in the area. Bilal’s family deem this to be good work as it is bringing them income and will generate electricity for potential industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRIVERS</td>
<td>CATEGORIES</td>
<td>CRITERIA</td>
<td>(EXAMPLE)</td>
<td>ASSESSMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Drivers</strong></td>
<td>External Pressure</td>
<td>NATO/ISAF</td>
<td>How does the individual and their family perceive NATO/ISAF?</td>
<td>Not specified. One can extrapolate that as they support GIRoA’s anti-HONTAS efforts and that they would be supportive of NATO/ISAF. However, it is not stated if there have been any clashes in the past.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>External Drivers</strong></td>
<td>External Pressure</td>
<td>OTHER COUNTRIES</td>
<td>What other countries exert their influence in the area the individual is from?</td>
<td>It is not specified if this family have links with other countries through family or other relations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Drivers</strong></td>
<td>International NGOs</td>
<td>Are there international NGOs in their village, or positive/negative perceptions of their influence?</td>
<td>It is not specified if there are any.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Drivers</strong></td>
<td>International Companies</td>
<td>Do international companies operate within the area? Positive/negative influence?</td>
<td>It is not specified if there are any. There might be in building the dam project, or for further industrial projects.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Diaspora Influence</td>
<td>Do any family members live abroad? Do they have positive/negative influence?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>International Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Media and Info Ops Influences (Either local or international)</td>
<td>If known, what type of media sources is this individual influenced by?</td>
<td>Unknown. However, as Bilal attended business school in Kabul, he is possibly influenced by the sources of information utilized at that time.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>WATER</td>
<td>Is there water scarcity, and how does this affect decision-making?</td>
<td>Yes. This has been a major cause of tension between Bilal’s family and the Noorzai. As a result, a mistrust has been built over time. It is unknown when the last major clash took place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>BLACK MARKET</td>
<td>Does a black market operate nearby, and does it employ or influence the area?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>Does the drug trade operate in the area, and does it employ or influence the area?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>MINERALS/MINING</td>
<td>Are there groups operating or looking to operate in mines nearby? Positive/negative?</td>
<td>Unknown. It is not specified if this is a mineral-rich area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Environmental Drivers</strong></td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. **Kamran Noorzai Matrix**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DRIVERS</th>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>(EXAMPLE)</th>
<th>ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personal Drivers</strong></td>
<td>ETHNICITY</td>
<td>Pushhtun, Tajik, Hazara, etc.</td>
<td>Pushhtun</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRIBE/FAMILY</td>
<td>Waziri, Afridi, etc.</td>
<td>Noorzai (Durrani-Boor Tareen)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EDUCATION/ LITERACY</td>
<td>To what level and how does this influence their decision-making?</td>
<td>He was educated locally, and since he is literate, he reads the local news to his tribesmen in the area, as the literacy rate is low where he lives. Presumably, this has elevated his social status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELIGIOUS/ POLITICAL AFFILIATION</td>
<td>What sect/party do they belong to?</td>
<td>Presumably a Sunni Muslim.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PERSONAL ECONOMIC STABILITY</td>
<td>Open to outside influence?</td>
<td>Deeply influenced by a desire to improve his economic status.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ASPIRATIONS</td>
<td>Social/political/economic desires?</td>
<td>He hopes for stability and economic growth in his area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tribal Code</strong></td>
<td>SEEN AS HONOURABLE</td>
<td>Is this individual seen as honourable?</td>
<td>Since he is literate and has won the local storytelling competition, these are honourable features. However, it is unknown if his direct family are seen to be honourable and how this impacts how he is perceived.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE IN AREA</td>
<td>What areas of justice/injustice influence this individual?</td>
<td>He does not want to see the fertile land Tajiks continue to prosper at the expense of his village. He feels that the Rakhmon family ties to Kabul put their interests ahead of his village.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Family-level Pressures</strong></td>
<td>HISTORICAL ASSOCIATIONS/ CONFLICTS</td>
<td>Tension or alliances with neighbouring village/tribe, village justice?</td>
<td>Several conflicts with the neighbouring Tajik tribes who reside in the fertile lands. It is his tribe’s belief that the dry lands are very fertile, but that the Tajiks have stolen the water for so long, which is why nothing grows.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAMILY VILLAGE’S ECONOMIC STABILITY</td>
<td>Is the individual’s family village economically secure?</td>
<td>Not very secure. Kamran hopes to use his education to earn an income, and he would like to see his village earning more money.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FAMILY VILLAGE’S ECONOMIC/ POLITICAL ASPIRATIONS</td>
<td>What are the social/political/economic desires of this village?</td>
<td>His tribe is known as good fruit growers. They hope to get the water back from the fertile land so that they can grow their own fruits. They despise seeing the Tajiks, as an ethnic minority in the area, prospering and would like to have political power so they can counteract the Tajiks’ Kabul links.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Societal Drivers</strong></td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH GIROA</td>
<td>Is GIRoA seen as honourable and supporting village’s growth, development, and justice?</td>
<td>Not for this village. They believe that the rival fertile lands have prospered with the help of their contacts in Kabul. They have gained money from the dam project as well, which is a source of tension.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH SHADOW GOVERNANCE</td>
<td>If the village is in an undergoverned space, who is the local power broker? How do they influence the village?</td>
<td>HONTAS have said that they want to help the dry lands gain what is rightfully theirs, which is water from the river that the fertile lands have allegedly stolen in the past. HONTAS claim the dam project will take water away from dry lands, crippling any chance for economic growth. Kamran has worked for HONTAS as a storyteller to pass on messages to his village.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RELATIONSHIP WITH LOCAL NGOs</td>
<td>Are there NGOs in the area? Are they seen to be doing good work?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRIVERS</td>
<td>CATEGORIES</td>
<td>CRITERIA</td>
<td>(EXAMPLE)</td>
<td>ASSESSMENT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Drivers</td>
<td>External Pressure</td>
<td>NATO/ISAF</td>
<td>How does the individual and their family perceive NATO/ISAF?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OTHER COUNTRIES</td>
<td>What other countries exert their influence in the area the individual is from?</td>
<td>Kamran had his education paid for by an uncle living abroad. Unknown if there are other influences in the area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL NGOs</td>
<td>Are there international NGOs in their village, or positive/negative perceptions of their influence?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>INTERNATIONAL COMPANIES</td>
<td>Do international companies operate within the area? Positive/negative influence?</td>
<td>World Bank and USAID have funded a dam project and a member of the dry land’s rival village in the fertile lands has won the contract to implement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DIASPORA INFLUENCE</td>
<td>Do any family members live abroad? Do they have positive/negative influence?</td>
<td>Yes. Kamran’s uncle lives abroad. Unknown if any other family members do. He paid for Kamran’s education, so he presumably has an influence over him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MEDIA AND INFO OPS INFLUENCES (Either local or international)</td>
<td>If known, what type of media sources is this individual influenced by?</td>
<td>He is literate and reads the local newspapers to his fellow villagers as the literacy rate is very low and his skill is very valuable to them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental Drivers</td>
<td>Economic Pressure</td>
<td>WATER</td>
<td>Is there water scarcity, and how does this affect decision-making?</td>
<td>Yes. This impacts this area greatly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BLACK MARKET</td>
<td>Does a black market operate nearby, and does it employ or influence the area?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>DRUGS</td>
<td>Does the drug trade operate in the area, and does it employ or influence the area?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MINERALS/MINING</td>
<td>Are there groups operating or looking to operate in mines nearby? Positive/negative?</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D-2-4
NOTIONAL PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES MILITARY ASSISTANCE

The following annex provides an example of key learning and enabling objectives that should be considered when designing and developing pre-deployment training for MA or SFA missions. The key to the training’s success is the instructors and facilitators provided. Instructors/facilitators should be people who have served in similar MA or SFA missions and SMEs of the different agencies involved. SMEs on the HN and its respective culture are also essential for successful pre-deployment training.

Figure E-1. Notional Pre-deployment Training for Special Operations Forces Military Assistance
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# LEXICON

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Allied Command Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJP</td>
<td>Allied joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALI</td>
<td>air land integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANSF</td>
<td>Afghan national security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOI</td>
<td>area of interest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCOPE</td>
<td>areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWT</td>
<td>air weapons team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BATT</td>
<td>British Army training teams</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAAT</td>
<td>COM JTF advisory and assistance team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CANSOFCOM</td>
<td>Canada Special Operations Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAOC</td>
<td>combined air operations centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASEVAC</td>
<td>casualty evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>component command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>close combat attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCBA</td>
<td>closed-circuit breathing apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCOMC</td>
<td>Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counter-intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>civil-military cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVCAS</td>
<td>civilian casualty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJSOR</td>
<td>combined joint statement of requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CM</td>
<td>capability milestone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>centre of gravity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counter-insurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPD</td>
<td>Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPG</td>
<td>commander’s planning guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPOE</td>
<td>comprehensive preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRC</td>
<td>combat rubber raiding craft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRU</td>
<td>crisis response unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>direct action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCoP</td>
<td>district chief of police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSO</td>
<td>Director Special Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>exclusive economic zones</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2UID</td>
<td>find, feel, understand, influence, and disrupt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3EAD</td>
<td>find, fix, finish, exploit, analyse, and disseminate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FW</td>
<td>fixed-wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G&amp;D</td>
<td>guidance and direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCPSU</td>
<td>general command police special unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDPSU</td>
<td>general directorate of police special unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIRoA</td>
<td>Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>governmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTEP</td>
<td>Georgia Train and Equip Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAOE</td>
<td>human aspects of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNSF</td>
<td>host nation security forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNSI</td>
<td>host nation security infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IJC</td>
<td>ISAF joint command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Ops</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>international organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISU</td>
<td>investigation and surveillance unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>information technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITT</td>
<td>in-theatre training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCO</td>
<td>joint coordination order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHQ</td>
<td>joint headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLSG</td>
<td>joint logistics support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPG</td>
<td>joint operations planning group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPTL</td>
<td>joint prioritized target list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAC</td>
<td>joint terminal attack controller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KIA</td>
<td>killed in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLE</td>
<td>key leader engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEP</td>
<td>locally employed personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LI</td>
<td>lessons identified</td>
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<td>LL</td>
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<td>LO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LOAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>LoO</td>
<td>line of operation</td>
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<td>ME</td>
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<td>MOD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>mobile training team</td>
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<td>NTM</td>
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<td>OCCP</td>
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<td>PIR</td>
<td>priority intelligence requirement</td>
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<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, information and infrastructure</td>
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<td>quick reaction force</td>
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<td>rule of law</td>
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<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
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<td>special operations air task group</td>
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<td>special operations air task unit</td>
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<td>SOM</td>
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<td>special operations maritime task group</td>
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<td>special operations maritime task unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
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<td>SOPLE</td>
<td>special operations planning and liaison element</td>
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<td>special operations partnering team</td>
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<td>SOR</td>
<td>statement of requirements</td>
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<td>SOTG</td>
<td>special operations task group</td>
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<td>SPU</td>
<td>special police unit</td>
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<td>SACEUR’s strategic assessment</td>
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<td>sensitive site exploration</td>
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<tr>
<td>STD</td>
<td>strategic technical directorate</td>
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<td>strategic technical service</td>
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<td>TCN</td>
<td>troop-contributing nation</td>
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<td>TEO</td>
<td>technical exploitation operation</td>
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<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>VBSS</td>
<td>visit, board, search, and seizure</td>
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<td>village stability operation</td>
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<td>WNGO</td>
<td>warning order</td>
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REFERENCES

Part 1: The following bibliography lists the Allied publications and other documents related to this publication. It is provided to supplement the reader’s knowledge of MA and special operations. Unless otherwise noted, only ratified and promulgated publications are listed.

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<tr>
<td>AAP-6</td>
<td>NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions</td>
<td>Apr 13</td>
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<td>AAP-15</td>
<td>NATO Glossary of Abbreviations Used in NATO Documents and Publications</td>
<td>27 Feb 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACO</td>
<td>Forces Requirements, Volume II, Land Forces</td>
<td>Dec 13</td>
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<td>ACO</td>
<td>Forces Requirements, Volume VII, Combat Readiness Evaluation of Land HQs and Units</td>
<td>Feb 14</td>
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<td>AD 83-2</td>
<td>ACO Guidance for Military Medical Services Involvement with Humanitarian Assistance and Support to Governance, Reconstruction, and Development</td>
<td>Mar 10</td>
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<td>AJP-3.5(A)(1)</td>
<td>Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations</td>
<td>17 Dec 13</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>SFA Guide 2.0</td>
<td>1 Jan 14</td>
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<td>NSHQ</td>
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<td>Mar 12</td>
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Part 2: The following are additional references and resources of interest.


G-1


NSHQ Lessons Learned Bulletin, dated 31 Aug 12.


Report by NATO’s Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Center. “Medical Civil-Military Interaction,” dated 16 July 2010


Part 3. The following are suggested open-source materials and courses to engage with in building awareness of the human terrain. This is not an exhaustive list, but provides a strong starting point.

- Center for Strategic & International Studies
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
- The World Bank Country Reports
- The UN Country Reports
- University of St. Andrews, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence
- Kings College War Studies
g. Georgetown University Security Studies Program
h. Catalyst for Change professional development course, NSOS